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1. Introduction 
 
1.1 Background 
Water is increasingly becoming a limiting factor for sustainable economic growth and 
development in many countries. Its allocation has significant impacts on overall economic 
efficiency, particularly with growing physical scarcity in certain regions (Dinar, 2012). A 
growing world population and climate change are posing severe challenges to available water 
resources (Yang et al., 2003; UNWATER, 2007), and the use of water for industrial purposes 
and domestic consumption is putting more and more pressure on the amount of water 
available for agricultural production. Because of climatic conditions, rainfed agriculture is 
very limited, and irrigation plays an important role in the agricultural sector in many 
countries (Dinar, 2012). Worldwide, irrigated land has increased from 50 mln ha (million 
hectares) in 1900 to 267 mln ha today, with much of this increase in developing countries 
(Gleick, 2000). 
Water scarcity may become an important constraint on future food production growth, 
particularly in developing countries (Rosegrant and Cai, 2002; Dinar, 2012). Policies and 
institutions, which are capable of coping with the rapidly increasing demand for water 
resources, are crucial for successful adaption of efficient, equitable and sustainable resource 
use (Binswanger-Mkhize et al., 2010). Governments in different parts of the world apply 
various types of water policies and institutions aiming at achieving objectives, such as 
income equality, higher food production, environmental sustainability, and resource 
conservation. Appropriately implemented policies and institutions can affect decision-making 
processes and motivate water users to conserve and use water more efficiently for irrigation 
and other uses (Dinar, 2012). 
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In China per capita water availability is only one quarter of the world average 
(Falkenmark et al., 1989). In addition, water resources are distributed unevenly across 
Chinese regions. Water scarcity is most intense in the north, while water availability in the 
south is relatively less problematic due to abundant precipitation (World Bank, 2001; Yang et 
al., 2003; Zhang et al., 2008). Current water availability in the north (757 m
3
 per person) is 
almost 25 percent below the water scarcity threshold, while water availability in the south 
(3,208 m
3
 per person) is relatively abundant (Qu et al., 2011). Moreover, due to the monsoon-
dependent and continental climate in the north, rainfall is restricted to a short period of the 
year in that region. Yet, almost half of the Chinese population lives in the north, and most of 
the maize, wheat and vegetables are grown there (Yang et al., 2003). As much as 75% of crop 
output in north China is generated from irrigated land (Yang et al., 2003).  
During the last few decades, Chinese irrigation water institutions have undergone a 
number of important changes. Before the agrarian reforms in China in the late 1970s, 
irrigation water resources were managed primarily through collective ownership 
arrangements. Since then, a variety of institutional arrangements have been established to 
govern irrigation water. They involve the introduction of market-oriented instruments as well 
as institutional innovations such as water pricing, the introduction of water users associations 
(WUAs) (Qu et al., 2011), and contracting out of irrigation canal management to individuals 
(Wang et al., 2010).  
Evaluation of the impacts of policies and institutions on environmental and economic 
outcomes in the context of agricultural water resource management is important for effective 
water policy decision making, planning and management (OECD, 2010). While the economic 
impacts of policies and institutions regarding irrigation water use have gained increasing 
attention in the existing international literature, most economic analyses focus on the effects 
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of different pricing schemes on farmers’ choice of crops, income redistribution, and water use 
efficiency (Tsur and Dinar, 1997; Johansson, 2000; Johansson et al., 2002; Dinar and Mody, 
2004; Tsur et al., 2004; Liao et al., 2008). Quantitative analyses of structural policies and 
institutional change in irrigation water management (e.g. WUAs, water markets) are scanty 
due to limited data availability.  
The case of north China may provide a fertile soil for research on irrigation policies and 
institutions, given the fast growth rates of the Chinese economy, the limited availability of 
water and land resources, and the process of economic and institutional transformation that 
the country is going through. Research is needed in particular at the household level, given 
that it is the basic level at which cropping and water use decisions are taken. Moreover, 
agricultural water management policies and institutions are developed at different layers of 
governments and may have inconsistent effects on farmers’ decisions that often are difficult 
to disentangle.  
 
1.2 Objective and research questions 
The general objective of this study is to empirically investigate household-level effects of 
some major recent institutional changes and policies affecting irrigation water use in north 
China.  
To reach this objective, the study aims at answering the following four specific research 
questions: 
1. Regarding user-based water management (Chapter 2): 
To what extent do differences in WUA characteristics affect the productivity of irrigation 
water use by WUA member households? 
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2. Regarding a government intervention directly affecting availability of water for 
different crops (Chapter 3): 
What is the impact of the water allocation intervention on farmers’ crop planting 
decisions? 
3. Regarding valuation of irrigation water (Chapter 4): 
a. What is the economic valuation (i.e. marginal value) of irrigation water for different 
crops? 
b. How does the introduction of the water allocation intervention (Chapter 3) influence 
the valuation of irrigation water for various crops? 
4. Regarding water trading (Chapter 5): 
a. What is the impact of output market development on irrigation water trading? 
b. What factors impede the functioning of water markets? 
 
 
1.3 Data and Methodology 
1.3.1 Research area and data collection 
The information used for the empirical analyses in this study largely comes from two 
surveys that were carried out in Minle County, Zhangye City, Gansu Province in northern 
China in May 2008 and May 2010, covering information for the years 2007 and 2009.  
In early 2002, the Ministry of Water Resources initiated a pilot project “Building a 
Water-saving Society in Zhangye City”, the first project of its type in the country. One major 
aim of the project was to establish a new water use rights (WUR) system with tradable water 
quotas and to reallocate and use resources efficiently through market-based instruments 
5 
 
(Zhang et al., 2009). Pilot projects typically take place within a limited scope. In case of 
failure it would be stopped, in case of success it would be extended to larger scale (Malik, 
2012). Therefore, examining the effects of different policy measures regarding water resource 
management in Zhangye City is of great importance for the Chinese government to decide 
whether or not to implement the policies in other regions. 
Moreover, one of the six counties in Zhangye City, Minle County (see Figure 1.1 for its 
location), has become involved in the international market of potato production with high 
water requirement, since the entry of a Dutch potato processing company in this region in 
2008. To meet the growing demand for potatoes of the Dutch potato processing company as 
well as two local potato processing companies, the government assigned water allocation 
priority for potato production, in order to stimulate the potato growing in this area. The entry 
of the new company provides a good opportunity to examine the impact of output market 
development – as an external driving factor of institutional change – on the performance of 
irrigation water institutions.  
Household interviews were done in 21 villages and WUAs, 15 households per village / 
WUA, giving us a dataset containing 315 observations1 (see Wachong Castro et al., 2010 for 
a description of the sampling method). Where possible, the same households that were 
interviewed in 2008 were also interviewed in May 2010. In cases where the same household 
could not be found, it was replaced by another, randomly selected, household in the same 
village. This resulted in a panel dataset containing 265 households. It includes information 
about crop production, use of water and other inputs, water trading, WUA participation, water 
and other prices, land tenure and land use, and so on. But due to data limitations, for some of 
                                                 
1 In two villages, 16 instead of 15 households were interviewed in May 2008. The last observation in these two villages was 
included in panel dataset containing 265 households. 
6 
 
the analyses only the cross-section data set for the year 2009, collected in May 2010, could be 
used.  
Figure 1.1: Location of Minle County, Zhangye City, and Gansu Province, People’s Republic 
of China 
 
Source: Adapted from 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Location_of_Zhangye_Prefecture_within_Gansu_(China).p
ng
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1.3.2 Methodologies 
Chapter 2 applies a random intercept regression model to the data set covering 
information over the year 2009. It involves information about 21 WUAs and 315 households 
in the research area. As the dependent variable in the models, two different measures of water 
productivity are used, namely total crop production value and household income from crop 
production, both expressed per m
3
 of water. Explanatory variables in the analysis are derived 
from an established user-based resource governance framework, and are measured at the 
WUA level. As we use hierarchical data in the models with variables varying at two different 
levels (i.e. WUA and household levels), a random intercept method is applied for the 
estimation. 
Chapter 3 estimates a system of unconditional crop acreage demands (i.e. four crop-
specific functions) based on data collected during the two rounds of the farm household 
survey held in Minle County. The dependent variables are the shares of land allocated to four 
different groups of crops. Explanatory variables cover prices of variable inputs, levels of 
quasi-fixed inputs, prices of outputs, and an indicator measuring the water allocation 
intervention. The Seemingly Unrelated Regressions Estimator (SURE) approach is applied 
for estimating the model, as it allows to properly account for correlation in error terms 
between the four equations and to apply cross-equation restrictions imposed by theory. 
In Chapter 4, a system of production functions for the same four groups of crops 
(Chapter 3) is developed to examine the economic value of irrigation water for the years 2007 
and 2009, respectively. Based on initial tests of functional forms, a translog function is 
applied for the estimation, using the same datasets as in Chapter 3. First, a system of 
production functions is estimated econometrically to examine the marginal productivity of 
irrigation water. Second, the internal valuation (i.e. marginal value) of irrigation water is 
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derived by multiplying the resulting marginal productivities with the (average) prices of the 
four crop groups. 
In Chapter 5, a case study approach is used to examine the impact of output market 
development on changes in water trading between the years 2007 and 2009. In the year 2008 
a large-scale potato processing company was established in the research area that mainly uses 
potatoes grown within the same region. The case study analysis builds on the survey data for 
two years and on insights gained through informal field visits to the area. Due to the limited 
number of households that trade water, the analysis does not rely on econometric methods. 
Instead, descriptive statistics and statistical tests are presented to examine differences 
between water traders and non-traders and the factors that drive and limit water trading. 
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2. Water users associations and irrigation water productivity in 
northern China
2
 
 
Abstract: 
Traditional irrigation water management systems in China are increasingly replaced by user-
based, participatory management through water users associations (WUAs) with the purpose 
to promote water savings and higher farm incomes. Existing research shows that significant 
differences exist in the institutional setup of WUAs in China, and that WUAs have not been 
universally successful in saving water and improving farm incomes. This paper aims to 
examine the underlying causes of differences in WUA performance by analysing the impact 
of WUA characteristics on the productivity of irrigation water. Explanatory variables in our 
analysis are derived from Agrawal’s user-based resource governance framework. Applying a 
random intercept regression model to data collected among 21 WUAs and 315 households in 
Minle County in northern China, we find that group characteristics, particularly group size 
and number of water users groups, and the existing pressure on available water resources are 
important factors in water productivity. Resource characteristics, i.e. resource size and degree 
of overlap between the WUA boundaries and natural boundaries, do not significantly affect 
water productivity in our research area.  
                                                 
2 This chapter is based on an article submitted to Ecological Economics in June 2012, as Lei Zhang, Nico Heerink, Liesbeth 
Dries and Xiaoping Shi “Water users associations and irrigation water productivity in northern China” (Revised version). 
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2.1 Introduction 
Water scarcity constitutes a major problem in China, as per capita water availability is 
only a quarter of the world average (Falkenmark et al., 1989; Shalizi, 2006). Within the 
country, water resources are distributed rather unevenly. Water is a very scarce resource in 
the north, while water availability in the south is less problematic due to abundant 
precipitation (World Bank 2001; Yang et al., 2003; Zhang et al., 2008). Moreover, the 
monsoon-dependent, continental climate in the north makes that rainfall is restricted to a 
short period of the year in that region. Yet, almost half of the Chinese population lives in the 
north, and most of the maize, wheat and vegetables is grown there (NBS, 2012; Calow et al., 
2009). 
Growing demands for water, particularly in the north, are putting more and more 
pressure on China’s ability to produce its own food as agricultural production in China is 
highly dependent on irrigation water. In northern China, 75 percent of crop output is 
generated from irrigated land (Yang et al., 2003). The size of the irrigated area has rapidly 
increased in recent decades, from 45 mln. ha. in 1979-81 to 61.7 mln. ha. in 2011 (World 
Bank, 2006; NBS, 2012). The use of water for industrial purposes and domestic consumption, 
however, is increasingly reducing the amount of water available for agricultural production. 
As a share of total water use, the use of water in agriculture has steadily declined from around 
80% in 1980 to 61.3% in 2011 (World Bank, 2006; NBS, 2012). 
Technical innovations as well as water policy and management reforms are required to 
improve water use efficiency in agriculture to meet growing food demands (Rosegrant and 
Cai., 2002; Yang et al., 2003). Farmers in northern China increasingly resort to water-saving 
irrigation systems and cultivation methods, but also greatly increased the use of groundwater 
for agricultural production (Wang et al., 2007; Zhang et al., 2008). As a result, groundwater 
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tables in the Hai river basin have fallen considerably; evidence on groundwater tables in other 
parts of northern China is mixed, however (Qu et al., 2011).  
The management of water resources was mainly done through collective ownership 
arrangements since the implementation of the household responsibility system in agriculture 
at the end of the 1970s / beginning of the 1980s, with village leaders (representing the village 
council) being responsible for water allocation, canal operation and maintenance and fee 
collection (Huang et al., 2009). This traditional management system is similar to the system 
that governed most of China’s rural water resources during the people’s commune system 
period.  
In recent years, two major types of management reforms can be observed in northern 
China, namely user-based, participatory management through water users associations 
(WUAs) and contracting out of irrigation canal management to individuals. Huang et al. 
(2009) estimate that more than one-quarter of the villages in northern China had replaced 
traditional management by either WUAs or contracting in 2004. Their study further finds that 
water availability, length and complexity of the canal system and reform-promoting policies 
of local governments are the main drivers of water management reforms. In subsequent 
research comparing the performance of the three management systems, Huang et al. (2010) 
find that WUAs perform better than traditional management systems in terms of maintenance 
expenditures, timeliness of water delivery and rates of fee collection; management systems 
based on contracting also perform better than traditional systems, although not as much as 
WUA-based systems.  
The impact of WUAs on farm production, income and water savings is examined by 
Wang et al. (2005, 2006, 2010). These studies find that WUAs have not been universally 
successful in either saving water or improving farm incomes, and link the performance of 
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water management systems to the incentives that these new institutions provide to water 
managers. Wang et al. (2010) identifies five key principles that, according to World Bank 
project managers, WUAs should satisfy in order to be successful: (1) There should be 
adequate and reliable water supply, (2) the WUA should be organized hydraulically (not 
administratively), (3) leaders should be elected and WUA management and decision making 
should be with the farmers (without local government interference), (4) water should be 
charged volumetrically (not according to land area), and (5) the WUA should have the right 
to collect water fees. Empirical evidence among WUAs in Ningxia, Gansu, Hubei and Hunan 
Provinces indicates that there are important differences in the extent to which these five key 
principles are implemented, and that the degree of implementation has important implications 
for water use efficiency (Wang et al., 2010). Water use in rice, wheat and maize in World 
Bank-supported WUAs, which mostly operate according to the five principles, is found to be 
15-20 percent lower than in traditionally managed villages. In villages where participation by 
farmers plays only a minor role and water management reforms have been only nominally 
implemented, the establishment of WUAs has had little effect on water use. The study further 
finds that crop yields and incomes are not significantly different between World Bank-
supported WUAs and other WUAs.  
The study by Wang et al. (2010) emphasizes the importance of five key principles 
promoted by the World Bank for successful user-based water management. It neglects, 
however, the potential role played by other factors identified in the literature on sustainable 
governance of common pool resources, such as group size or level of dependence on the 
resource system. A large group size may negatively affect collective management of water 
because it intensifies problems of collective action and free-riding. A high participation in 
off-farm employment among WUA members, and hence a low reliance on agricultural 
production, may reduce the incentives of group members for improving agricultural water use. 
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Policies that narrowly focus on promoting the five key principles may be less successful in 
stimulating water savings through sustainable user-based water management if such 
additional factors that may play a role in user-based decision making are not properly taken 
into account. Empirical research that identifies the relative importance of different factors 
influencing the performance of user-based water management is needed to underpin such 
policies. To our knowledge, however, no rigorous empirical studies of user-based water 
management on the basis of an established framework of common pool resource management 
have been carried out so far in the case of China. 
This study aims to examine the conditions for successful user-based management of 
irrigation water in northern China, based on a framework of sustainable governance of 
common-pool resources presented by Agrawal (2003). We estimate a random intercept 
regression model of the impact of various WUA characteristics on two indicators of water 
productivity, i.e. total crop production value and cropping income, both expressed per m
3
 of 
water. The empirical analysis is based on data collected among 315 households and 21 
WUAs in Minle County, Zhangye City, Gansu Province for the year 2009.   
A number of studies have discussed the conditions under which user groups will 
sustainably govern common-pool resources such as irrigation water (e.g. Ostrom, 1990a, 
1990b; Meinzen-Dick, 2007; Slangen et al., 2008; Binswanger-Mkhize et al., 2010). Agrawal 
(2003) summarizes the conclusions of three influential studies by Baland and Platteau (1996), 
Ostrom (1990a) and Wade (1988) and further extends the set of determinants distinguished in 
these studies. We choose to apply Agrawal’s framework instead of the more recent 
framework presented by Ostrom (2007, 2009, 2010), because it includes relationships 
between resources and user groups and their external environment (markets, technology), 
which may play an important role in the Chinese context.  
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The paper is structured as follows. The next section discusses the research area and the 
method of data collection. In section 2.3 we discuss how we implement Agrawal’s 
framework, present descriptive statistics of the WUA characteristics that we include in our 
analysis, and discuss the expected effects of these characteristics on the productivity of 
irrigation water. Subsequently, in section 2.4, we specify the regression model that we use for 
our analysis and present descriptive statistics for the dependent variables and control 
variables. The regression results of our model are presented in section 2.5. The final section 
summarizes the main findings and discusses their implications for the ongoing water 
management reforms in northern China. 
 
2.2 Research area and data collection 
The data used for our research were collected via a household survey and a WUA survey 
held in May 2010 in Minle County, Zhangye City, Gansu Province. Zhangye City is an oasis 
located midstream of the Heihe River, an inland river that flows across Qinghai Province, 
Gansu Province and Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region. It originates from the Qilianshan 
Mountains in Qinghai province and ends in Juyanhai Lake in Inner Mongolia. In the 
midstream of the Heihe River watershed, the land is flat, sunshine is abundant, and annual 
precipitation is very low while evaporation is high. But due to the availability of irrigation 
water from the Heihe River, the area has become a major grain and vegetables production 
base in Gansu province.  
According to the Ministry of Water Resources (MWR) (2004), Zhangye City is severely 
short of water resources, even though it uses up almost all the water of Heihe River. Only 
50% of the farmland is well irrigated, and much arable land has been abandoned due to water 
shortage. Agriculture accounts for approximately 95% of all water use and almost all water in 
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the Heihe River is extracted for irrigation use. As a result, too little water flows into Juyanhai 
Lake; the lake dried out in 1992, turning an area of 200 km
2
 around the lake into a desert 
(MWR, 2004; Zhang et al., 2009).  
To deal with these problems, the MWR initiated a pilot project called ‘Building a Water-
saving Society in Zhangye City’ in 2002. The project, the first project of its type in the 
country, was designed to save water through government investments in a water-saving 
irrigation system and in meters for measuring water use and through establishing a water use 
rights (WUR) system with tradable water quotas. The first two measures decreased irrigation 
water use somewhat, but trading of WUR did not become popular (Zhang et al., 2009). 
Minle County, one of the six counties in Zhangye City, is located between the foothills of 
the Qilian Mountains and the lower lying Hexi corridor. Its total cultivated land area equals 
860,000 mu
3
, with irrigated land constituting 67 percent. Major crops in Minle County 
include barley, wheat, maize, sesame, rapeseed, garlic and potato. Surface water is the major 
water resource for irrigated agriculture in the area. Due to the high costs of pumping water 
from the wells, the use of groundwater is less than 5 percent of total water use in irrigated 
agriculture (source: Water Bureau of Minle County).  
Agricultural land in Minle County is usually divided into three zones with different 
planting conditions and water requirements. Zone 1 has an elevation ranging from 1,600 to 
2,000 meters. Precipitation in this zone is relatively scarce. Zone 2 is located between 2,000 
and 2,200 meters, while zone 3 has an elevation ranging from 2,200 to 2,600 meters. By far 
the largest zone is the second one, with 500,000 mu of cultivated land, followed by the first 
and third zones, with 190,000 and 170,000 mu respectively. Due to the relatively high rainfall 
in zone 3, it relies less on irrigation than the other two zones. 
                                                 
3 15 mu equals one hectare. 
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The water used for surface irrigation is stored in seven reservoirs in the Qilianshan 
mountains, serving five irrigation areas within Minle County. Five water management 
bureaus (WMBs), one for each of the five irrigation areas, arrange the water allocations to 
WUAs within their own irrigation area. WUAs are responsible for arranging the water 
distribution to households belonging to their own WUA. WUA are sub-divided into water 
users groups (WUGs), consisting of households having plots along the same channel. Since 
the plots of different households within a WUG are irrigated at the same time, households 
belonging to a WUG need to coordinate their planting decisions and water demands.  
Irrigation is carried out by flooding adjacent farmland at the same time, organized from 
lowest to highest altitudes, with villages in the first zone receiving more irrigation rounds 
(generally three) per year than the villages in the other two zones (generally one or two 
rounds). Standard water quantities per mu are assigned for each irrigation round, but these 
quantities are only realized in years of abundant rainfall. Water is allocated according to a 
quota system based on the size of the so-called WUR land of the farmers. Not all the irrigated 
land is classified as WUR land. Its size depends on the labor provided by a village to the 
construction of the reservoir and some other factors (like WUR land obtained through 
auctions).  
The household survey and WUA survey data used in this study were collected in May 
2010 by staff and students from Gansu Academy of Social Sciences in Lanzhou, Gansu 
Agricultural University in Lanzhou, and Nanjing Agricultural University. The data cover 
information for the year 2009. Household interviews were done in the same 21 villages where 
a similar household survey was held in May 2008
4
 (see Wachong Castro et al., 2010 for a 
description of the sampling method). This resulted in a household-level dataset containing 
315 observations. Because some crucial information needed for the analysis in this study is 
                                                 
4 In the survey carried out in May 2010, we interviewed 265 households that were also interviewed two years before. The 
other 50 households could not be found, and were replaced by other randomly selected households within the same village. 
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missing in the data set for 2007, we only use the data set for 2009. It contains information 
about crop production, use of water and other inputs, WUA participation, water and other 
prices, land tenure and land use, and so on.  
For the WUA survey, we interviewed leaders of WUAs in the same 21 villages. The 
WUA survey covers information about water allocation, water trading and water exchange 
between WUAs, water-saving and canal maintenance activities, WUA management, income 
and expenditures of WUAs, and so on.  
To obtain more background information, the WMBs of the seven irrigation areas in 
Minle County were interviewed by the first author in August 2010. Questions asked during 
these interviews include the water allocation to WUAs within each irrigation area, the 
contents and participants of water management meetings organised by the WMBs, payments 
for water by the WUAs, and so on. 
 
2.3 Characteristics of the examined WUAs 
In this section, we use Agrawal’s theoretical framework (Agrawal, 2003) to examine the 
characteristics of the 21 surveyed WUAs in Minle County and to develop hypotheses on their 
expected effects on sustainable irrigation water management. In doing so, we focus on one 
major aspect of sustainable water management, namely water productivity. The discussion in 
this section will follow the same grouping of characteristics as in Agrawal’s framework, but 
is limited to the characteristics for which information is available and show a sufficient 
degree of variation in our data set.
5
  
 
                                                 
5 Variables dropped due to a very small degree of variation include the share of ethnic minorities among the member 
households (as an indicator of shared norms) and (former) village leadership of the WUA leader (as an indicator of 
appropriate leadership). 
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Characteristics of the resource 
We take the following two resource characteristics identified by Agrawal (2003) into 
account in our analysis.  
 Resource size 
We use the length of 2
nd
 level canals within a WUA as an indicator of the size of water 
resources. In our research area, 1
st
 level canals feed water from the reservoir to 2
nd
 level 
canals. WUAs distribute the water from the 2
nd
 level canals that they manage over the 3
rd
 and 
4
th
 level canals. Farmers’ fields are usually located alongside the 4th level canals. The length 
of the 2
nd
 level canals varies from 0.3 to 20 km for the WUAs in our sample, with an average 
length of 5.68 km (see Table 2.1). We expect that water productivity is higher in WUAs with 
a smaller size, as measured by the length of their 2
nd
 level canals, because water use is easier 
to monitor in relatively small resource systems (Ostrom, 2009; Agrawal, 2003).  
 Resource boundaries 
Well-defined resource boundaries make it easier to exclude outsiders from using the 
resource. The boundaries of all the 21 WUAs that we use in the regression analysis 
correspond to the boundaries of administrative villages. All resource boundaries therefore 
seem to be well-defined in our sample. As a consequence we do not include an indicator for 
this resource characteristic in our analysis of water productivity.  
Village boundaries, however, often do not correspond to the natural boundaries of the 
water resource. Some WUAs are located along one 2
nd
 level canal, while others are located 
along two, or even three or four, 2
nd
 level canals (see Table 2.1). We use the number of 2
nd
 
level canals in a WUA as an indicator of the degree of overlap between the WUA boundaries 
and the natural boundaries, and expect that WUAs with fewer 2
nd
 level canals have a higher 
productivity of water use.  
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Table 2.1: Descriptive statistics of WUA characteristics  
 
Indicators Unit Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Resource characteristics 
Length of 2
nd
 level canals km 5.68 5.61 0.3 20 
Number of 2
nd
 level canals  2.05 0.86 1 4 
Group characteristics 
Number of households  276 190 37 630 
Age of WUA leader Years 46.3 6.76 35 59 
Share of households with per capita land  > 
twice the average 
% 5.80 11.1 0 40 
Number of WUGs  8.29 4.71 3 20 
Share of poor households % 28.8 25.1 0 90 
Relationship between resource and group characteristics 
Share of households with migrant heads % 35.2 22.8 0.83 75.2 
Water demand at current water price level 
10,000 
m
3
/hh 
0.572 0.426 0.02 1.44 
Governance 
Expenses on guards per mu of WUR land RMB/mu 0.22 0.34 0 1.24 
Involvement of WUA in cropping decision  1=yes, 
0=no 
0.33 0.48 0 1 
External environment 
Percentage of land planted with marketed crops % 8.16 6.47 0 28.3 
 
 
Group characteristics 
Five group characteristics, that are expected to facilitate institutional success in the 
sustainable governance of common pool resources in Agrawal’s framework, are included in 
our empirical analysis.  
 Group size 
We use the number of households within a WUA as an indicator of group size. It varies 
from 37 to 630 in our sample, with a mean size of 276 households (see Table 2.1). We expect 
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that WUAs with fewer households have higher water productivity, because small groups can 
overcome problems of collective action and free-riding more easily. 
 Group leadership 
Appropriate leadership facilitates efficient rules setting, and therefore is expected to 
stimulate higher water productivity. According to Agrawal (2003), appropriate leadership 
requires that the group leader is young, familiar with changing external environments, 
connected to local traditional elite. Among these our dataset only includes information about 
the age of WUA leader, which is used as an indicator of group leadership in the analysis. It 
ranges from 35 to 59 in our sample, with a mean value of 46. Although young leaders may be 
more familiar with changing external circumstances,  relatively old leaders may receive more 
respect from member households and therefore be able to establish more efficient rules. 
Hence, the impact of the age of the leader on water productivity may be positive or negative.   
 Heterogeneity of endowments 
Heterogeneity of endowments is expected to have a positive effect on resource 
management, through enhancing the possibility of collective action (Baland and Platteau, 
1996). The underlying argument is that organizing a community for collective action involves 
large start-up costs; wealthy elites that have a relatively large economic interest in the 
resource can afford to invest extra effort in initiating and maintaining collective action as they 
stand to benefit most from sustainable collective management of the resource (Nagendra, 
2011). Because use of irrigation water is closely linked to land endowments, we use the 
proportion of households with per capita land more than twice the average
6
 as an indicator of 
endowment heterogeneity. Its value varies from 0 to 40% in our sample, with an average 
value of 5.8%. We expect a positive relationship between this variable and water productivity. 
 Homogeneity of interests 
                                                 
6 The average of households within the same village. 
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WUAs with members having a relatively high degree of homogeneity of identities and 
interests are more likely to have common concerns. In our analysis, joint interests in 
agricultural production and water savings are likely to be an important factor in water 
productivity. These interests are expected to be very similar within WUGs, but may differ 
considerably between WUGs. We therefore use the number of WUGs within a WUA as an 
indicator of the homogeneity of interests (in agriculture and water savings), and expect that it 
is negatively related to water productivity. The value of this variable varies from 3 to 20, with 
a mean value of 8.29 (see Table 2.1).  
 Poverty level 
Poor households are expected to be more interested in achieving individual rather than 
common goals. We use the proportion of households with an income lower than 1,200 RMB 
per capita per year, which is the poverty line of Gansu Province in 2009, as an indicator of 
the level of poverty in a WUA. Using this definition, the share of poor households ranges 
between 0 and 90% for the WUAs in our sample, with an average value of 28.8%. We expect 
that WUAs with relatively low poverty shares have higher water productivity. 
 
Relationship between resource and group characteristics 
A third category identified in Agrawal’s framework reflects the relationship between 
resource characteristics and group characteristics. We use two indicators of such relationships 
in our analysis.    
 Resource dependence 
In successful cases of self-organization, users are either dependent on the resource 
system for a substantial portion of their livelihoods or attach high value to the sustainability 
of the resource. Otherwise, the costs of organizing and maintaining a self-governing system 
may not be worth the effort (Ostrom, 2009). We use the share of households in a WUA with 
heads that migrate at least six months per year as an indicator of the degree of dependence of 
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the resource. Its value varies from 0.8 to 75.2%, with a mean value of 35.2%.
7
 We expect that 
WUAs with a higher share of migrating household heads have lower water productivity.  
 Level of demand 
High levels of user demand may increase the possibilities of conflicts among users, 
which are expected to be negatively related with successful joint action (Agrawal, 2003; 
Ostrom, 2009). On the other hand, when users’ demand for water is high, they may have 
more incentives for saving water use. In the survey, a question was included that asked the 
amount of water that the WUA was willing to buy, if there were no constraints, at the current 
water price level. The resulting water demand level divided by the number of households 
within a WUA is used as the indicator of the level of demand in our analysis. Its value varies 
from 200 to 14,400 m
3
 for the WUAs in our sample, with a mean value of 5,720 m
3
. The 
impact of this variable on water productivity is indeterminate.  
 
Governance 
8
 
Our data set contains information on two variables that reflect the governance and 
institutional arrangements within WUAs.   
 Monitoring processes 
Adequate monitoring of water use is essential for a proper functioning of WUAs and for 
increasing water productivity levels. The use of surface water for irrigation is measured in a 
similar way throughout Minle County as part of the water-saving pilot project in Zhangye 
City (see section 2.2). Important differences exist, however, in expenses on guards that 
prevent water stealing. Prevention of water stealing may affect successful joint action in 
irrigation water use and therefore also result in higher water productivity. Expenses on guards 
                                                 
7 These values are based on the answers provided by the leaders of WUAs. The variation in actual migration rates of 
household heads may be less extreme than these answers suggest.  
8 The terminology used for this set of characteristics resembles more closely the terminology in Ostrom (2009).  
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vary from 0 to 1.24 RMB per mu for the WUAs in our sample, with a mean value of 0.22 
RMB (see Table 2.1). Guards may increase water productivity by reducing water stealing, but 
expenses on guards may be higher in WUAs where more water stealing occurs. Hence, the 
expected impact of this variable on household water productivity is indeterminate. 
 Operational rules 
A bottom-up approach to rules setting and enforcement is seen as an important factor in 
sustainable joint resource management. In Agrawal’s framework this means that governments 
should not interfere in the way WUAs operate. In a similar vein, we may argue that WUA 
interference in households’ decisions may negatively affect water productivity of member 
households. On the other hand, WUA decisions are taken jointly by member households 
instead of an outside authority with limited knowledge of local conditions. Hence, it is 
unclear a priori whether WUA involvement in cropping decisions has a positive or a negative 
impact on water productivity of its member households. We use a dummy variable that 
reflects whether or not the WUA is involved in cropping decisions made by households as an 
indicator of WUA interference. Of the households in our sample, 33% report WUA 
involvement in their cropping decisions (see Table 2.1).  
 
External environment 
A distinguishing feature of Agrawal’s framework is the emphasis placed on the impact of 
the external environment on successful management of the commons. Our data set allows us 
to include one external factor in the analysis.  
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Articulation with external markets 
External markets form an important external stress factor on resource systems. The level 
of articulation with external markets is therefore expected to affect water productivity 
negatively. We use the proportion of land planted with marketed crops as an indicator of this 
factor. Its value varies from 0 to 28.3% in our dataset, with an average value of 8.16%.  
 
 
2.4 Model specification 
The econometric model that we use for our empirical analysis explains irrigation water 
productivity of WUA member households from the WUA characteristics discussed in section 
2.3. Water productivity is an indicator of the performance of irrigation systems (Keller et al., 
1996), and is a measure of partial productivity that indicates how efficiently the system 
converts water into valuable outputs (Molden et al., 1998). The assessment of water 
productivity has attracted attention from many researchers (e.g. Clemmens and Molden, 2007; 
Kassam et al., 2007; Rockstrom and Barron, 2007; Steduto et al., 2007).  
The two dependent variables in the model that we will examine are total crop production 
value and household income from crop production
9
, both expressed per m
3
 of water. The first 
indicator measures water savings achieved by either using water saving irrigation techniques 
and management methods or by changes in crop choice. These water savings not only affect 
the total production value of crops, but may also affect the costs of inputs (including 
irrigation water) that farmers use for growing these crops and hence the profits that farmers 
make. To examine these consequences, we also run a regression with household cropping 
income per m
3
 of water as dependent variable.    
                                                 
9 Income is calculated as revenues, incl. the value of own food consumption, minus costs of input use, incl. water fees paid 
by households. 
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Table 2.2: Descriptive statistics of dependent variables 
Variables 
Unit No. of 
observ. 
Mean Std. Dev. 
Min Max 
Crop production value 
per m
3 
of water 
RMB/m
3
 
302 1.96 1.57 0.29 13.5 
Cropping income per m
3
 
of water 
RMB/m
3
 
302 1.12 1.49 -4.76 11.2 
 
Table 2.2 shows the descriptive statistics of the two dependent variables. The total value 
of crops harvested by farmers in the research region equals on average 1.96 RMB per m
3
 of 
irrigation water, while average cropping income amounts to 1.12 RMB per m
3
 of water.  
Besides WUA characteristics, we include agricultural production inputs and agro-
ecological zone dummies in the model to control for differences in water productivity caused 
by conventional factors. This gives the following specification for the regression model: 
ijijijjij DFWfWP  ),,(    for i= 1,...,315, j= 1,...,21               (2.1)
      
Where: 
WPij = Water productivity for household i in WUA j ; 
Wj = Set of 12 WUA characteristics for WUA j ; 
Fij = Set of 10 agricultural production inputs for household i in WUA j; 
Dj= Set of two agro-ecological zone dummies for WUA j;   
ij = Random disturbance terms with standard properties.  
As specified in from equation (2.1), we use hierarchical data in the model, with WUA 
characteristics and agro-ecological dummies varying between WUAs, but not within WUAs, 
and production inputs varying at the household level. A suitable method to estimate linear 
models in which the explanatory variables vary at two or more different levels is the random 
intercept model (Cameron and Trivedi, 2009). We assume that the problem of reverse 
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causality is negligible for the characteristics in the model, because the model is estimated 
from household data. The WUAs in the research area consist on average of 276 households, 
so if the water productivity of an individual household would affect one of the characteristics 
of the WUA to which it belongs, its impact will be very small.   
Descriptive statistics of the 12 WUA characteristics, and the expected impact of each 
indicator on water productivity, were discussed in Section 2.3. In addition, ten agricultural 
production factors and variable inputs and two agro-ecological zone dummies are included as 
control factors in the regression equations. 
 
Table 2.3: Descriptive statistics of other explanatory variables 
Variables Unit No. of 
observ. 
Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Agricultural production inputs 
Land  mu 312 19.6 11.1 1.60 71.3 
Labour  days 310 145 126 6.0 862 
Machines  RMB 310 1026 755 45 4680 
Water  m3 308 8880 6409 544 42800 
Fertilizer jin 312 3872 2534 360 15312 
Seed  jin 309 1264 773 13 3960 
Fertility of land 1= good, 
0= otherwise 
312 0.58 0.49 0 1 
Slope of land 1= flat,  
0= otherwise 
312 0.96 0.20 0 1 
Age of head Years 315 46.4 10.2 23 78 
Education of head Years 314 7.52 3.51 0 15 
Agro-ecological zones 
D1 1= zone 1 
0= otherwise 
315 0.23 0.42 0 1 
D2 1= zone 2 
0= otherwise 
315 0.62 0.49 0 1 
 
Besides cultivated land size, labour input, machines value, irrigation water use and 
fertilizer and seed use, we also include two indicators of the quality of the land and two 
human capital indicators in the regression model. All these variables are expected to have a 
positive impact on crop production value per unit water. Their impact on cropping income 
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per unit water is indeterminate, except for the two land quality variables, because the costs of 
using inputs may be larger than the productivity gains they generate.    
Two dummy variables are included in the regression equation to control for the 
differences in agro-ecological conditions between the three zones in Minle County (see 
section 2.2). Crops planted at higher altitudes need less irrigation water. Hence, the dummies 
for zone 1 and zone 2 are both expected to have a negative impact on water productivity.  
Table 2.4: Expected effects of explanatory variables 
Variable  Expected 
effect 
Resource characteristics 
Length of 2nd level canals  – 
Number of 2nd level canals – 
Group characteristics 
Number of households – 
Age of WUA leader  +/– 
Households with per capita land more than twice the average  + 
Number of water users groups – 
Share of poor households  – 
Relationship between resource and group characteristics 
Share of households with migrant heads – 
Water demand at current water price level +/– 
Governance 
Expenses on guards per mu of WUR land  +/- 
Involvement of WUA in cropping decision (1=yes, 0=no) +/– 
External environment 
Share of land planted with marketed crops  – 
Agricultural production inputs  
Land  + (+/-)
1
 
Labour  + (+/-) 
Machines  + (+/-) 
Water  + (+/-) 
Fertilizer + (+/-) 
Seed  + (+/-) 
Fertility of land (1=good, 0=otherwise) + 
Slope of land (1=flat, 0=otherwise) + 
Age of head  + (+/-) 
Education of head  + (+/-) 
Agro-ecological zones 
D1 (1=zone 1, 0=otherwise) – 
D2 (1=zone 2, 0=otherwise) – 
1
: Expected sign in cropping income equation is listed between brackets 
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The expected signs of the impact of each of the WUA characteristics (discussed in 
section 2.3) and control variables (discussed in the current section) on water productivity are 
summarised in Table 2.4. 
We use a Cobb-Douglas specification for the agricultural production inputs, with (the 
logarithms of) land size, labour input, machines value, fertilizer use and seed use expressed 
per unit water, and dummy variables entering the model in a linear way. For reasons of 
consistency, we enter the WUA characteristics in a similar way into the model, i.e. using 
logarithmic transformations for all variables except the dummy variables. Four of the non-
dummy explanatory variables, namely share of households with per capita land exceeding 
twice the average, share of poor households, expenses on guards and education of head, have 
a number of zero observations. We use the method proposed by Battese (1997) for estimating 
a model with logarithmic transformations of these variables.  
 
2.5 Regression results 
Equation (2.1) was estimated for the 315 households in our data set using the random 
intercept method. Table 2.5 shows the regression results for each of the two dependent 
variables. Due to missing data for a number of variables, the sample size for the crop 
production value equals 302. In addition, we dropped 30 households with negative crop 
incomes for the estimation of the crop income equation. This gave us 272 observations for 
estimating that equation.  
Table 2.5: Regression results for water productivity, random intercept model 
 ln(Crop production 
value/Water)  
ln(Cropping income/ 
Water)  
Resource characteristics 
ln(Length of 2
nd
 level canals)  
 
-0.052 
(-0.93) 
0.132 
(1.06) 
ln(Number of 2
nd
 level canals) -0.143 0.105 
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(-1.40) (0.45) 
Group characteristics 
ln(Number of households) -0.275 *** 
(-2.91) 
-0.735 *** 
(-3.35) 
ln(Age of WUA leader)  -0.251 
(-0.99) 
1.32 ** 
(2.24) 
ln(Share of households with per capita 
land > twice the average)  
0.303 *** 
(3.90) 
0.533*** 
(3.12) 
ln(Number of water users groups) 0.409 *** 
(3.27) 
0.846*** 
(2.91) 
ln(Share of poor households)  -0.064 
(-1.41) 
-0.126 
(-1.19) 
Relationship between resource and group characteristics 
ln(Share of households with migrant heads)  0.076 * 
(1.87) 
0.098 
(1.08) 
ln(Water demand at current price)  -0.161 ** 
(-2.32) 
-0.026 
(-0.17) 
Governance 
ln(Expenses on guards)  -0.014 
(-0.72) 
-0.010 
(-0.23) 
Involvement of WUA in cropping decision 
(1=yes, 0=no) 
0.204 *** 
(2.93) 
0.582*** 
(3.62) 
External environment 
ln(Share of land planted with marketed 
crops)  
-0.094 
(-0.97) 
-0.432 * 
(-1.89) 
Agricultural production inputs 
ln(Land/Water) 0.620 *** 
(6.92) 
0.920*** 
(4.31) 
ln(Labour/Water) 0.004 
(0.12) 
0.064 
(0.97) 
ln(Machines/Water) 0.021 
(0.53) 
0.052 
(0.59) 
ln(Water)  -0.012 
(-0.30) 
0.251 ** 
(2.54) 
ln(Fertilizer /Water) 0.161*** 
(2.63) 
-0.023 
(-0.16) 
ln(Seed/Water) 0.081 
(1.63) 
-0.047 
(-0.42) 
ln(Age of head)  
 
0.032 
(0.32) 
-0.082 
(-0.36) 
ln(Education of head) 
 
-0.004 
(-0.13) 
-0.069 
(-0.94) 
Fertility of land  
(1=good, 0=otherwise) 
0.076 
(1.60) 
0.198 * 
(1.82) 
Slope of land  
(1=flat, 0=otherwise) 
0.230 ** 
(2.02) 
0.008 
(0.03) 
Agro-ecological zones 
D1 
(1=zone 1, 0=otherwise) 
-0.271 ** 
(-2.17) 
-0.192 
(-0.69) 
D2  
(1=zone 2, 0=otherwise) 
-0.366*** 
(-2.93) 
-0.130 
(-0.46) 
Intercept  5.62*** 
(5.52) 
2.55 
(1.08) 
Number of observations 302 272 
Number of WUAs 21 21 
30 
 
R
2
 (overall) 0.67 0.37 
Wald chi2 539.86*** 141.63 *** 
Notes: *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively. z-statistics are 
in parentheses. 
 
The results indicate that resource characteristics do not significantly affect water 
productivity. Both the length of the 2
nd
 level canals and the number of those canals within a 
WUA do not have a statistically significant impact on the productivity of water among farm 
households in our sample
10
. Hence, the hypothesis that water productivity is notably higher in 
smaller water resources, because water misuse is easier to monitor, is rejected for our 
research area.  
On the other hand, several group characteristics are found to play a significant role in 
achieving water savings. Three out of the five examined group characteristics have a strongly 
significant impact of a household’s crop production value per cubic meter of water. The 
number of households in a WUA has a significant negative impact, thereby providing 
supportive evidence for the hypothesis that a large group size may exacerbate problems of 
collective action and free riding in joint water management. Our results further support the 
hypothesis that heterogeneity of endowments, as measured by the percentage of households 
with per capita land more than twice the average, is an important precondition for successful 
collective action. Heterogeneity of interests, as measured by the number of WUGs in a WUA, 
has a significant positive impact on crop production per m
3
 water value in our regression 
results. In theory, groups having heterogeneous interests are expected to have lower water 
productivity. However, households in WUAs with a relatively large number of WUGs may 
                                                 
10 High correlations between resource characteristics and group characteristics may potentially affect our findings. The 
correlation coefficient of length of second-level canals and number of households in a WUA, however, is only 0.05. And the 
correlation coefficient of number of second-level canals and number of WUGs is 0.10. Likewise, no problematic correlations 
were found for the other explanatory variables in the model. The correlation matrix can be obtained from the first author 
upon request. 
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have more options for crop diversification and have a better tuning of planting and irrigation 
decisions among member households, and thereby obtain a relatively high water productivity. 
A fourth group characteristic, the age of WUA leader, is found to have a significantly 
positive impact on cropping income per unit water, but not on total crop value per unit water. 
This result indicates that households in WUAs with more experienced and respected  heads 
do not manage to save more water per unit output, but do manage to save on the other inputs 
that are used in producing crops. 
The third group of WUA characteristic that we examine consists of two indicators of the 
relationship between resource characteristics and group characteristics. They are both found 
to significantly affect crop production value but not the cropping income per unit water. The 
estimated coefficients are positive for the share of migrant household heads and negative for 
water demand at the current price. The latter finding provides supporting evidence for the 
hypothesis that higher water demand may lead to more conflicts among users and hence to 
fewer water savings. But the hypothesis that smaller resource dependence negatively affects 
joint action in water management is not supported by the result for share of migrant heads in 
a WUA. In fact, we find that the share of migrant heads has a significant positive impact on 
crop production value per unit of water (at a 10-percent testing level), but not on the cropping 
income per unit water. These findings suggest that households in WUAs with relatively many 
migrant heads have higher water productivity because their diversified income sources allow 
them to take more risks and because they spend relatively more on productive inputs. In other 
words, using the terminology of the so-called new economics of labour migration (e.g. Taylor 
and Martin, 2001), we find some evidence of positive insurance and income effects that 
dominate the negative lost-labour effect of migration plus the negative resource dependency 
effect outlined above.There are two governance variables in our model. Expenses on guards 
do not significantly affect water productivity in neither of the two estimated equations. Hence 
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the two counteracting effects of this variable on water productivity seem to more or less 
balance each other. For WUA involvement in cropping decisions, we find a significantly 
positive impact on crop production value and cropping income per unit of water. This finding 
suggests that jointly decided crop choices lead to higher water productivity than crop choices 
made by individual households within a WUA.   
The last WUA characteristic that we consider in our analysis refers to the external 
environment. The hypothesis that external markets put more pressure on water resources and 
therefore lead to lower water productivity is not supported by our results. The estimated 
coefficient for the share of land planted with marketed crops is not significantly different 
from zero in the equation for crop production value per unit water. The same variable, 
however, is found to have a significantly negative impact in the equation explaining cropping 
income per unit water. In other words, these results suggest that households belonging to 
WUAs that are relatively more involved in marketed crops tend to buy more expensive inputs 
which negatively affect the cropping income, but these inputs do not affect total crop 
production per unit water.  
The regression results for the control variables confirm that land size is a crucial 
determinant of agricultural production in China, given the scarcity of cultivated land. 
Controlling for other determining factors, crop production per unit water is highest in the 
highest altitude zone (zone 3). Households living in that zone rely more on rainfall, and hence 
need less irrigation water than farm households living in the other two zones. Cropping 
income per unit water, however, is not significantly affected. Hence, households living in 
zone 3 achieve the higher productivity by spending relatively more on productive inputs.   
 
33 
 
2.6 Conclusion 
This study examines which characteristics of WUAs play a significant role in promoting 
water productivity among the households belonging to a WUA in northern China. Data 
collected among 315 households and 21 WUAs in Minle County, Gansu Province for the 
year 2009 are used to estimate a random intercept model explaining total crop production 
value and cropping income per cubic meter of water.  
Previous research on WUAs and performance of user-based water management in 
northern China has concentrated on the five so-called key principles, identified and promoted 
by World Bank project managers, that WUAs should satisfy. These are: adequate and reliable 
water supply, hydraulically (not administratively) organized WUAs, elected leaders and no 
government interference in WUA management and decision making, water payments based 
on used quantities, and water fees collection rights with the WUA. Our research broadens the 
analysis by examining a range of potentially important factors identified in the literature on 
sustainable common pool resource management.  
Model specification in our study is derived from a comprehensive framework developed 
by Agrawal (2003). The regression results that we obtain indicate that group characteristics, 
particularly group size and number of sub-groups, are important factors in water productivity. 
Large groups tend to have greater difficulties in overcoming problems of collective action 
and free-riding. A large number of sub-groups, i.e. water users groups (WUGs), within a 
WUA can promote water productivity by allowing more crop diversification and by a better 
tuning of planting and irrigation decisions among member households. Another group 
characteristic that affects water productivity in our sample is heterogeneity of land 
endowments, which is found to have a positive effect on water productivity of member 
households in a WUA.  
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Several other factors listed in Agrawal’s framework are found to affect water productivity in 
our research area. In particular we find that a high pressure on the water resource caused by a 
large unmet water demand negatively affects water savings in crop production, while the 
share of households with migrant heads in a WUA positively affects the productivity of water 
use. Another noteworthy result is that we do not find evidence that resource characteristics, 
i.e. resource size and degree of overlap between the WUA boundaries and natural boundaries, 
affect water productivity in our research area.     
Our findings have important implications for the ongoing water management reforms in 
northern China. Increasing water productivity is of crucial importance for maintaining food 
self-sufficiency, a major national-level policy goal in China. And it is also needed to meet the 
growing water demand from non-agricultural sectors, including the environment. 
Consequently, it may contribute to achieving food self-sufficiency as well as environmental 
goals. 
WUAs established on the basis of the five key principles identified and promoted by World 
Bank project managers may play an important role in this respect, as convincingly shown by 
Wang et al. (2010). Our findings show that a number of factors that are commonly identified 
in the literature on sustainable management of common pool resources also need to be taken 
into account if WUAs are to be successful in promoting higher water use efficiencies. In 
particular we find that WUAs with a relatively small number of member households, a large 
number of WUGs, and a low pressure on the available water resources are more likely to 
achieve relatively high water use efficiencies. Water management reforms in northern China 
are more likely to be successful in stimulating water productivity and possibly even farm 
income levels, if these characteristics are taken into account and, wherever possible, 
manipulated in appropriate directions.
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Appendix 2A 
Correlation matrix (1): WUA characteristics 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
1. Length of 2
nd
 
level canals 
1.00 -0.07 0.05 0.12 -0.00 0.04 -0.01 -0.05 -0.08 -0.02 0.08 -0.01 
2. Number of 2
nd
 
level canals 
-0.07 1.00 0.27 0.15 0.53 0.10 -0.07 0.20 -0.29 -0.27 0.43 0.62 
3. Number of 
households 
0.05 0.27 1.00 0.22 0.12 0.38 0.04 -0.47 -0.25 -0.21 0.27 0.12 
4. Age of WUA 
leader 
0.12 0.15 0.22 1.00 -0.15 0.29 0.07 0.33 -0.35 -0.14 0.09 0.19 
5. Share of 
households with 
per capita land > 
twice the average 
-0.00 0.53 0.12 -0.15 1.00 -0.11 -0.05 -0.18 0.10 -0.11 0.33 0.43 
6. Number of 
water user groups 
0.04 0.10 0.38 0.29 -0.11 1.00 0.22 -0.35 -0.18 -0.01 0.02 0.15 
7. Share of poor 
households 
-0.01 -0.07 0.04 -0.07 -0.05 0.22 1.00 0.15 0.04 -0.22 -0.15 -0.24 
8. Share of 
households with 
migrant heads 
-0.05 0.20 -0.47 0.33 -0.18 -0.35 0.15 1.00 0.05 0.14 -0.16 -0.07 
9. Water demand 
at current price 
-0.08 -0.29 -0.25 -0.35 0.10 -0.18 0.04 0.05 1.00 0.41 -0.15 -0.14 
10. Expenses on 
guards 
-0.02 -0.27 -0.21 -0.14 -0.11 -0.01 -0.22 0.14 0.41 1.00 -0.15 -0.14 
11. Involvement 
of WUA in 
cropping 
decision 
0.08 0.43 0.27 0.09 0.33 0.02 -0.15 -0.16 -0.15 -0.15 1.00 0.19 
12. Share of land 
planted with 
marketed crops 
-0.01 0.62 0.12 0.19 0.43 0.15 -0.24 -0.07 -0.14 -0.14 0.19 1.00 
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Correlation matrix (2): WUA characteristics and input variables 
 Seed fertilizer labour machine land water 
Length of 2
nd
 level 
canals 
0.04 0.01 0.06 0.12 0.08 -0.07 
Number of 2
nd
 level 
canals 
-0.00 -0.22 -0.03 -0.15 -0.32 -0.09 
Number of 
households 
0.16 0.07 0.08 0.11 0.12 -0.30 
Age of WUA leader 0.28 -0.17 -0.03 -0.11 -0.26 -0.19 
Share of households 
with per capita land > 
twice the average 
-0.09 -0.20 -0.05 -0.18 -0.16 0.06 
Number of water user 
groups 
0.14 -0.02 0.04 0.03 -0.04 -0.17 
Share of poor 
households 
-0.15 -0.22 0.03 -0.04 -0.09 0.01 
Share of households 
with migrant heads 
-0.05 -0.25 -0.01 -0.11 -0.27 0.02 
Water demand at 
current price 
-0.22 -0.11 -0.09 -0.17 -0.19 0.43 
Expenses on guards 0.02 0.15 -0.01 0.07 0.07 -0.02 
Involvement of WUA 
in cropping decision 
0.05 0.03 -0.04 -0.12 -0.12 -0.02 
Share of land planted 
with marketed crops 
0.07 -0.23 -0.04 -0.25 -0.33 0.06 
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3. Impact of water allocation interventions on farmers’ cropping 
decisions
11
 
 
 
Abstract: 
This article aims to provide more insights into the impact of government interventions on 
farmers’ production decisions. Specifically, we analyse the effects of assigning more 
irrigation water to a newly introduced cash crop on farmers’ cropping decisions. By 
aggregating crops into four groups, we estimate a system of unconditional crop acreage 
demand functions from data that were collected during two rounds of a farm household 
survey held in an arid region in northern China. We find that the water priority given to the 
cash crop (Atlantic potatoes) does not affect the land allocated to that crop, because its 
planting decisions are mainly taken by village leaders instead of households. Instead, the 
intervention results in a shift from planting local potato varieties towards grains with 
relatively low water requirements.  
                                                 
11 This chapter is based on an article submitted to Land Economics in May 2013, as Lei Zhang, Thomas Herzfeld, Nico 
Heerink and Xiaoping Shi “Impact of water allocation interventions on farmers’ cropping decisions” (under review). 
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3.1 Introduction 
Governments frequently interfere in agricultural production in order to achieve goals 
such as food self-sufficiency, income equality, and so on. Research on the effects of 
agricultural policy interventions is under increasing scrutiny and may be used, in some 
settings, for prescribing policies (Alston and James, 2002). The available literature on 
domestic commodity policy instruments focuses mainly on price interventions (subsidies) and 
on supply control policies (output or input quotas). In their review of agricultural policies, 
Alston and James (2002) conclude that considerable progress has been made in theoretical 
models that help to analyse the effects of agricultural policies, but that real-world policies 
frequently deviate from common theoretical generalizations and that empirical studies often 
misrepresent the market conditions under which a policy is applied. More meaningful 
empirical analysis requires, in their view, better measures of the conditions of supply of 
different factors of production in particular industries as well as more realistic representations 
of policy instruments. 
One important factor of production in agriculture is water. The use of water for industrial 
purposes and domestic consumption is putting more and more pressure on the amount of 
water available for agricultural production in many countries (Dinar, 2012). As a result, 
governments in different parts of the world apply various types of water policies aiming at 
achieving objectives such as income equality, higher food production, environmental 
sustainability, and resource conservation.  
The most frequently used water policies relate to price interventions. The effects of such 
policies are still under debate. For instance, Tsur et al. (2004) find that water prices have a 
small effect on income distribution within the farming sector in South Africa, Turkey and 
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Morocco, and conclude from this evidence that water pricing should be designed primarily to 
increase the efficiency of water use. On the other hand, Liao et al. (2008) conclude from three 
case studies for China that increasing the water price to fully recover supply cost may 
seriously affect grain production and farmers’ income. 
Available studies regarding supply control policies of water mainly focus on the 
institutions that are used for allocating water. Much attention is paid in the literature to the 
roles of water users associations (e.g. Phadnis and Kulshrestha, 2012; Wang et al., 2005) and 
water markets (e.g. Garrido, 2007; Zhang et al., 2009) in stimulating more efficient water use. 
The consequences of direct government interventions in the allocation of irrigation water, on 
the other hand, have received little attention in the literature so far. 
Water scarcity constitutes a major problem in China, as per capita water availability is 
only a quarter of the world average (Falkenmark et al., 1989; Shalizi, 2006). In addition, 
water resources are distributed unevenly across Chinese regions. Whereas water scarcity is a 
major problem in the north, it is less problematic in the south due to abundant precipitation 
(World Bank 2001; Yang et al., 2003). In response to the growing water scarcity, farmers in 
the north increasingly resort to water-saving irrigation systems and cultivation methods, and 
to the cultivation of water-saving crops. On the other hand, policy interventions like the 
promotion of cash crop production may conflict with the goal of saving irrigation water. 
When cash crops are relatively water-intensive, as is frequently the case, such policy 
interventions may negatively affect the availability of irrigation water for, and hence the 
yields of, other crops.  
Facing the more and more serious challenges regarding water resources, the Chinese 
government has increasingly used policy interventions to reach the goal related to water 
resource use. Adjusting crop pattern is regarded as a useful method to achieve water saving. 
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Water consuming crops should be limited at areas with water shortage and, it should be 
encouraged to grow crops with low consuming less water but with high added value (e.g. Gu, 
2001). As direct support of specific crops is impossible due to the WTO agreements, 
government tends to affect farmers’ cropping choices through intervening in the input 
markets. Effects of relevant policies are however rarely analysed in the existing literature. 
Our study aims to provide an empirical analysis of the effect of a government intervention in 
irrigation water supply on farm household cropping decisions in north China. To this end we 
perform a case study of a government intervention in irrigation water allocation aimed at 
promoting a newly introduced cash crop, and examine the impact of this policy on farmers’ 
cropping decisions. We use the share of land planted with different crops as the dependent 
variable. Land allocation decisions of smallholder farmers are thought to be more subject to 
farmer’s control than crop output (Rao, 1989) and have therefore interested researchers and 
policy makers for decades (e.g. Just and Zilberman, 1983; Chibwana et al., 2011).   
This paper contributes to the available literature by performing an empirical analysis of 
an existing government intervention in the supply of a major agricultural production factor, 
irrigation water, on farm households’ cropping decisions. As argued by Alston and James 
(2002), there is an urgent need for empirical studies that are based on realistic representations 
of actual policy instruments in order to provide better empirical estimates of the relevant 
commodity supply elasticities. Additionally, compared to the standard partial equilibrium 
analysis used in many studies of the effects of agricultural policy interventions, our study 
covers the whole cropping part of the farm household and includes indirect effects of the 
policy intervention on other crops than the intervention crop.  
The remainder of this article is organized as follows. The following section derives a set 
of unconditional land demand functions, which will be estimated econometrically, from an 
established farm production behavioural model. Next, we describe the study area and the data 
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underlying the econometric analysis. Subsequently, in section 3.4, we present and discuss the 
econometric results. The final section summarizes the main results of the empirical analysis 
and provides some policy recommendations. 
 
3.2 Conceptual framework 
A farmer’s decision of allocating total land to various crops can be modelled basically in 
three different ways (Arnberg and Hansen, 2012; Moore et al., 1994). Deterministic linear 
programming optimizing models of the agricultural production system, such as Amir and 
Fisher (2000), can be used to analyse the system’s response to changes in input and output 
amounts and prices. Such programming models, however, lack a theory-based behavioural 
model. Specifically, it lacks a behavioural model based on microeconomic theory besides the 
underlying maximisation of the objective function. Therefore, statistical estimation and 
validation of the model are impossible
12
. Among the approaches based on neoclassical 
producer theory, two strands can be distinguished. Models assuming input jointness assign 
inputs to all crops. For a multi-crop farm with apparent jointness, input use on one crop 
depends on land allocation to the crop itself as well as acreage of other crops. Such an 
approach does not allow for a specific analysis of substitution in input use between crops. 
Alternatively, Moore et al. (1994) and Gorddard (2009) assign all inputs except one quasi-
fixed but allocatable input (e.g. land) to individual crops. Input non-jointness is assumed, so 
that the multi-output function decomposes into the sum of distinct crop-specific functions. 
This approach has the advantage that interdependences across crops can be accounted for 
explicitly in the model. Given that output and variable input markets in China can be 
considered highly integrated (Huang and Rozelle, 2006; Park et al., 2002; Qiao et al., 2003), 
                                                 
12 Heckelei and Wolff (2003) discuss the different methods in detail. 
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we assume that input use of one crop is based on land allocation to the crop itself, while 
being independent of the land allocation to other crops. Therefore, in this study we follow the 
non-jointness approach. 
Each farmer is assumed to behave rationally and to be risk-neutral. We assume the 
farmer to maximise profits by deciding how much input to use including the acreage 
allocated to the different crops. At the optimum the well-known condition of equality of the 
value of marginal product and input price should hold for all inputs and all crops.  
Governments frequently intervene in farm production decisions by providing input 
subsidies (e.g. Chibwana et al., 2011) or supporting farm output prices (e.g. Floyd, 1965). 
Input subsidies may encourage farmers to concentrate on a few crops only, as has been the 
case in Malawi (Chibwana et al., 2011; Harrigan, 2008). Any policy which favours one 
selected output or input exclusively comes at the cost of reduced diversification and might 
reduce the household’s resilience with respect to production risks. 
In our case, giving priority in irrigation water allocation to one specific crop implies an 
indirect subsidy of the use of water on that crop and an indirect taxation of water applied in 
alternative uses. To quantify this effect we analyse the allocation of land to the different crops. 
That is, based on the assumption of profit maximisation, the farmer decides how much land 
to allocate to output j. The resulting unconditional input demand function for land x
A
j can be 
established as:  
x
A
ij = f(p, w, z);                                                                                                              (3.1) 
Where i = 1, ..., N refers to households; p refers prices of outputs, w refers to prices of 
variable inputs, and z refers to levels of quasi-fixed inputs. 
Dividing each equation by total area (
A
ix ) returns unconditional land demand as a system 
of land share equations and normalised exogenous variables p*, w*, z*: 
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sij = x
A
ij/x
A
 = f(p*, w*, z *)                                                                                            (3.2) 
The unconditional input demand function can be established as: 
sij = 0 + k k w
*
ik + l Al p
*
il + t At z
*
it                                                                  (3.3) 
The β’s refers to unknown parameters to be estimated; i, j, w, p and z as defined in (3.1). 
For the purpose of our study, we are especially interested in the effects of the government 
intervention in irrigation water supply on farmers’ land allocation among different crops. To 
estimate this, a variable referring to the water allocation intervention is included in the model 
(more details will be explained in Section 3.4). 
 
3.3 Research area and data collection 
Located in one of the driest zones in the world, Zhangye City is an oasis mainly watered 
by the Heihe River. It is an inland river that flows across Qinghai Province, Gansu Province 
and Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region. It originates from the Qilianshan Mountains in 
Qinghai province and ends in Juyanhai Lake in Inner Mongolia. In the midstream of the 
Heihe River watershed, the land is flat, sunshine is abundant, and annual precipitation is very 
low while the evaporation is high. But due to the availability of irrigation water from the 
Heihe River and from reservoirs in the mountains, the area has become a major grain and 
vegetables production base in Gansu province.  
In Zhangye City, water demand is increasing due to the growing population and 
expanding economy, with variable water demands from different users, regions and industrial 
sectors. Therefore, water reallocation is a difficult and sensitive issue (Zhang et al., 2009). 
The Ministry of Water Resources initiated a pilot project called ‘Building a Water-saving 
Society in Zhangye City’ in 2002. This project, which is the first of its type in the country, 
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was designed to save water through government investments in a water-saving irrigation 
system and through establishing a system of water use rights (WUR) with tradable water 
quotas. The first two measures decreased irrigation water use somewhat, but trading of WUR 
did not become popular (Zhang et al., 2009). 
In this paper, we focus on Minle County, one of the six counties in Zhangye City. 
Agriculture is the biggest consumer of water, taking 88.1% of total water resources.
13
 Major 
crops in Minle County include barley, wheat, maize, sesame, rapeseed, garlic and potato. 
Surface water is the major water resource for irrigated agriculture in the area. Due to the 
depth of groundwater in this region, pumping water from the wells generates high costs. Thus 
the use of groundwater is less than 5 % of total water use in irrigated agriculture
14
. The water 
used for surface irrigation is stored in seven reservoirs in the Qilianshan mountains, serving 
five irrigation areas within Minle County. Five water management bureaus (WMBs), one for 
each of the five irrigation areas, decide the water allocations to water users associations 
(WUAs) within their own irrigation area. WUAs are responsible for arranging the water 
distribution to households belonging to their own WUA. WUAs are sub-divided into water 
users groups (WUGs), consisting of households having plots along the same channel. Since 
the plots of different households within a WUG are irrigated at the same time, households 
belonging to a WUG need to coordinate their planting decisions and water demands.  
The policy change regarding water allocation has been caused by the entry of a large 
potato processor in this region which is partly owned by the regional government
15
. The 
potato processing company entered in 2008 and demands Atlantic potatoes for processing 
into flakes and starch. In order to meet the growing demand for Atlantic potatoes with high 
                                                 
13 Water Management Bureau of Minle County, Gansu Province, P.R. China (2007). 
14 The information was provided by Water Bureau of Minle County. 
15 The Government of Minle County owns 51% of the joint venture, and the Dutch company owns the other 49%. 
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water requirements, the local government assigned water allocation priority for Atlantic 
potato growing to stimulate its production in this area.  
In general, two factors determine water allocation by the WMBs. First a standard water 
allocation quota is allocated to the so-called WUR land of the WUAs within the irrigation 
area in question. Not all the irrigated land is classified as WUR land. Its size depends on the 
labour provided by a village to the construction of the reservoir and some other factors, like 
the WUR land obtained through auctions. Then, based on the actual availability of water 
within a reservoir, a certain percentage of the water quota is actually distributed to the WUAs 
within the irrigation area. Before the government intervention in water allocation, the 
percentage of water quota that was distributed within an irrigation area was the same for all 
crops. As a result of the intervention that started in 2009, the percentage of the water quota 
allocated to Atlantic potatoes is larger than that is allocated to other crops, but differs between 
the different irrigation areas. The percentages of water quota are determined by the WMBs at 
the level of irrigation areas, and hence are exogenous from farmers’ behaviours. 
The household survey data used in this study were collected in May 2008 and May 2010 
by staff and students from Gansu Academy of Social Sciences in Lanzhou, Gansu 
Agricultural University in Lanzhou, and Nanjing Agricultural University. The surveys 
covered the years 2007 and 2009, respectively. The resulting data set contains information 
about land use, crop production, input use, prices of water and other inputs, WUA 
participation, land tenure and related information. To ensure that all townships would be 
equally represented in the year 2007 survey, the population in Minle County was stratified 
into ten townships. Next, 10 percent of the villages in each stratum were randomly selected, 
giving 21 villages. In each of the 21 selected villages, 15 households were randomly selected 
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to be interviewed. This gave us a dataset containing 315 observations
16
 (see Wachong Castro 
et al., 2010 for a more detailed description of the sampling method). Two years later, the 
same households were interviewed again whenever possible.
17
 This resulted in a two-year 
balanced panel dataset containing 265 households. Six households among them rented out all 
their land to other households and worked off-farm either in 2007 or in 2009. These six 
households were excluded. Additionally, households that had missing data on one or more 
variables or reported outliers
18
 were excluded from the sample. As a result, we use a sample 
of 248 observations (households) with information covering the years 2007 and 2009 for our 
empirical analysis.
 
 
The WMBs of the five irrigation areas in Minle County were interviewed in August 2010 
in order to obtain more insight into the institutional setting of irrigation water allocation. One 
of the questions asked during these interviews was the water allocation to Atlantic potatoes 
and other crops within their irrigation areas. The variable representing the water allocation 
intervention in our empirical analysis is derived from that information.  
  
3.4 Data analysis and results 
All crops relevant for our analysis have been assigned to four groups
19
: grain crops 
(barley, wheat and maize), cash crops
20
 (sesame, rapeseed and garlic), Atlantic potatoes and 
other potatoes (various local varieties).  
The unconditional input demand function can be specified as equation (3.4): 
                                                 
16 In two villages, 16 instead of 15 households were interviewed in May 2008. The last observation in these two villages was 
dropped from the sample so that we have 15 households in each village in each survey. 
17 In cases were the same household could not be found, it was replaced by another, randomly selected, household in the 
same village. These households, however, are not included in the panel dataset that we use for this study.    
18 Here we define outliers as households with large changes (>50%) in area shares of any of the four crops between the two 
years. 
19 Minor crops (e.g. peas, Chinese medicine, vegetables etc.) are not included in this analysis. 
20 Atlantic potatoes are excluded from the group termed ‘cash crops’ in our analysis.  
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0                            (3.4) 
Where: 
*
kijw  refers to prices of variable input k (k=1, ..., 4) for household i (i=1, ..., 248) and output j 
(j=1, ..., 4);  
*
tijz  refers to levels of quasi-fixed input t (t=1, 2) for household i (i=1, ..., 248) and output j 
(j=1, ..., 4);  
*
ijp  refers to prices of output j for household i (i=1, ..., 248);  
hiH  refers to the value of household and farm characteristic h (h=1, ..., 6) for household i 
(i=1, ..., 248);  
WA  is a variable measuring the water allocation intervention and is derived at the level of 
irrigation areas
21
;  
The β’s refers to unknown parameters to be estimated;  
ij = Disturbance terms with standard properties. 
We estimate the system of land share equations, by taking first differences between 2007 
and 2009. Seemingly Unrelated Regressions Estimator (SURE) is used for the estimation. 
The estimator allows to properly account for correlation in error terms between the four 
equations and to apply cross-equation restrictions imposed by the theory.
22
  
A first investigation of the collected data revealed that the total cultivated land per 
household remained almost constant between the two survey years. It declined from 15.42 
mu
23
 in 2007 to 15.34 mu in 2009. But for some households in our sample the cultivated land 
area changed considerably between the two years due to the renting in or out of land. We 
therefore apply area shares rather than absolute areas planted with each crop as dependent 
variables in the crop-specific production functions. 
                                                 
21 See detailed explanation in section 3.4. 
22 An alternative approach involves the estimation of a multinomial logit model. However, imposition of cross-equation 
restrictions is impossible for that method. 
23 15 mu equals one hectare.  
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Table 3.1: Crop-specific area shares, 2007 and 2009 
 
Crop 
2007 2009 Change 2007-
2009 (%) 
Mean (%) Std. Dev. Mean (%) Std. Dev. 
Grains 80.6 20.4 83.1 22.5 2.54 
Cash crops 10.3 20.8 9.80 23.4 -0.48 
Atlantic 
potatoes 
0.62 2.51 1.69 3.49 1.07 
Other potatoes 8.51 9.62 5.38 7.20 -3.13 
 
Table 3.1 displays the changes in average shares of land allocated to different crops from 
2007 to 2009. The distribution of these changes, derived by using Kernel Density estimation, 
is shown in Figure 3.1.  
Figure 3.1: Distribution of changes in land shares between 2007 and 2009, Kernel Density 
estimation  
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Grains are by far the most popular crop grown by farmers in the region. The share of 
land planted with grains increased by 2.54 percentage points between the two survey years. 
The areas planted with cash crops and other potatoes declined between the two years, with 
0.48 and 3.13 percentage points respectively, while the area planted with Atlantic potatoes 
increased by 1.07 percentage points.
24
 The average percentage of land planted with Atlantic 
potatoes is relatively small even in the year 2009 (1.69%), partly because that potatoes 
require some rotation due to phytosanitary reasons, and their land share is limited in practice. 
Moreover, given the constraint explained above, land is competitive between Atlantic 
potatoes and other potatoes, which further restricts the share of land planted with Atlantic 
potatoes. 
Especially noteworthy is also that the spread in area changes is much larger for grains 
and other potatoes than for cash crops and, especially, Atlantic potatoes (see Figure 3.1). This 
reflects the fact that decisions about cash crop contract farming in Minle County, as in many 
other parts of China, are taken at the local government level with little autonomy in decision 
making for individual households.      
Based on equation (3.4), we explain a household’s area share planted with a specific crop 
group from the prices of variable inputs, the levels of quasi-fixed inputs and the prices of 
outputs. For the purpose of our analysis we add a variable representing the government 
intervention in water allocation, namely the ratio of the percentage of the water quota 
allocated to Atlantic potatoes to the percentage of the water quota allocated to other crops
25
. A 
higher value of this variable indicates that Atlantic potatoes receive a higher priority in the 
allocation of irrigation water. Two hypotheses will be tested in the empirical analysis. First, 
                                                 
24 Although the potato processing company became operational in 2008, some farmers already planted Atlantic potatoes in 
2007 and delivered them to the storage facility of the company.   
25 As explained in section 3.3, the percentages of water quota allocated to Atlantic potatoes and other crops, and the resulting 
ratio between them is decided by the WMBs at the level of irrigation areas. They are supposed to be exogenous from 
decisions at the farm household level. 
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the intervention results in an increase in land allocated to Atlantic potatoes and a decrease in 
land allocated to the other crops. Second, among the alternative crops (i.e. other crops than 
Atlantic potatoes), the intervention is expected to cause a stronger response among cash crops 
and other potatoes than among grains, because grains are mainly grown for home 
consumption.  
Another policy variable that we include in our model is the amount of grain subsidies per 
mu of land received by a household. Finally, six household and farm characteristics that are 
expected to affect acreage allocation among crops are added as control factors to the 
regression equations. The exact definitions of all explanatory variables are presented in Table 
3.2. 
Table 3.2: Definitions of explanatory variables 
Variable Definition Unit 
Prices of variable inputs 
Hired labour  Price of hired labour RMB/hour 
Water  Price of irrigation water RMB/m
3 
Seeds  Price of seeds RMB/jin 
Fertilizer  Price of chemical fertilizer RMB/jin 
Levels of quasi-fixed inputs 
Labour  Amount of own labour and exchanged labour per mu land Days/mu 
Machinery  Amount of money spent on own and hired machinery services per mu land RMB/mu 
Output prices 
Grains Price of grains  RMB/jin 
Cash crops Price of cash crops RMB/jin 
Atlantic 
potatoes 
Price of Atlantic potatoes  RMB/jin 
Other potatoes Price of other potatoes  RMB/jin 
Household and farm characteristics 
Non-working Share of non-working members in the household % 
Gender Ratio of male labourers in the household % 
Age head Age of the head of the household Years 
Education 
head 
Years of education of the head of the household Years 
Slope Ratio of sloping land in total land  % 
Fertility Average fertility of the land: 3 = bad quality, 1 = good quality  
Grain subsidies 
Subsidy Amount of grain subsidies per mu land planted with grains RMB/mu 
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Water allocation intervention 
Water ratio Ratio of percentage of water quota allocated to Atlantic potatoes to the percentage 
of water quota allocated to other crops 
 
Note: 1 jin equals 0.5 kg. 
Table 3.3 presents the descriptive statistics of all explanatory variables. In case of 
aggregated crops, i.e. grains, cash crops and other potatoes, the prices of variable inputs, 
levels of quasi-fixed inputs and prices of outputs are weighted averages using the acreage 
shares of each crop within its group as weights.
26
 
Table 3.3: Descriptive statistics of explanatory variables 
                                                 
26 In case of zero observations for prices of variable inputs or outputs, we use the average price for sampled households 
within the same village or, if the number of non-zero observations within the same village is less than five, within the same 
township. To avoid potential endogeneity problems, we use the area shares in 2007 for weighting the 2007 prices as well as 
the 2009 prices. 
Variable 2007 2009 2007-2009  
Change Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. 
Prices of variable inputs 
Hired labour (RMB/hour) 42.8 7.63 50.3 14.9 7.52 
Water (RMB/m3) 0.091 0.011 0.095 0.060 0.003 
Seeds 
(RMB/jin) 
Grains 1.36 0.486 1.41 0.453 0.048 
Cash crops 6.08 4.33 8.85 7.54 2.77 
Atlantic potatoes 0.787 0.078 0.997 0.569 0.210 
Other potatoes 0.702 0.082 0.737 0.117 0.035 
Fertilizer 
(RMB/jin) 
Grains 0.690 0.811 0.739 0.855 0.050 
Cash crops 0.639 0.246 0.690 0.349 0.051 
Atlantic potatoes 0.832 0.337 0.703 0.395 -0.130 
Other potatoes 0.803 0.218 0.782 0.437 -0.021 
Levels of quasi-fixed inputs 
Own and 
exchanged  
labour 
(days/mu) 
Grains 9.40 5.79 7.60 6.75 -1.80 
Cash crops 12.5 9.09 12.0 11.6 -0.522 
Atlantic potatoes 1.68 1.23 1.81 1.15 0.134 
Other potatoes 16.7 12.7 15.2 8.49 -1.52 
Machine 
(RMB/mu) 
Grains 52.5 28.2 59.8 27.0 7.32 
Cash crops 44.9 29.0 38.5 18.7 -6.41 
Atlantic potatoes 29.8 15.8 35.1 38.7 5.31 
Other potatoes 39.8 31.8 38.4 42.2 -1.38 
Output prices 
Grains (RMB/jin) 0.838 0.096 0.786 0.087 -0.052 
Cash crops (RMB/jin) 2.12 0.613 1.96 0.566 -0.163 
Atlantic potatoes (RMB/jin) 0.320 0.032 0.396 0.072 0.076 
Other potatoes (RMB/jin) 0.273 0.040 0.318 0.111 0.045 
Household characteristics 
Non-working (%) 14.1 15.9 15.9 16.2 1.75 
Gender (%) 50.7 14.0 53.4 14.8 2.71 
Age head (yeas) 46.3 10.5 46.7 10.5 0.43 
Education head (years) 6.77 3.36 7.48 3.51 0.698 
Farm characteristics 
Slope (%) 5.20 20.7 4.54 12.1 -0.664 
Fertility (1=good, 2= medium, 3=bad) 1.44 0.559 1.52 0.600 0.085 
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Note: Prices of hired labour and water are the same for all crops. 
 
The table shows some interesting price trends during our period of investigation. The 
mean price received by farmers for Atlantic potatoes increased 27 percent, and the price of 
local potato varieties went up 11 percent. The mean prices of grains and cash crops, on the 
other hand went down by 10 and 12 percent, respectively.  Moreover, the mean price of 
fertilizer used on Atlantic and other potatoes declined 16 and 12 percent, respectively, while 
the price of fertilizers used on the other major crops went up 7 – 8 percent. The prices of 
seeds and seed potatoes went up for all crops, but most for cash crops (46 percent) and 
Grain Subsidies 
Subsidy (RMB/mu) 20.3 10.8 64.3 45.9 44.0 
Water allocation intervention 
Water ratio 1 0.000 1.67 0.616 0.67 
53 
 
Atlantic potatoes (27 percent). These widely divergent price trends have had a major impact 
on the profitability of the four major crop groups that we distinguish. It is important to 
control for these trends when estimating the impact of the local government intervention in 
water allocation on farmers’ cropping decisions.     
Information that we collected from the WMBs corresponding to each irrigation area 
shows that the average percentage (over all irrigation areas) of irrigation water that was 
actually allocated in 2007 equalled 63.3% for all crops, while it was 76.3% for Atlantic 
potatoes and 55.9% for other crops in 2009
27
. As a result, the mean value of the water 
allocation intervention variable for all households in our sample increased from 1.00 to 1.67. 
Another noteworthy finding is the rapid increase in grain subsidy, from 20.3 RMB per mu to 
64.3 RMB per mu between the two survey years. According to our data, 27.8% and 5.24% of 
the households (in 2007 and 2009 respectively) could not tell us the amount of grain 
subsidies that they received even though they did grow grain on their fields. For these 
households, we used the average values of grain subsidies in the village where they live as an 
approximation. Huang et al. (2010) found similar problems with non-reporting households 
(11.4% in their survey held in 2008), and explain it from the fact that grain subsidies are 
transferred directly to a special, government-initiated bank account, which some farmers do 
not check frequently. The same study also found a large degree of variation in the amount of 
grain subsidies received by farm households.
28
 Possible explanations include households’ 
confusion in distinguishing between grain subsidies and input subsidies, and differences 
between localities in the distribution of grain subsidies over their farmers.    
                                                 
27 In 2007, 63.3% of the standard water quotas were allocated to all crops; and in 2009, water quotas are still consistent for 
all crops, however, 76.3% of the standard water quotas were allocated to Atlantic potatoes, while 55.9% of the standard 
water quotas were allocated to other crops. 
28 The coefficient of variation in grain subsidies amounts to 1.88 (for 2007) and 1.45 (for 2008) in Huang et al. (2010), and 
0.53 (for 2007) and 0.71 (for 2009) in our sample. 
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Table 3.4: Regression results 
 Grains Cash crops Atlantic potatoes Other potatoes 
Prices of variable inputs 
Price of hired 
labour 
-0.004 
(-0.30) 
-0.001 
(-0.09) 
0.003 
(0.31) 
-0.006 
(-0.32) 
Price of water 8.10 
(0.69) 
1.58 
(0.18) 
-0.757 
(-0.18) 
-9.27 
(-1.13) 
Price of seeds 0.029 
(0.07) 
0.057 
(1.37) 
-0.078 
(-0.23) 
0.624 
(0.42) 
Price of fertilizer 0.018 
(0.10) 
-0.038 
(-0.07) 
0.728 * 
(1.64) 
0.022 
(0.25) 
Levels of quasi-fixed inputs 
Amount of own 
and exchanged 
labour 
0.007 
(0.25) 
-0.013 
(-0.72) 
-0.015 
(-0.87) 
-0.004 
(-0.24) 
Expenditures on 
machinery service 
-0.002 
(-0.35) 
0.000 
(0.02) 
-0.002 
(-0.50) 
0.002 
(0.38) 
Output prices 
Price of grains 13.7 *** 
(2.58) 
-11.7 *** 
(-2.91) 
0.732 
(0.38) 
-2.35 
(-0.64) 
Price of cash 
crops 
-2.24 ** 
(-2.18) 
2.75 *** 
(3.53) 
0.810 ** 
(2.24) 
-1.27 * 
(-1.77) 
Price of Atlantic 
potatoes 
-16.4 * 
(-1.64) 
13.4 * 
(1.78) 
-4.27 
(-1.19) 
4.84 
(0.70) 
Price of other 
potatoes 
-11.9 * 
(-1.63) 
13.0 ** 
(2.35) 
-6.18 ** 
(-2.42) 
4.75 
(0.94) 
Household and farm characteristics 
Non-working -0.042 
(-0.83) 
0.043 
(1.14) 
0.005 
(0.26) 
-0.007 
(-0.21) 
Gender 0.035 
(0.75) 
0.026 
(0.74) 
-0.005 
(-0.29) 
-0.057 * 
(-1.74) 
Age -0.002 
(-0.07) 
0.007 
(0.31) 
-0.007 
(-0.66) 
-0.006 
(-0.31) 
Education 0.430 
(1.46) 
-0.090 
(-0.40) 
0.214 ** 
(2.10) 
-0.566 *** 
(-2.78) 
Slope 0.087 * 
(1.70) 
-0.037 
(-0.94) 
-0.008 
(-0.44) 
-0.043 
(-1.21) 
Fertility -0.926 
(-0.89) 
0.008 
(0.01) 
-0.131 
(-0.36) 
1.07 
(1.48) 
Grain subsidies 
Subsidy -0.008 
(-0.31) 
-0.011 
(-0.54) 
0.004 
(0.42) 
0.010 
(0.53) 
Water priority policy 
Water priority 3.47 *** 
(2.81) 
1.36 
(1.44) 
-0.186 
(-0.40) 
-4.40 *** 
(-5.14) 
Intercept -0.499 
(-0.18) 
-4.87 ** 
(-2.29) 
2.30 ** 
(2.16) 
3.43 * 
(1.75) 
Number of 
observations 
248 248 248 248 
R
2
 0.17 0.17 0.09 0.17 
Note: *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively. True parameters are 
presented, instead of the estimated coefficients, and t-statistics are in parentheses. Homogeneity restriction imposed before 
estimation. 
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The regression results are presented in Table 3.4, while the (arc) elasticities that 
correspond to the estimated coefficients are shown in Table 3.5
29
. Only the coefficients that 
are statistically significant (at a 10 percent testing level) are included in that table. 
Table 3.5: Estimated elasticities 
 Grains Cash crops Atlantic potatoes Other potatoes 
Prices of variable inputs 
Price of hired 
labour 
    
Price of water     
Price of seeds     
Price of fertilizer   0,48 *  
Levels of quasi-fixed inputs 
Amount of own 
and exchanged 
labour 
    
Expenditures on 
machinery service 
    
Output prices 
Price of grains 0.12 *** -0.95 ***   
Price of cash 
crops 
-0.06 ** 0.56 *** 1.43 ** -0.37 * 
Price of Atlantic 
potatoes 
-0.07 * 0.48 *   
Price of other 
potatoes 
-0.04 * 0.38 ** -1.58 **  
Household and farm characteristics 
Non-working     
Gender    -0.43 * 
Age     
Education   1.32 ** -0.58 *** 
Slope     
Fertility     
Grain subsidies 
Subsidy     
Water priority policy 
Water priority 0.06 ***   -0.85 *** 
 
Our results do not support the first hypothesis presented above. The intervention in water 
allocation by the local government does not significantly affect the share of land allocated to 
Atlantic potatoes. Instead, the policy results in an increase in the share of land allocated to 
grains and a decrease in the land share of other potatoes, both at the 1% significance level. 
                                                 
29 The elasticities are derived by multiplying the estimated coefficients with the ratio of the average level of the explanatory 
variable in 2007 and 2009 to the average level of the dependent variable in 2007 and 2009.  
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The main explanation for this result lies in the fact that planting decisions of farm households 
in the research area are strongly influenced by their village leaders. Out of the 86 farm 
households growing Atlantic potatoes in our survey of the year 2009, 54 households (62.8%) 
indicated that they were obligated by their village leaders to plant Atlantic potatoes. For 24 
out of these 54 households, however, the actual area planted with Atlantic potatoes differed 
from the area they were required to plant by the village leader. Hence, despite the pressure 
from their local leader they do seem to have some freedom in deciding upon the actually 
planted area. Secondly, due to the larger water shares allocated to Atlantic potatoes and the 
lower water shares available for other crops, farmers tend to switch to crops with relatively 
low water requirements. This explains why farmers prefer planting a larger share of their land 
with grains instead of other potatoes after the change in water allocation, as potatoes demand 
a relatively large amount of water. It also explains why farmers in the research area started to 
grow fewer local variety potatoes and more grains (Table 3.1) even though the price trends 
during the period of observation were much more favourable for potatoes than for grains 
(Table 3.3).    
Our second hypothesis, which states that crops grown mainly for home consumption 
respond relatively less to the intervention, is partly confirmed by the results. We do find that 
the government intervention in water allocation caused a stronger response for other potatoes 
(elasticity: -0.85) than for grains (elasticity: 0.06). But the impact on the area planted with 
cash crops is not significantly different from zero. Output prices seem to play a more 
important role in cash crop planting decisions, as is evident from the regression results (see 
Table 4 and Table 5). The own price effect is positive and strongly significant (elasticity: 0.56) 
while the cross-price effect for grains is negative and strongly significant (elasticity: -0.95). 
The cross-price effects of Atlantic potatoes (elasticity: 0.48) and other potatoes (elasticity: 
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0.38) are positive, and significant at the 10 and 5 percent testing level, respectively. The latter 
result suggests that these crops are considered as complements by farmers.  
The own price elasticity of Atlantic potatoes is not significantly different from zero (at a 
one percent testing level). We do find, however, significant cross price elasticities for the 
prices of cash crops (elasticity: 1.43) and other potatoes (elasticity: -1.58). These findings 
suggest that farmers’ decision on the share of land allocated to Atlantic potatoes follows other 
incentives than its own prices. Among these an important factor is that Atlantic potatoes are 
strongly influenced, but not fully controlled, by village leaders. The cross-price elasticity 
with respect to prices of other potatoes indicates the substitute relationship between Atlantic 
potatoes and other potatoes. Due to phytosanitary reasons, only a limited share of land can be 
allocated to potatoes, and hence land is competitive between other potatoes and Atlantic 
potatoes. The prices of variable inputs and the available levels of quasi-fixed inputs do not 
have much impact on acreage allocation decisions of the farmers in our survey. We only find 
a significant impact (at a 10 percent testing level) for the price of fertilizer on the share of 
land allocated to Atlantic potatoes.  
  
3.5 Conclusions and policy recommendations 
This article analyses the impact of a local government intervention in the allocation of 
irrigation water on farmer’s land allocation to different crops. It adds to the available 
literature by providing empirical estimates of relevant crop supply elasticities to the 
government intervention, based on a realistic, evidence-based representation of an actual 
policy instrument, and taking into account the whole set of cropping options available to 
households.  
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Using household survey data collected among 248 households in an arid region in 
northern China the year before and the year after the government intervention in water 
allocation, we estimate a system of unconditional crop acreage demands that includes a 
variable representing the water policy intervention. Our findings indicate that the water 
priority given to the newly introduced cash crop (Atlantic potatoes) does not significantly 
affect the land allocated to that crop. This finding can be explained from the fact that planting 
decisions about Atlantic potatoes are strongly influenced by the village leader, as is evident 
from the answers given to a question in the survey about this issue. Moreover, the revealed 
behaviours of farmers show a strong preference of growing grain crops, which require 
relatively less amount of irrigation water, and are traditional crops mainly used for own 
consumption within the households.   
These findings confirm the well-known empirical fact that direct government 
interventions often tend to have unintended side-effects. In this case, the government 
intervention is in the planting decisions of farmers and in the provision of a major productive 
input with the purpose to increase the yields of a crop that the government is actively 
promoting. The unintended side-effect is the shift that it causes from growing local potato 
varieties towards grain crops. Although this side-effect is likely to be unplanned, it does 
contribute to the realization of another major policy gain in China, namely the ambition to 
remain self-sufficient in grain production. The extent to which the intervention contributes to 
raising rural household incomes, another major policy goal, is however doubtful.   
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4. Valuation of irrigation water and the impact of water allocation 
interventions
30
 
 
 
Abstract: 
This article aims to provide more insights into the economic value of irrigation water. 
Specifically, we evaluate the internal valuation (i.e. marginal value) of irrigation water in an 
arid Chinese region facing the introduction of a new policy assigning more irrigation water to 
a specific cash crop. A system of crop production functions is estimated, using data that were 
collected during two rounds of a farm household survey. The results show that the valuation 
of irrigation water for grains is very low in both years, and is below the actual water prices 
that are charged to farm households. Potential explanations for this finding include the self-
consumption of grains by farm households and grain subsidies that are based on planted areas 
of grains. Among other crops than grains, we find evidence that increased water allocation to 
the new cash crop affects farmer’s valuation of water. The policy causes the valuation of 
irrigation water for the preferential crop to be lower than that for other crops. The returns to 
water for other crops go up after the intervention.  
                                                 
30 This chapter is based on an article submitted to the Australian Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics in April 
2013, as Lei Zhang and Thomas Herzfeld “Valuation of irrigation water and the impact of water allocation interventions” 
(under review). 
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4.1 Introduction 
In developing countries, agriculture continues to be an important economic sector as it 
makes a significant contribution to national incomes and economic growth, and provides 
livelihood support for 60-80% of the population. However, the potential for continued growth 
in agriculture is diminishing rapidly due to the limits on further development of water 
resources in many parts of the world (Hussain et al., 2007). Especially in physically water-
scarce regions, competition for water across sectors (agricultural, domestic, industrial, 
commercial, and environmental) is growing with increasing pressure on available water 
supplies for agriculture. The key strategy now being advocated for addressing water scarcity 
problems is increasing productivity of water to obtain more value for each drop of water use 
(Hussain et al., 2007; Molden et al., 2001). 
Water scarcity constitutes a major problem for agricultural producers in China, 
particularly in the north. Reasons are relatively limited precipitation and the growing use of 
water for industrial purposes and domestic consumption (Shalizi, 2006; World Bank 2001; 
Yang et al., 2003). Currently, irrigation water productivity in China is just about 0.8 kg/m
3
. In 
some developed countries, such as Israel or the United States, it almost reaches 2 kg/ m
3
 
(Liao et al., 2008). In China, before the economic reforms started in 1978, water was 
generally considered a free good.  After the reforms, water fees were gradually introduced 
and increased in an effort to meet the cost of water supply and improve water use efficiency. 
In spite of the growing concern on the regulation of irrigation water via pricing, current prices 
charged for irrigation water in China are still thought to fall far short of the costs of supplying 
irrigation water to users, and often do not even attempt to recover the initial capital costs 
(Liao et al., 2008; Wang et al., 2004; Yang et al., 2003; Qu et al., 2011). Since 1 January 2004, 
China has introduced a new water pricing regulation; its main objectives are that water prices 
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should be increased to fully recover water supply cost and that water should be treated as a 
market good (Liao et al., 2008). However, regional development goals might conflict with 
national policy interests in increasing water use efficiency resulting in policy inconsistencies 
faced by farmers. 
Two methods are established in the literature to analyze the economic value of water: 
Estimation of the opportunity costs of water by using econometric methods (e.g. Moncur and 
Pollock, 1988), and Contingent Valuation Method (CVM) by using experiments (e.g. 
Chandrasekaran et al., 2009). There are some available quantitative studies (Esmaeili and 
Vazirzadeh, 2009; Eshghi and Hosseini-Yekani, 2012; Jamalijaghdani et al., 2012; Speelman 
et al., 2011; Chandrasekaran et al., 2009), but empirical research on China is still very limited. 
Wang et al. (2003) estimate the value of agricultural water in Ningxia and Henan Provinces 
using data collected in surveys carried out in 2001. Focusing on a few major staple crops in 
these regions, their results indicate that the value of agricultural water ranges from 0.06 to 
0.29 USD/m
3
 for wheat, 0.08-0.38 USD/m
3
 for maize, and 0.04-0.22 USD/m
3
 for rice. 
Our study analyses the effect of an irrigation policy change directly affecting availability 
of water for different crops on farmer’s internal valuation of water in a northern Chinese 
region. Previous research analyzed policy interventions mainly with respect to output market 
interventions (e.g. Buschena et al., 2005; Huang et al., 2011). With respect to water as an 
agricultural input, previous research has concentrated on comparing the valuation of water 
between different crops, using cross section data. Our study estimates the valuation of 
irrigation water in an arid Chinese region for two years, that is, before and after the 
introduction of the policy. The study contributes to the existing literature by performing a 
quantitative analysis of the valuation of irrigation water in China, and analyzing the impacts 
of a government intervention in water availability on the valuation of water at the farm 
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household level. Results of our analysis can be used to inform policy makers about intended 
as well as unintended effects of policy interventions in water allocation.  
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The next section establishes a 
theoretical framework as the basis of the empirical analysis. In Section 4.3, we describe the 
research area and the data underlying the econometric results. Then in Section 4.4, we discuss 
the methodologies, and a set of production functions are established. The econometric results 
are presented in Section 4.5. The final section summarizes the main results of the empirical 
analysis and provides some policy recommendations. 
 
4.2 Theoretical framework 
Alternative water pricing mechanisms have been adopted as the primary means to 
regulate irrigation water consumption. Water prices usually consist of a combination of an 
area–based component, an output-based component and a fixed capital and operation and 
maintenance (O&M) fee. “Getting prices right” is seen as a desirable way to allocate water 
efficiently, but how much prices should be raised remains a debatable issue (Johansson, 2000; 
Johansson et al., 2002; Tsur and Dinar, 1997). The two major views are that water prices 
should either cover the costs of supplying water (Esmaeili and Vazirzadeh, 2009; Tsur et al., 
2004; Tsur and Dinar, 1997) or should reflect the real water resources value (i.e. shadow 
prices or value of marginal product), also reflecting the resource scarcity (Liu et al., 2009).  
Taking perfectly functioning input and output markets as the hypothetical reference case, 
economic theory provides us with a straightforward tool to assess the impact of government 
interventions in water allocation. Assuming each farmer behaves rationally and risk-neutral, 
irrigation water should be distributed across different crops up to the point where the 
marginal productivity of water valued at output prices across the different crops is equal 
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(‘principle of equimarginal value31’). We assume further that water availability is limited. In a 
graphical way of analysis, the optimal amount of water use is the intersection of irrigation 
water demand (value of marginal product, VMP) and irrigation water supply. In case of water 
scarcity, this intersection should be at the inelastic part of the water supply function (Figure 
4.1). At the vertical axis we can derive water’s value of marginal product which will be equal 
across all crops.  
 
Figure 4.1: Changes in valuation of water due to the water priority policy 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
With the introduction of a water policy assigning more water to a specific cash crop, here 
Atlantic potatoes (more details will be explained in Section 4.3), water’s value of marginal 
product will differ across crops. The farmer looks for a new optimal input allocation by 
maximizing profits subject to the total availability of irrigation water. As shown in Figure 4.1, 
with all other factors held constant, the water priority allocation to Atlantic potatoes results in 
                                                 
31 Of course, this principle assumes homogeneity of the good in question. Here, we assume farmers use exclusively surface 
water with the same quality everywhere. As no farmers in our sample use groundwater, this assumption imposes not too 
much a restriction. 
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a higher water availability for Atlantic potatoes (increasing from SP0 to SP1) and less water for 
other crops (decreasing from SA0 to SA1). As a result, water’s value of marginal product for 
Atlantic potatoes is expected to decrease while that for all other crops will increase. In other 
words, the government intervention in water allocation creates an economic inefficiency. The 
extent of inefficiency depends on the shape of the MVP curves and the size of the 
intervention and is an empirical matter.  
This study aims to estimate whether the valuation of water for Atlantic potatoes and other 
crops changes due to the implementation of the regional government’s water policy; and if 
yes, whether the changes are consistent with the hypotheses derived from micro-economic 
theory. Results of the empirical analysis allow to draw conclusions about the efficiency costs 
associated with the water policy. Our theoretical framework suggests two hypotheses to be 
tested in the econometric model. First, before the introduction of the new water policy, 
valuation of irrigation water is expected to be equal across the different crops. Second, after 
the water policy change, valuation of irrigation water is expected to be lower for Atlantic 
potatoes compared to the alternative crops.  
 
4.3 Description of the research area and water institutions 
Zhangye City is an oasis located midstream of the Heihe River, an inland river that flows 
across Qinghai Province, Gansu Province and Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region. It 
originates from the Qilianshan Mountains in Qinghai province and ends in Juyanhai Lake in 
Inner Mongolia. The water resources of the Heihe river basin area originate mainly from 
glacial water from the Qilianshan Mountain, which is perpetually covered by snow. In the 
midstream of the Heihe River watershed, the land is flat, sunshine is abundant, and annual 
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precipitation is very low while the evaporation is high
32
. But due to the availability of 
irrigation water from the Heihe River, the area has become a major grain and vegetables 
production base in Gansu province.  
According to the MWR (2004), Zhangye City is severely short of water resources. Water 
demand is covered from the Heihe River. Agriculture accounts for approximately 95% of 
total water use. As a result of continuous excessive water extraction, too little water flows 
into Juyanhai Lake, which dried out in 1992 and an area of 200 km
2
 around the lake became 
desert (MWR 2004; Zhang et al., 2009).  
To deal with these problems, the Ministry of Water Resources initiated a pilot project 
called ‘Building a Water-saving Society in Zhangye City’ in 2002. The project, the first 
project of its type in the country, was designed to save water in three ways. First, the 
government invested capital to build a water-saving irrigation system because local farmers 
could not afford it. Second, the government invested and installed meters for water users 
(including irrigators) and tried to discourage farmers from wasting water by accurately 
metering and charging for irrigation water. Finally, a water use rights (WUR) system
33
 with 
tradable water quotas was established. Specifically, a standard water quota is allocated 
according to the WUR land area, and farm households pay for the amount of allocated water. 
Based on this, households can trade WUR in excess or short in demand. The first two 
measures decreased irrigation water use somewhat, but trading of WUR did not become 
popular (Zhang et al., 2009). 
Minle County, as one of the six counties in Zhangye City, is spread between the foothills 
of the Qilian Mountains and the lower lying Hexi corridor. Its total cultivated land area equals 
                                                 
32 The precipitation in Zhangye City is 89-283 mm per year, while the evaporation is 1700 mm per year. 
33 Not all the irrigated land is classified as WUR land. Its size depends on the labor provided by a village to the construction 
of the reservoir and other factors. The average proportion of WUR land in total arable land is 72.6% for all households in 
our sample. 
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860,000 mu
34
, with irrigated land constituting 67 percent. Major crops in Minle County 
include barley, wheat, maize, sesame, rapeseed, garlic and potato. Surface water is the major 
water resource for irrigated agriculture in the area
35
. Agricultural land in Minle County is 
usually divided into three zones with different planting conditions and water requirements. 
Zone 1 has an elevation ranging from 1,600 to 2,000 meters. Precipitation in this zone is 
relatively scarce. Zone 2 is located between 2,000 and 2,200 meters, while zone 3 has an 
elevation ranging from 2,200 to 2,600 meters. By far the largest zone is the second one, with 
500,000 mu of cultivated land, followed by the first and third zones, with 190,000 and 
170,000 mu respectively. Due to the relatively much rainfall in zone 3, it relies less on 
irrigation, compared with the other two zones. 
There are seven reservoirs, serving five irrigation areas within Minle County. Five water 
management bureaus (WMBs), one for each of the five irrigation areas, arrange the water 
allocations to WUAs (i.e. Water Users Associations) within their own irrigation area. First a 
standard water allocation quota is allocated to the WUR land of the WUAs within the 
irrigation area in question. Then, based on the actual availability of water within a reservoir, a 
certain percentage of the water quota is actually distributed to the WUAs within the irrigation 
area. 
WUAs are responsible for arranging the water allocation to households belonging to their 
own WUA. The households within each WUA are sub-divided into water user groups 
(WUGs), consisting of households having plots along the same channel. Since the plots of 
different households within a WUG are irrigated at the same time, households belonging to a 
WUG need to coordinate their planting decisions and water demands. Irrigation is carried out 
by flooding adjacent farmland at the same time, organized from lowest to highest altitudes, 
                                                 
34 One mu equals 0.07 ha. 
35 Due to the high costs of pumping water from the wells, the use of groundwater is less than 5 percent of total water use in 
irrigated agriculture. 
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with villages in the first zone receiving more irrigation rounds (generally three) per year than 
the villages in the other two zones (generally one or two rounds). 
The policy change regarding water allocation was caused by the entry of a potato 
processing company in this region which is partly owned by the regional government
36
. The 
company entered in 2008 and demands a specific variety of potatoes, called Atlantic potatoes, 
for processing into flakes and starch. In order to meet the growing demand for Atlantic 
potatoes with high water requirements, the local government assigned more water for Atlantic 
potato growing to stimulate its production in the area. Stimulating the production of a crop 
with relatively high water demands via institutional instruments in a water scarce region 
evidently may conflict with policy goals at the national level like promoting grain self-
sufficiency and increasing water productivity. 
The surveys used for this study were carried out in May 2008 and May 2010 by staff and 
students from Gansu Academy of Social Sciences in Lanzhou, Gansu Agricultural University 
in Lanzhou, and Nanjing Agricultural University. Household interviews were done in 21 
villages; giving us a dataset containing 315 observations
37
 (see Wachong Castro et al., 2010 
for a description of the sampling method). If possible, the same households in each village 
that were interviewed in 2008 were also interviewed in May 2010. In cases where the same 
household could not be found, it was replaced by another, randomly selected, household in 
the same village. Combining both surveys and excluding households interviewed only once 
results in a two-year balanced panel data set containing 265 households. The data include 
information, among others, about crop production, use of water and other inputs, water 
trading, WUA participation, water and other prices, land tenure and land use. Six households 
among them rented out their land to other households and were engaged in off-farm work, 
                                                 
36 The Government of Minle County owns 51% of the joint venture, and the Dutch company owns the other 49%. 
37 In two villages, 16 instead of 15 households were interviewed in May 2008. The last observation in these two villages was 
included in panel dataset containing 265 households. 
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thus did not grow any crops either in 2007 or in 2009. Additionally, households that had 
missing data or reported outliers38 on one or more variables used in the empirical analysis 
were excluded. As a result, a two-year panel dataset containing 248 households is used in the 
following empirical analysis. 
 
4.4 Methodology 
Young (2005) classifies methods to derive the value of irrigation water into two groups: 
inductive and deductive. Deductive methods rely on the estimations of willingness to pay 
derived from models of human behavior together with conditions of production and 
consumption. Inductive methods use statistical techniques to infer economic values from data. 
Hussain et al. (2007) summarize the various indicators of value of water, mainly including 
average and marginal values
39
. For water resources investment and allocation decisions, 
marginal values may be more useful and provide greater insights than average values do 
(Hussain et al., 2007). 
In this study, we use an inductive approach to examine the value of marginal productivity 
of irrigation water by estimating a system of production functions. To reduce the complexity 
of the system, farm household i’s production portfolio of crops is structured in four groups40 j: 
grain crops (barley, wheat and maize), cash crops
41
 (sesame, rapeseed and garlic), Atlantic 
potatoes and other potatoes (various local varieties). 
We include the following factors as inputs into the production function: water (W), other 
inputs including seed (S), fertilizer and pesticide (F), labour (L), and machinery use (M). 
                                                 
38 Here we define outliers as households with large changes (>50%) in area shares of any crops between the two years. 
39 The whole list of indicators is: Average gross value of product per unit of water, average gross margins per unit of water, 
average gross net value of product per unit of water, value of marginal productivity of water. 
40 Minor crops (e.g. peas, Chinese medicine, vegetables etc.) are not included in this analysis. 
41 Atlantic potatoes are excluded from the group termed ‘cash crops’. 
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Different functional forms can be chosen for the production function, with the Cobb-Douglas 
and translog functions being the most widely used specifications. Based on initial tests of 
functional forms, we rely on the more flexible translog functional form in this analysis
42
. The 
production function can be specified as Equation (4.4):  
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 (4.4) 
Output is measured in physical units (lnY). Similarly, water (lnW), seeds (lnS) and labor 
use (lnL) enter in their respective natural units. Fertilizer and pesticide inputs (lnF) as well as 
machinery use (lnM) are measured in monetary units. All variables are normalized by area.  
The α’s refer to unknown parameters to be estimated. 
Table 4.1: Definitions of explanatory variables 
Variable Definition Unit 
Levels of variable and quasi-fixed inputs 
Water (W) Amount of irrigation water per mu land m
3/mu 
Seeds (S) Amount of seeds per mu land jin/mu 
Fertilizer and pesticide (F) Expenditures on chemical fertilizer and pesticide per mu land RMB/mu 
Labour (L) Amount of labour per mu land Days/mu 
Machinery (M) Amount of machinery costs per mu land RMB/mu 
Household characteristics 
Non-working Share of non-working members in the household % 
Gender Ratio of male labourers in the household % 
                                                 
42 From a methodological perspective alternative estimators have been suggested which support a better identification 
of production functions and allow for the possible endogeneity of inputs (Olley and Pakes, 1996). However, a higher 
longitudinal dimension of the sample is necessary to use this estimator.. 
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Age head Age of the head of the household Years 
Education head Years of education of the head of the household Years 
Farm characteristics 
Slope Ratio of land on slope % 
Fertility Average fertility of the land: 3 means bad quality, 1 means good  
 Agro-ecological zones  
D1 1=zone 1, 0=otherwise  
D2 1=zone 2, 0=otherwise  
Note: 1 jin = 0.5 kg. 
Besides agricultural inputs, factors like farmer’s managerial capability and natural 
conditions affect output levels. We approximate these determinants by adding household 
characteristics, such as age and education level of the household head, as well as farm 
characteristics, like slope and fertility of the land. Furthermore, two dummy variables control 
for the differences in agro-ecological conditions between the three zones in Minle County 
(see Section 4.3). The definition of all explanatory variables is presented in Table 4.1. 
The elasticity of output with respect to the input of water is calculated by taking the 
partial derivative of output with respect to water use. The water elasticity of output, as 
derived from Equation (4.4), is shown in Equation (4.5).  
WMLFS ln*2lnlnlnln 1698761                                            (4.5) 
The marginal productivity of water then is: ρ = ε * (Y/W), and the marginal value (i.e. 
shadow price) of water is: v = ρ * P, where P refers to the output price (average price for all 
households). In case of aggregated crops, i.e. grains, cash crops and other potatoes, the price 
is a weighted average using acreage shares of each crop within the group as weights.  
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4.5 Data analysis and results 
Table 4.2 displays yields of the four output categories in 2007 and 2009. Our data shows 
that a large majority of farmers grew grain crops in both years (247 households in 2007 and 
245 households in 2009). 110 households planted cash crops in 2007 and 116 households did 
in 2009. The numbers of households planting other potatoes are 177 and 152, in 2007 and 
2009 respectively. In terms of the Atlantic potato growing, in 2007, only 21 households were 
involved
43
, and the number increased to 86 in the year 2009.  
Table 4.2: Yields of different crop groups in 2007 and 2009 
Crops 2007 2009 
Mean (jin/mu) No. of observations Mean (jin/mu) No. of observations 
Grains 892 247 911 245 
Cash crops 674 110 812 116 
Atlantic 
potatoes 
2400 21 2534 86 
Other 
potatoes 
3343 177 3288 152 
 
It is shown in Table 4.2 that the yields of most crops go up on average from 2007 to 2009, 
except that of other potatoes, which declines on average from 3343 to 3288 jin
44
/mu. A 
remarkable change is that yields of cash crops go up from 674 to 812 jin/mu during this 
period. On the one hand, yields of both cash crops (i.e. rapeseed and garlic) increase during 
this period. Specifically, the yields of rapeseed and garlic (for all households on average) are 
387.4 and 1923 jin/mu in 2007, and increase to 410.4 and 2128 jin/mu in 2009. On the other 
                                                 
43 Although the potato processing company became operational in 2008, some farmers already planted Atlantic potatoes in 
2007 and delivered them to the storage facility of the company.  
44 One jin equals 0.5 kg. 
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hand, the share of land planted with garlic in total cash crop area (for all households on 
average) goes up from 20.7% to 24.5% during this period. 
 
Table 4.3: Input use in 2007 and 2009 
Input 2007 2009 
Grains Cash 
crops 
Atlantic 
potatoes 
Other 
potatoes 
Grains Cash 
crops 
Atlantic 
potatoes 
Other 
potatoes 
Water 
(m
3
/mu) 
499 776 577 645 310 542 699 607 
Seeds 
(jin/mu) 
70.9 66.8 320 361 65.8 56.2 421 403 
Fertilizer 
and 
pesticide 
(RMB/mu) 
76.8 80.0 129 114 76.3 80.0 112 116 
Labour 
(days/mu) 
9.71 12.1 20.8 18.0 7.76 12.8 19.5 16.2 
Machine 
(RMB/mu) 
53.5 37.5 36.4 52.1 58.7 41.4 35.2 34.5 
 
Table 4.3 presents descriptive statistics of input use for both years separately. The data 
indicate that due to the water policy change, the quantity of water use on Atlantic potatoes 
goes up from 577 to 699 m
3
/ mu; while the amount of water use for all other crops declines 
from 2007 to 2009. Especially for cash crops, the amount of water use decreases from 776 to 
542 m
3
/ mu. Descriptive statistics of other explanatory variables used in the production 
function are presented in Table 4.4. 
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Table 4.4: Descriptive statistics of other explanatory variables 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4.5 shows the prices of different outputs in the two years. Zero observations of 
output prices
45
 are replaced by the average prices of interviewed households within the same 
village. If the number of observations within a village is less than five, we replace the zero 
observation by the average value at the township level. The data show that prices of grain 
crops and cash crops go down during the two years. On average, grain prices drop from 0.840 
to 0.759 RMB/jin, and prices of cash crops decline from 2.16 to 1.92 RMB/jin. Prices of the 
two groups of potatoes go up during this period. The price of Atlantic potatoes increases from 
0.325 to 0.421 RMB/jin, and the price of other potatoes goes up slightly, from 0.274 to 0.298 
RMB/jin. 
                                                 
45 Some farm households use (part of) the crops for own consumption, and therefore did not indicate the market prices of 
outputs in the surveys. 
Variable 2007 2009 
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. 
Households characteristics 
Non-working (%) 14.1 15.9 15.9 16.2 
Gender (%) 50.7 14.0 53.4 14.8 
Age head (years) 46.3 10.5 46.7 10.5 
Education head (years) 6.77 3.36 7.48 3.51 
Farm characteristics 
Slope (%) 5.20 20.7 4.54 12.1 
Fertility (1=good, 2= medium, 3=bad) 1.44 0.559 1.52 0.60 
Agro-ecological zones 
D1 (1=zone 1, 0=otherwise) 0.20 0.40 0.20 0.40 
D2 (1=zone 2, 0=otherwise) 0.66 0.47 0.66 0.47 
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Table 4.5: Output prices in 2007 and 2009 (unit: RMB/jin) 
Crop 2007 2009 
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. 
Grains 0.840 0.098 0.759 0.084 
Cash crops 2.16 0.959 1.92 0.526 
Atlantic potatoes 0.325 0.043 0.421 0.056 
Other potatoes 0.274 0.039 0.298 0.118 
 
The regression results for the translog production functions are presented in the Appendix. 
Based on these coefficient estimates, the output elasticities, marginal productivity and 
marginal value of irrigation water are derived and presented in Table 4.6. Due to the limited 
number of observations of farm households growing Atlantic potatoes in 2007, we cannot 
estimate its production function for that year. 
Table 4.6: Economic valuation of water in 2007 and 2009 
  Units Grains Cash crops Atlantic 
potatoes 
Other 
potatoes 
2007 Output elasticity of 
water 
 0.044 0.177  0.008 
Marginal 
productivity of 
water  
(jin/m
3
) 
(kg/m
3
) 
0.079 
(0.039) 
0.153 
(0.077) 
 0.041 
(0.021) 
Marginal value of 
water  
(RMB/m
3
) 
(USD/m
3
) 
0.066 
(0.011) 
0.331 
(0.053) 
 0.011 
(0.002) 
2009 Output elasticity of 
water 
 0.021 0.197 0.174 0.336 
Marginal 
productivity of 
water 
(jin/m
3
) 
(kg/m
3
) 
0.061 
(0.031) 
0.295 
(0.148) 
0.632 
(0.316) 
1.82 
(0.91) 
Marginal value of 
water 
(RMB/m
3
) 
(USD/m
3
) 
0.046 
(0.007) 
0.567 
(0.091) 
0.266 
(0.043) 
0.543 
(0.087) 
Note: Too few observations of farmers growing Atlantic potatoes in 2007. 
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Our first hypothesis of equality of shadow prices of water for different crops before the 
water policy change can be rejected based on statistical grounds.  The low marginal returns of 
water for grains (0.066 RMB/m
3
) and other potatoes (0.011 RMB/m
3
) are a bit surprising, and 
are even below the charged water prices (i.e. 0.091 RMB/m
3
 for all households on average). 
Farmers may attach significant non-market values to traditional crops, which are crucial for 
understanding supply response and on-farm conservation of these crops (Arslan, 2011). In 
this case, there may be a few reasons for the low marginal value of water for grains: First, a 
majority part of grains are used for intra-household consumption in this region. In 2007, 
58.8% of grains
46
 were used for own consumption by the farm households; and in 2009, it 
goes up to 61.2%. Second, grain subsidies received by farmers 
47
 may be another reason for 
the farmers to grow more grains and apply more irrigation water on it, which lead to the low 
marginal returns of water for grains. A possible reason for the low valuation of water for 
other potatoes is that they are also partly used for own consumption by the local farmers. Our 
data indicate that in 2007, 28.0% and 32.0% of other potatoes
48
 were used for own 
consumption, in 2007 and 2009 respectively. 
After the water policy change, the valuation of water for grains (0.046 RMB/m
3
) is still 
rather low
49
, probably because of the first reason as explained in the previous paragraph. Our 
second hypothesis is however partly confirmed by the results. Specifically, after the water 
policy change, the valuation of water for Atlantic potatoes is relatively low (0.266 RMB/ m
3
), 
compared to cash crops (0.567 RMB/ m
3
) and other potatoes (0.543 RMB/ m
3
). 
Moreover, comparing the results of the two years shows that valuation of water for cash 
crops and other potatoes increases from 2007 to 2009. Specifically, the marginal returns of 
                                                 
46 Output (unit: jin). 
47 The amount of grain subsidies received by the farm households is 11.8 RMB per mu and 56.2 RMB per mu in 2007 and 
2009 respectively. 
48 Output (unit: jin). 
49 The water price charged in reality in 2009 is 0.095 RMB/m3. 
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water for cash crops go up from 0.331 to 0.567 RMB/m
3
. Turning to other potatoes shows an 
interesting result, the valuation of water for this crop is the lowest among all crops in 2007 
(0.011 RMB/ m
3
), but rises remarkably to 0.543 RMB/ m
3
 in 2009. Similarly, the marginal 
productivity of other potatoes shows the highest increase. One possible explanation may be 
that irrigation water is mainly diverted from regular potatoes to Atlantic potatoes.  They are 
the closest substitutes among all crop groups, in terms of production cycle and water 
requirements
50
. 
 
4.6 Conclusions and policy recommendations 
This article analyses the impact of a policy affecting the water availability for various 
crops on the valuation of irrigation water for different crops. To accomplish this, we estimate 
a system of crop production functions with water, seed, fertilizer and pesticide, labour and 
machinery costs as inputs. The analysis is based on a data set collected among 265 
households for two years in an arid Chinese region. Previous research on valuation of water 
in agriculture has concentrated on comparing the valuation between different crops, using 
cross section data. This study to our knowledge provides the first quantitative analysis on the 
changes in valuation of water caused by government interventions in water availability for 
different crops. 
Policy makers may have different and sometimes contradictory goals. In our research 
area, water saving is the major goal for the government of Zhangye City, while the lower 
level government of Minle County mainly aims to stimulate the production of Atlantic 
potatoes with relatively high water requirements. Whereas the first goal seems to be driven 
by long term considerations, e.g. securing future development of the wider city, the local 
                                                 
50 As shown in Table 4.3, both Atlantic potatoes and other potato varieties are relatively water-intensive, particularly 
compared to grains. 
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government seems to have relatively short term financial interests, i.e. returns on investment 
in a potatoes processing company.  
Our findings indicate that government interventions in water allocation have major 
effects on the economic valuation of water for different crops. Specifically, due to the 
increased amount of water allocated to Atlantic potatoes, the marginal return of water for this 
crop is relatively low compared to other cash crops and other potatoes. Because of the limited 
observations of Atlantic potato growers in 2007, we are unfortunately not able to examine 
whether the valuation of water for this crop has declined over time policy, which would be 
expected on theoretical grounds. We further find that the marginal returns for water for other 
cash crops and other potatoes increase over time, which is consistent with the theoretical 
hypotheses. 
The valuation of water for grain crops is found to be very low in both years. It is not only 
much lower than the value of water for grain crops as estimated by Wang et al. (2003), but 
also below the water prices that are charged in our research area. Nevertheless, a large 
majority of farm households persist in growing grains and applying irrigation water on them, 
probably because of the household use (own consumption) of grains and grain subsidies 
received by farmers
51
. This result further implies that government interventions in water 
allocation have little impact on grain production and hence hardly affect grain ‘security’ (i.e. 
grain self-sufficiency), which is a major policy goal in China. 
However, due to the limitation of the datasets used for this research, the changes in the 
marginal value of irrigation water as estimated in our study should be considered as gross 
results of changes in water availability and changes of output prices. Further research should 
in particular apply a similar methodology to data collected from neighboring regions with 
                                                 
51 Since 2004, farmers received grain subsidies based on planted areas of grains. 
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similar price development but without such a water policy change to isolate the effects of the 
policy change from other conditions that changed over time.  
Further research is also needed to provide more insights into the reasons for the low 
returns for water for grains crops. Evidence from the behavioral economics literature suggests 
that people try to avoid losses (e.g. Frank, 2010). In the case at hand, farmers might apply 
more water (relative to the physical water requirements of the crop) to grain crops as an 
economically rational way to avoid bad harvests of this strategically important crop. Thus, 
low shadow values of water in grain production might also be a result of above economically 
optimal water use. More data are needed, e.g. on physical water requirements for various 
crops, to test this hypothesis. 
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Appendix 4A 
4A1: Regression results 2007  
 Grains Cash crops Other potatoes 
Levels of variable and quasi-fixed inputs 
lnwater -1.27 
(-1.01) 
0.019 
(0.02) 
-0.479 
(-0.24) 
lnseed -0.198 
(-0.11) 
0.104 
(0.18) 
-0.506 
(-0.26) 
lnfertilizer -1.21 
(-1.16) 
1.19 
(0.63) 
-0.591 
(-0.44) 
lnlabour -2.07 ** 
(-2.52) 
-4.43 ** 
(-2.25) 
-0.774 
(-0.43) 
lnmachine 0.559 
(1.04) 
0.131 
(0.13) 
0.500 
(0.98) 
lnwater*lnseed -0.171 
(-0.91) 
0.044 
(0.59) 
0.128 
(0.48) 
lnwater*lnfertilizer 0.122 
(0.95) 
-0.257 
(-0.86) 
0.388 ** 
(2.06) 
lnwater*lnlabour 0.231 ** 
(2.27) 
0.136 
(0.54) 
0.002 
(0.01) 
lnwater*lnmachine -0.029 
(-0.67) 
0.129 
(0.94) 
-0.012 
(-0.24) 
lnseed*lnfertilizer 0.202 
(1.28) 
-0.076 
(-1.31) 
-0.273 
(-1.15) 
lnseed*lnlabour 0.040 
(0.41) 
-0.104 * 
(-1.97) 
0.220 
(1.09) 
lnseed*lnmachine -0.028 
(-0.67) 
.009 
(0.30) 
-0.103 
(-1.14) 
lnfertilizer*lnlabour 0.072 
(0.73) 
0.925 *** 
(3.06) 
0.041 
(0.41) 
lnfertilizer*lnmachine -0.072 
(-1.05) 
-0.191 * 
(-1.75) 
0.024 
(0.66) 
lnlabour*lnmachine 0.024 
(0.80) 
-0.136 
(-1.61) 
-0.023 
(-0.53) 
(lnwater)
2
 0.089 
(1.42) 
0.030 
(0.88) 
-0.155 
(-1.10) 
(lnseed)
2
 0.059 
(0.59) 
0.084 *** 
(5.47) 
0.083 ** 
(2.01) 
(lnfertilizer)
2
 -0.027 
(-0.43) 
-0.076 
(-1.29) 
-0.031 
(-0.82) 
(lnlabour)
2
 0.012 
(0.40) 
-0.015 
(-0.12) 
-0.115 ** 
(-2.32) 
(lnmachine)
2
 -0.006 
(-0.96) 
0.025 
(1.03) 
0.021 
(1.65) 
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Household characteristics 
Non-working 0.001 
(0.85) 
0.003 
(0.75) 
0.002 
(0.76) 
Gender 0.002 * 
(1.68) 
-0.000 
(-0.10) 
0.000 
(0.03) 
Age head -0.001 
(-0.72) 
0.008 
(1.22) 
0.006 
(1.41) 
Education head 0.001 
(0.20) 
0.009 
(0.42) 
0.028 ** 
(2.25) 
Farm characteristics 
Slope -0.004 *** 
(-4.46) 
-0.002 
(-0.74) 
0.002 
(0.55) 
Fertility -0.062 * 
(-1.95) 
0.028 
(0.26) 
-0.034 
(-0.46) 
Agro-ecological zones 
D1 
(1=zone 1, 0=otherwise) 
0.413 *** 
(5.59) 
-0.365 
(-1.23) 
-0.021 
(-0.07) 
D2 
(1=zone 2, 0=otherwise) 
0.334 *** 
(5.39) 
-0.293 
(-1.49) 
0.039 
(0.13) 
Intercept  14.4 * 
(1.92) 
6.80 
(0.91) 
10.7 
(1.01) 
Number of observations 247 110 177 
R
2
 0.38 0.64 0.28 
Notes:  
1. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively. True parameters 
are presented, instead of the estimated coefficients, and t-statistics are in parentheses. 
2. Only 21 households planted Atlantic potatoes in 2007, so the production function for Atlantic potatoes 
cannot be estimated for the year 2007. 
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4A2: Regression results 2009  
 Grains Cash crops Atlantic potatoes Other potatoes 
Levels of variable and quasi-fixed inputs 
lnwater 1.15 
(1.28) 
0.363 *** 
(3.84) 
2.12 
(0.19) 
-1.07 
(-0.28) 
lnseed 1.06 
(1.28) 
0.085 
(0.16) 
7.58 
(1.44) 
-1.57 
(-0.59) 
lnfertilizer 0.417 
(0.56) 
2.64 * 
(1.74) 
3.44 
(1.62) 
0.408 
(0.31) 
lnlabour 0.137 
(0.34) 
-0.949 
(-1.02) 
1.28 
(0.42) 
3.44 * 
(1.82) 
lnmachine 0.463 
(1.01) 
-0.404 
(-0.43) 
-0.805 
(-0.48) 
-1.17 
(-1.47) 
lnwater*lnseed -0.077 
(-0.64) 
-0.062 
(-0.88) 
-0.764 
(-0.98) 
0.498 
(1.29) 
lnwater*lnfertilizer -0.041 
(-0.40) 
-0.347 
(-1.62) 
-0.489 
(-1.56) 
-0.251 
(-1.13) 
lnwater*lnlabour -0.061 
(-1.33) 
-0.102 
(-0.67) 
0.341 
(0.83) 
-0.512 ** 
(-2.17) 
lnwater*lnmachine -0.029 
(-0.48) 
0.085 
(0.60) 
0.152 
(0.56) 
0.121 
(1.19) 
lnseed*lnfertilizer -0.076 
(-0.98) 
-0.076 
(-0.98) 
-0.115 
(-0.60) 
0.327 * 
(1.69) 
lnseed*lnlabour 0.005 
(0.08) 
-0.002 
(-0.04) 
-0.531 * 
(-1.88) 
0.237 
(1.45) 
lnseed*lnmachine -0.007 
(-0.13) 
-0.008 
(-0.26) 
-0.104 
(-0.64) 
0.038 
(0.55) 
lnfertilizer*lnlabour 0.010 
(0.20) 
0.295 ** 
(2.31) 
0.048 
(0.41) 
-0.335 ** 
(-2.38) 
lnfertilizer*lnmachine -0.103 * 
(-1.88) 
-0.094 
(-0.92) 
0.085 
(0.58) 
0.043 
(0.74) 
lnlabour*lnmachine 0.050 ** 
(2.12) 
0.086 
(1.28) 
-0.097 
(-0.99) 
-0.011 
(-0.26) 
(lnwater)
2
 -0.037 
(-0.64) 
0.112 
(1.44) 
0.253 
(0.33) 
0.046 
(0.14) 
(lnseed)
2
 -0.032 
(-0.50) 
0.094 *** 
(3.61) 
-0.020 
(-0.09) 
-0.294 
(-1.48) 
(lnfertilizer)
2
 0.070 
(1.60) 
-0.048 
(-0.65) 
0.038 
(0.53) 
0.016 
(0.50) 
(lnlabour)
2
 -0.013 
(-0.69) 
0.033 
(0.85) 
-0.037 
(-0.22) 
0.005 
(0.07) 
(lnmachine)
2
 0.010 
(1.14) 
0.026 
(1.08) 
0.054 
(1.11) 
0.008 
(0.40) 
Household characteristics 
Non-working 0.001 
(0.72) 
-0.003 
(-0.69) 
-0.004 
(-0.65) 
0.002 
(0.55) 
Gender 0.000 -0.007 * -0.003 0.003 
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(0.08) (-1.84) (-0.57) (0.77) 
Age head 0.003 
(1.41) 
0.009 
(1.43) 
-0.001 
(-0.07) 
0.003 
(0.58) 
Education head -0.001 
(-0.15) 
-0.007 
(-0.40) 
-0.011 
(-0.35) 
0.024 
(1.63) 
Farm characteristics 
Slope -0.004 ** 
(-2.51) 
0.006 
(1.42) 
0.002 
(0.19) 
-0.001 
(-0.24) 
Fertility -0.057 * 
(-1.87) 
-0.079 
(-0.73) 
-0.128 
(-0.73) 
-0.134 * 
(-1.69) 
Agro-ecological zones 
D1 
(1=zone 1, 
0=otherwise) 
0.187 *** 
(2.69) 
-0.535 
(-1.25) 
-0.391 
(-0.72) 
-0.153 
(-0.79) 
D2 
(1=zone 2, 
0=otherwise) 
0.141 ** 
(2.35) 
-0.389 
(-1.43) 
-0.074 
(-0.19) 
0.002 
(0.01) 
Intercept  -1.04 
(-0.25) 
1.33 
(0.41) 
-30.8 
(-0.68) 
9.61 
(0.68) 
Number of 
observations 
245 116 86 152 
R
2
 0.20 0.71 0.45 0.34 
 
Note: *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively. True 
parameters are presented, instead of the estimated coefficients, and t-statistics are in parentheses. Homogeneity 
restriction imposed before estimation. 
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5. Does output market development affect irrigation water 
institutions? 
52
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
The main aim of this paper is to provide some insights into the impact of changing external 
conditions on irrigation water institutions in northern China. To this end, we perform a case 
study analysis of the impact of output market development on irrigation water trading, using 
data collected among 315 households in two surveys in Minle County, Zhangye City, Gansu 
Province, covering the years 2007 and 2009. The establishment of a large potato processing 
company in Minle County in 2008 provides a unique opportunity to examine the impact of an 
exogenous driving force on the functioning of water markets. Since Minle County is located 
within the water-saving pilot area of Zhangye City, our research also provides important 
insights into further policy reforms needed for establishing an efficient system of water 
allocation and trading. Our survey results indicate that water markets have emerged at a small 
scale in response to the development of the potato market in the region. Those who have 
started trading water rights tend to have more land with water use rights than other potato 
farmers. High transaction costs and information asymmetry between the government and 
water users, however, severely constrain the trading of water use rights in the region.  
 
                                                 
52 This chapter is based on an article that has been accepted, subject to satisfactory moderate revision, for publication by 
Agricultural Water Management, as Lei Zhang, Xueqin Zhu, Nico Heerink and Xiaoping Shi “Does output market 
development affect irrigation water institutions? – Insights from a case study in northern China”. 
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5.1 Introduction 
China is a country with substantial water resources, but their regional distribution is 
highly unequal. Water availability in the north (757 m
3
 per person in 2003) is almost 25 
percent below the internationally accepted water scarcity threshold of 1,000 m
3
 per person, 
while water availability in the south (3,208 m
3
 per person in 2003) is relatively abundant 
(Shalizi, 2006).  
The water resources available for agricultural production in China are rapidly declining 
due to increased water demand for industrial use and household consumption. The use of 
water in agriculture as a share of total water use has steadily declined from around 80 percent 
in 1980 to 61.3 percent in 2010 (World Bank, 2006; NBS, 2011). Technical innovations as 
well as water policy and management reforms are required to improve water use efficiency in 
agriculture to meet growing food demands (Rosegrant and Cai., 2002; Yang et al., 2003). The 
Ministry of Water Resources of the P.R. China has initiated a number of pilot projects to gain 
experience with the development of water-saving irrigation systems. The first of these pilot 
projects was initiated early 2002 in Zhangye City, an oasis with rich agricultural resources in 
Gansu Province in northern China. Measures taken under this project include the construction 
of an engineering system that optimizes the water distribution and an innovative system of 
water resources property rights allocation and trading.  
Zhang (2007) and Zhang et al. (2009) examine the water property rights system that was 
implemented in Zhangye City. These studies find that high transaction costs in some parts of 
the region, and management, legal, administrative and fiscal barriers in cases where 
transaction costs are low, discourage farmers from saving and trading surplus water. As a 
result, trading of water use rights is almost non-existent in this pilot project area. 
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Induced institutional innovation theory suggests that new institutions, such as tradable 
water use rights, may emerge when resources become more scarce due to growing population 
density, expansion of trade, or exogenous technological change (Hayami and Ruttan, 1985; 
Deininger, 2003). Although the theoretical literature elaborating the gains from institutional 
changes is vast and growing (Bromley, 1989; Saleth and Dinar, 2000), empirical studies 
examining drivers of institutional change are scarce due to lack of suitable data sets. 
Appropriately chosen case studies can provide deeper insights into the role of changing 
external conditions in stimulating institutional change, and may be used to formulate 
hypotheses on driving forces of institutional change that can be tested at a larger scale.  
In Minle County, one of the six counties in Zhangye City, a large potato processing 
factory was established in 2008. To meet the demand of this factory, the area grown with 
potatoes in Minle County is rapidly being expanded at the instigation of the local government. 
Potatoes need a relatively large amount of water, but the water should be applied at a later 
stage in the season than many other crops grown in the region. A detailed examination of the 
changes in the allocation of water to farm households and the trading of water by households 
that occurred since 2008 in Minle County may add to a better understanding of the impact of 
output market development on water institutions.  
The objective of this paper is to examine the impact of changing external conditions on 
the trading of irrigation water after the establishment of a large potato processing company in 
2008 in Minle County, northern China. Among the various external conditions identified in 
the existing literature, such as macroeconomic reform, political reform, international 
agreements, natural calamities, and technological progress (Saleth and Dinar, 2004), this 
study focuses on the development of a market for agricultural output. We use data collected 
for the years 2007 and 2009 among 315 households to compare water trading before and after 
the potato processing company was established, and to examine how this trading was affected 
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by changes made by the local government in the allocation of water to households in 
response to the arrival of the new factory. We find that water markets have emerged at a small 
scale in response to the development of the potato market in the region, but that high 
transaction costs and information asymmetry between government and water users may 
severely constrain the trading of water use rights in the region, and thereby limit also the 
potential efficiency gains that can be obtained from such markets.     
The next section presents the theoretical framework, focusing in particular on efficiency 
gains obtained by water markets, the role of transaction costs and the impact of exogenous 
and endogenous factors on water management institutions. Section 5.3 briefly summarizes 
recent developments in irrigation water management in China, while section 5.4 introduces 
the research area (Minle County, Zhangye City) and the data collection method. In section 5.5, 
we use the survey data and insights gained through informal field visits to examine changes 
in water trading in the period 2007-2009 and to explain the very limited functioning of the 
water market in the region. Section 5.6 draws conclusions and discusses their policy 
implications.     
 
5.2 Theoretical framework 
Water is used for many purposes such as irrigation in agriculture, hydropower generation, 
domestic consumption, industrial use and for environmental purposes. Water has an economic 
value in all its competing uses and should therefore be treated as an economic good (ICWE, 
1992). Due to its physical attributes, however, natural water is not a standard (private) 
economic good. Its consumption is non-rival when water is available in abundant quantities, 
but becomes rival when scarcity arises. Due to its fluid nature, exclusion is frequently 
impossible or may be obtained at high costs.  
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When scarcity arises, appropriate water institutions (such as well-defined water rights 
and water markets) are required to achieve an efficient allocation of water such that the total 
net benefits of water are maximized. Water institutions can be defined as the humanly devised 
constraints that regulate water development, allocation and utilization. Different institutions 
are combined in reality for water management, and continued public sector participation is 
required to deal with the public good property and fluidness of water and to address 
externalities (Griffin, 2006). As a result, various types of water institutions have been 
established in different areas around the globe.  
According to the first welfare theorem, when transaction costs are zero, establishing 
water property (use) rights and water markets are important for achieving water use efficiency, 
because a resource being managed as a transferable property will cause a market to arise and 
the market will produce a resource-conserving signal, namely its price (Griffin, 2006). Water 
trading means the exchange of water rights by willing buyers and sellers. Water trading is a 
scarcity-addressing strategy to achieve economic efficiency because water can be used to the 
highest value (e.g. Zhu and Van Ierland, 2012).  
When individual agents possess property rights in (natural) water, they will be able to 
exchange water for money or other property. Economic theory suggests that, in the absence of 
transaction costs, trading of water rights takes place until the marginal net benefits of all users 
are equalized. When a water trading scheme is implemented, the amount of water being 
transferred therefore depends on the differences between the marginal net benefits of different 
users. With a relatively large difference in marginal net benefits, water users are expected to 
trade water (transfer water rights). If there exist only small differences between the marginal 
net benefits, the traded amounts are expected to be small.  
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The existence of transaction costs in water market operations, however, can pose a 
serious hurdle for traders and limit the effectiveness of water exchange. When transaction 
costs exist, the welfare gains of tradable water will be reduced. If water is not very scarce, the 
transaction costs of trading water may be greater than the benefits. However, as demand for 
water expands over time and the shadow value of water increases, the benefits of trade will 
outweigh any transaction costs. Evidence for this is suggested by observations that in 
developed countries that allow water trading, trading activities increase significantly during 
drought years (Schoengold and Zilberman, 2007). 
There exists a close linkage between the form of water institutions (including water 
markets) and the performance of water users (i.e. water allocation efficiency) through the 
effects that different water institutions have on the costs of exchanges (transaction costs) and 
on the production costs (transformation costs) (Saleth and Dinar, 2004; Griffin, 2006;  Zhu 
and Ierland, 2012). Various factors affect this relationship between the form of water 
institutions and the performance of water users. Previous studies distinguish between 
endogenous factors such as water scarcity and financial constraints and exogenous factors 
such as macroeconomic reform, political reform, international agreements, natural calamities, 
and technological progress (e.g. Saleth and Dinar, 2004).  
With respect to endogenous factors, the relative scarcity of water and the transactions 
costs required to enforce water rights and establish water markets are found to have 
significant impacts on the functioning of water institutions. Water scarcity, arising e.g. from 
competing uses of water, creates an endogenous pressure for change, inducing change in the 
performance of water institutions and thus water-using sectors (Saleth and Dinar, 2004). In 
locations where market exchanges are novel or infrequent, transaction costs can be especially 
high due to a lack of familiarity either by market participants, their legal representatives, or 
the administrative agency (Griffin, 2006). 
89 
 
Changes in the structure of water institutions are also affected by exogenous factors such 
as historical forces, political arrangements, demographic conditions, resource endowments, 
and economic development. Economic policies, especially macroeconomic and trade (export 
market) reforms, also play an important role in providing impetus for institutional changes 
within the water sector (Saleth and Dinar, 2004).  
Given that various (endogenous and exogenous) factors influence the performance of 
water institutions and the water sector, it follows that similar water institutions that operate in 
different environments may greatly differ in their performance. It also means that the actual 
performance of an existing water institution in a given setting is an empirical question. 
Gaining insights into the most important factors explaining institutional change and 
performance in the water sector is not only relevant from a scientific point of view, but may 
also contribute to the design of policies that stimulate a more efficient use of limited water 
resources.  
The pilot project ‘Building a Water-saving Society in Zhangye City’ provides a unique 
opportunity to examine changes in water institutions and their performance in a market-
oriented setting. The establishment of a large-scale potato processing factory in Minle County 
makes it possible to examine the impact of a major exogenous driving force, namely rapid 
output market development, on water markets. Focusing on the existing water allocation and 
trade framework in Minle County, we intend to gain more insight into how the associated 
water markets work,  to what extent water use rights are exchanged, and which factors drive 
the (absence of) exchange of water use rights, when such a major exogenous driving force 
comes into play.  
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5.3 Irrigation water management in China  
Before the agrarian reforms in China in the late 1970s, water resources were managed 
primarily through collective ownership arrangements. Since the start of the reforms, a variety 
of institutional arrangements have been established to govern water resources (Mukherji and 
Shah, 2005; Zhang et al., 2008). Besides contracting out of water management and joint 
management through water users associations (WUAs), recent changes in irrigation water 
management in China mainly involve tradable water use rights and introduction of water 
pricing (Qu et al., 2011; Wang et al., 2010). 
The establishment of water markets was made possible by the revised national Water 
Law that came into force in late 2002 (Yuan and Chen, 2005). However, water markets in 
China are at an elementary stage and are generally occurring outside of a structured trading 
framework (WET, 2006). Examples of water use rights (WUR) exchange to date mainly 
include sales from one local government to another, and the transfer of WUR from irrigation 
districts to industries following water efficiency initiatives (Gao, 2006; Speed, 2009). Notably, 
these have been driven by the relevant governments and not by the free market (Speed, 2009). 
Water was generally considered a free good until the agricultural reforms, since when the 
central government encouraged the adoption of a system of volumetric surface-water pricing 
(Lohmar et al., 2003; Qu et al., 2011). Water fees were gradually introduced and increased 
since then in an effort to meet the cost of water supply and improve water efficiency. Current 
prices charged for irrigation water, however, are generally believed to be well below levels 
that are efficient (i.e. that markets would set). Irrigation water prices often do not even cover 
the costs of operating and maintaining irrigation systems (Hussain, 2005; Wang et al., 2004; 
Yang et al., 2003). 
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5.4 Description of the research area and data collection 
In our research we use information that we collected via two surveys held in Minle 
County, Zhangye City, Gansu Province. In this section we first introduce the research area 
and then briefly discuss the method of data collection.  
 
5.4.1 Research area 
Zhangye City is an oasis located midstream of the Heihe River, an inland river that flows 
across Qinghai Province, Gansu Province and Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region. It 
originates from the Qilianshan Mountains in Qinghai province and ends in Juyanhai Lake in 
Inner Mongolia. In the midstream of the Heihe River watershed, the land is flat, sunshine is 
abundant, and annual precipitation is very low while the evaporation is high. But due to the 
availability of irrigation water from the Heihe River, the area has become a major grain and 
vegetables production base in Gansu province.  
According to the Ministry of Water Resources  (2004), Zhangye City is severely short of 
water resources, even though it uses up almost all the water of Heihe River. Only 50% of the 
farmland is well irrigated, and much arable land has been abandoned due to water shortage. 
Agriculture accounts for approximately 95% of all water use and almost all water in the 
Heihe River is extracted for irrigation use. As a result, too little water flows into Juyanhai 
Lake, which dried out in 1992 and an area of 200 km
2
 around the lake became desert (MWR 
2004; Zhang et al., 2009).  
Minle County is located between the foothills of the Qilian Mountains and the lower 
lying Hexi corridor. Its total cultivated land area equals 860,000 mu, with irrigated land 
constituting 67 percent. Major crops in Minle County include barley, wheat, maize, sesame, 
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rapeseed, garlic and potato
53
. Surface water is the major water resource for irrigated 
agriculture in the area. According to Water Bureau of Minle County, , the use of groundwater 
is less than 5 percent of total water use in irrigated agriculture due to the high costs of 
pumping water from the wells.  
The water used for surface irrigation in Minle County is stored in five reservoirs in the 
Qilianshan mountains. Each of these reservoirs serves its own irrigation area within Minle 
County. One reservoir serves two irrigation areas, while the other reservoirs each serve one 
irrigation area. A county-level water management bureau (WMB) is responsible for the water 
allocation institutions within the region. Six lower-level WMBs, one for each of the seven 
irrigation areas, arrange the water allocations to WUAs within their own irrigation area. 
WUAs are responsible for arranging the water allocation to its member households. The 
households within each WUA are sub-divided into water user groups (WUGs), consisting of 
households having plots along the same channel. Since the plots of different households 
within a WUG are irrigated at the same time, households belonging to a WUG need to 
coordinate their planting decisions and water demands. A water price is charged to all farmers 
according to volume and is approximately 0.09 RMB/m
3
 in both 2007 and 2009.  
Water is allocated to farmland in the form of several rounds of irrigation each year. 
Standard water quantities per mu
54
 are assigned for each round of irrigation, and water is 
allocated according to a quota system based on the size of the so-called WUR land of the 
farmers. Not all the irrigated land is classified as WUR land. Its size depends on the labor that 
was provided by a village to the construction of the reservoirs, and on other factors like WUR 
land obtained through auctions.  
                                                 
53 Atlantic potatoes as well as some local varieties. 
54 15 mu equals one hectare. 
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5.4.2 Data collection 
A baseline survey, covering the year 2007, was carried out in May 2008. The collected 
information reflects the situation before the entry of the potato processing company, a joint 
venture
55
 of a Dutch company and the local government of Minle County. A follow-up survey, 
covering the year 2009, was held in May 2010. Comparison of the outcomes of the two 
surveys allows us to examine the changes that took place in irrigation water allocation and 
water markets since the establishment of the new company and the concomitant expansion of 
the potato market.  
The new company demands a specific variety of potatoes, named Atlantic potatoes, for 
processing into flakes and starch. In order to meet the growing demand for Atlantic potatoes, 
the local government assigned quota for Atlantic planting areas to lower level governments. 
And it also ordered the Water Management Bureaus (the ‘sellers’ of irrigation water) in the 
region to give priority to land planted with Atlantic potatoes in the allocation of water over 
the WUAs in their districts.  
The water allocation priority policy requires that in spite of the water scarcity in this 
region, a sufficient amount of irrigation water has to be reserved for irrigating Atlantic 
potatoes. The remaining quantity of irrigation water is allocated to land planted with other 
crops. Specifically, water is allocated to Atlantic potatoes according to its actual planting area, 
while water allocation to other crops is based on the WUR area. Normally the WUR area is 
smaller than the actual growing area
56
. Moreover, two or three rounds
57
 of irrigation are 
carried out for most crops, while four or five rounds are carried out for Atlantic potatoes.   
                                                 
55 The Government of Minle County owns 51% of the joint venture, and the Dutch company owns the other 49%. 
56 The average proportion of WUR land in total arable land is 72.6% for all households in our sample. 
57 Depending on the altitudes, some villages receive two rounds of irrigation, while others receive three rounds (to be 
explained later this section). 
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The surveys used for this study were carried out by staff and students from Gansu 
Academy of Social Sciences, Gansu Agricultural University, and Nanjing Agricultural 
University. Fifteen households per village were interviewed in 21 villages, giving us a dataset 
containing 315 observations
58
 for the years 2007 and 2009 (see Wachong Castro et al., 2010 
for a description of the sampling method). Out of these 315 households, 265 households were 
interviewed in both surveys. The dataset includes information about crop production, use of 
water and other inputs, water trading, WUA participation, water and other prices, land tenure 
and land use, and so on.    
 
5.5 Water allocation and water markets in Minle County 
Zhang et al. (2009) analyses the implementation of the tradable water rights system as 
part of the water-saving pilot project carried out in Zhangye City since 2002, using survey 
data covering the year 2003 collected in five different irrigation areas (out of the 25 main 
irrigation areas in Zhangye City). One of the selected irrigation areas, Hongshuihe, is located 
in Minle County while the other four are located in other counties. Their study finds no WUR 
exchanges in the four irrigation areas where there are groundwater sources, and a very limited 
number of water exchanges in the Hongshuihe irrigation area, where use of groundwater is 
not a realistic alternative due to the high pumping costs involved. Among the 380 households 
in the Hongshuihe irrigation area interviewed in their survey, five households traded WUR
59
 
with other households. All exchanges took place within the own village, and against payment. 
The average price was 0.025 USD/m
3
 (or 0.20 RMB/ m
3
) 
                                                 
58 In two villages, 16 instead of 15 households were interviewed in May 2008. The last observation in these two villages was 
dropped from the sample so that we have 15 households in each village in each survey.  
59 For reasons mentioned below, we disregard the 8 so-called ‘long-term trades’ distinguished by Zhang et al. (2009) 
consisting of water and land use rights that are being transferred together.  
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According to our first survey in Minle County, none of the 315 interviewed households 
traded water in 2007. In the second survey round, however, 15 of the 315 interviewed 
households (4.8 percent) answered that they traded water in 2009. Among these 15 
households, seven are living in the Hongshuihe irrigation area, where the water exchanges 
observed in the study by Zhang et al. (2009) occurred. Given that 105 out of the 315 
households interviewed in our survey live in the Hongshuihe area, this means that 6.7 percent 
of the interviewed households in that area traded WUR in 2009. Table 5.1 summarizes the 
trend in WUR exchanges in the Hongshuihe irrigation area based on Zhang et al. (2009) and 
our two surveys. The data suggest an increasing trend, but overall the percentage of 
households involved in exchanging WUR remains very small. 
 
Table 5.1: Water trading in Hongshuihe irrigation area in 2003, 2007 and 2009 
 2003 2007 2009 
Number of households 
interviewed  
380 105 105 
Number of households 
exchanging WUR 
5 0 7 
Percentage of households 
exchanging WUR 
1.3 0 6.7 
Sources: Zhang et al. (2009) for 2003; our surveys for 2007 and 2009 
 
Water trading may possibly be related to land rental transactions among households, 
since rented land also needs water. Seven out of the 15 households that traded water in 2009 
(i.e. 47 percent) were involved in the renting out/in of land. Among the 300 households that 
did not trade water in 2009, 128 (43 percent) rented out/in some land. In other words, land 
transfers do not seem to play a role in the reported water exchanges. When land is being 
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rented out to other households, the water rights are normally part of the same deal and are 
unlikely to be considered by households as water trade.  
Out of the 15 households that traded water in 2009, 12 were involved in water exchanges 
without payments (see Table A1 in the Appendix for details). That is to say, a household 
received an amount of water from another household in one round of irrigation and returned 
the same amount of water in another round, or even within the same round. Such water 
exchanges normally occur between households that are very familiar with each other. The 
quantities of water that were exchanged varied from 10 to 3000 m
3
. Two of the 15 households 
bought water from another household (at a price of 0.1 RMB/m
3
, roughly equal to the fee of 
0.094 RMB//m
3 
paid for the allocated water) in one irrigation round in 2009, and sold the 
same quantity of water (100 and 150 m
3
, respectively) to the same household at the same 
price in another irrigation round in 2009. One household that exchanged water with another 
household also bought a large quantity of water (3,000 m
3
) later in the season at a price of 0.2 
RMB/m
3
. And finally there was one household that received 900 m
3
 of water without 
payment in 2009 and also bought some water (100 m
3
) at a price of 0.16 RMB/m
3
 early in the 
year.    
What role did the establishment of the potato processing company and the priority given 
to Atlantic potatoes in water allocation play in promoting these water exchanges? Among the 
15 households who traded water in 2009, ten households (i.e. 2/3) grew Atlantic potatoes that 
were supplied to the new company. Out of the 315 households that we interviewed, 105 (i.e. 
only 1/3) grew Atlantic potatoes in 2009. This result indicates that Atlantic potato growers  
were relatively more involved in water trade than other farmers.  
As mentioned before, Atlantic potatoes require a relatively large amount of water, but 
later in the season. They do not need water during the first irrigation round (early May), when 
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the seedlings are still small, but receive water during the other irrigation rounds and extra 
irrigation rounds later in the year. As discussed in section 5.2, water users have an incentive 
to trade WUR whenever the marginal net benefits of water differ between water users. For 
Atlantic potato growers, the marginal benefits of water are expected to be relatively low 
during the first irrigation round and much higher during the later rounds. In our data, however, 
we hardly find any Atlantic potato growers who provide water to other households during the 
first round (early May) and obtain water in return during a later irrigation round (see Table 
A1 in the Appendix). The spring period is a very dry season in Minle County, and hence there 
is a high demand for applying water to most crops during the first irrigation round. It may 
therefore be assumed that the marginal benefit of water is very high for all farmers during the 
first irrigation round, and no water trading takes place. Later in the year, when there is more 
precipitation, the marginal benefits of irrigating water become lower. The water that Atlantic 
potato farmers receive during extra irrigation rounds may not always fit the growing 
requirements of the crop. Hence, it makes sense for them to exchange part of this additional 
water with other households in their own water user group or village.         
Why did only ten of the Atlantic potato growers trade water in 2009, and the other 95 did 
not? A number of factors may play a role. Firstly, households with better-educated heads 
possibly have more knowledge about water markets and may be more efficient farmers that 
obtain higher marginal net benefits of water. The average education level of the head of the 
household for all the non-trading households who planted Atlantic potatoes in 2009 is 7.95 
years, while that of the households who traded water in 2009 is 8.50 years on average (see 
Table 5.2). But the difference is not statistically significant. Secondly, a larger area planted 
with Atlantic potatoes results in the allocation of more water due to the water allocation 
priority policy, and may induce more water trading. In 2009, the size of the area planted with 
Atlantic potatoes for the ten households that traded water was 1.04 mu while it was 0.91 mu 
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for the other farm households growing Atlantic potatoes (Table 5.2). But again the difference 
is not statistically significant. Likewise, the difference in the total arable land size did not 
differ significantly between the two groups in 2009. One important aspect that differed 
significantly (at a 5% testing level) was the size of the WUR land (see the last two columns 
of Table 5.2). Atlantic potato farmers who traded water rights had significantly more WUR 
land (22.0 mu on average) than other Atlantic potato farmers (14.8 mu on average). As 
mentioned in Section 5.3, water is allocated to crops other than Atlantic potatoes according to 
their WUR area. Therefore, households owning land with a large WUR area receive relatively 
much water for irrigating all crops that they grow, and may find it profitable to transfer some 
of their surplus water to other households.   
Table 5.2: Characteristics of Atlantic potato growers: water traders vs. non-traders 
 Education of 
head  (years) 
Arable land 
(mu) 
Atlantic potatoes 
area (mu) 
WUR land  
(mu) 
Mean Std. 
Dev. 
Mean Std. 
Dev. 
Mean Std. 
Dev. 
Mean Std. 
Dev. 
Atlantic growers 8.00 2.42 20.0 11.2 0.92 0.657 15.3 11.7 
            Water traders 8.50 2.97 22.0 12.4 1.04 0.847 20.0 ** 7.0 
Others 7.95 2.91 19.8 11.1 0.91 0.638 14.8 ** 7.6 
Whole sample 7.49 3.51 19.6 12.5 0.31 0.575 13.8 7.8 
Notes: ** indicates that the difference between the group means is statistically significant at the 5% testing 
level. The differences between the mean values of the other variables are not significant at the 10% level for 
water traders and other Atlantic growers. 
Another important aspect of the functioning of water markets is the pricing of water. 
Under a proper water trading scheme, the water price should reflect its marginal value to 
buyers and sellers. In the absence of transaction costs, each unit of water will be worth the 
same at the margin to each agent after the exchange. For this to happen, water users should be 
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free to set their own prices for exchanged WUR. However, water prices are not fully market 
determined in Minle County. According to the Bureau of Water Resource Management in 
Zhangye City, the prices of exchanged water are not allowed to exceed 0.3 RMB/m
3
. If a 
household charges a higher price for its WUR, the WUR allocated to that household can be 
withdrawn by the local government.  
High transaction costs may also be an important obstacle to the development of water 
markets (see Section 5.2). Transaction costs faced by households interested in trading water 
include time and costs involved in acquiring information on possible water trading 
procedures, in searching for households willing to sell or buy water, in negotiating the 
conditions of the water transfer, and in monitoring and enforcing water transfers (see also 
Zhang et al., 2009). In this respect, trust may play an important role. Low levels of trust result 
in relatively high transaction costs. The exchanges of WUR that we observed in our survey 
all occurred between relatives or neighbors, where levels of trust tend to be high. 
Information that we obtained during field visits and informal talks with farmers provides 
additional insights into the reasons why only few households traded their water rights. In the 
first place, the amount of water allocated to households is often considered insufficient for 
irrigating all the crops that they planted, let alone that they would have redundant water for 
selling. This implies that it is difficult for households willing to buy water to find potential 
sellers, given the prevailing water price ceiling. In the second place, if there exist large 
differences in marginal benefits of water between farm households, the incentives for 
exchanging water will be large. In our research area, however, differences in marginal 
benefits between farm households may be relatively small. Irrigation requirements mean that 
farmers need to tune their crop choice and management decisions with other households 
within the same WUGs and WUAs. As a result, farmers within the same village tend to grow 
similar crops with similar (planting and irrigation) technologies.  
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Costs of obtaining (reliable) information are an important element of transaction costs.  
In our survey held in May 2010 we asked questions about farmers’ understanding of the 
tradability of their WUR in 2007 and 2009. Although the exchange of WUR is permitted 
since 2002 in this area, only 9.8% of the interviewed households were aware that they could 
exchange water with payment, while 24.1% realized that they were allowed to exchange 
water without payment in 2007. In 2009, these percentages were only slightly higher: 10.8% 
thought that they were allowed to exchange water with payment, and 27.9% thought that they 
were allowed to exchange water without payment (Table 5.3). Therefore, the information 
asymmetry between the government and water users may be one of the main obstacles of 
water trading in this region. 
As mentioned above, the price that farmers can charge for water should not exceed 0.3 
RMB/m
3
. Theoretically, the price constraint is expected to affect the exchange of WUR, 
through limiting the supply of water and increase its demand. However, in our survey we 
found that only six people were aware of the upper limit set by the government. Therefore, 
the price limit does not seem to constrain the exchange of WUR in this case.   
 
Table 5.3: Farmers’ understanding of the exchange of Water Use Rights 
Are you allowed to exchange water without payment? 
2007 
2009 
Yes (%) No (%) No idea (%) 
Yes (%) No (%) No idea (%) 
24.1 52.4 23.5 
27.9 48.9 23.2 
Are you allowed to exchange water with payment? 
2007 2009 
Yes (%) No (%) 
No idea (%) Yes (%) 
No (%) No idea (%) 
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9.8 64.4 
25.7 10.8 
62.5 26.7 
Given the current low water price and limited availability of water, the marginal benefits 
of water will probably exceed the actual water price (0.09 RMB/m
3 
on average) for many 
farmers. The lack of appropriate information and the low water price charged by the WMBs, 
however, limit the functioning of the water market even though a tradable WUR system has 
been introduced through the pilot project and even though the establishment of the large 
potato processing company has created more economic incentives for water trading. If 
farmers would be well-informed that they are allowed to exchange WUR and would be free 
in choosing a water price without any restriction, more farmers will be expected to sell or buy 
water at prices that most likely will exceed the current fixed water price and in some cases 
perhaps even the current ceiling on the water price. 
 
5.6 Conclusions and policy implications  
This case study analyses the impact of output market development on irrigation water 
institutions, using a two-year household survey data sets collected in Minle County in 
northern China. The study contributes to the research area of impact of output market 
development of the functioning of water markets, which has received very little attention in 
the existing literature so far. Our findings indicate that development of an output market does 
not tend to have significant impact on water markets, they however provide a basis of future 
research to be undertaken in this field. 
Previous research by Zhang et al. (2009) based on a household survey data set covering 
the year 2003 shows that water exchange took place at a very small scale in Zhangye City 
after a system of tradable WUR was introduced in 2002. Our case study of Minle County, one 
of the six counties within Zhangye City, shows that a slightly larger water market has set off 
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after the entry of a potato processing company in 2008. Potatoes need a relatively large 
amount of water, but they need it later in the season than many other crops grown in the 
region. To secure an adequate supply of potatoes to the newly established factory, the 
government of Minle County allocated more water to farmers planting Atlantic potatoes, the 
variety that the factory needs. Observed water trade in our survey of the year 2009 consists 
mainly of the exchange of water without payment between relatives or neighbors, and seems 
to be meant to improve the timing of water applications to crops with different seasonal water 
requirements. Yet, only 4.8 percent of the interviewed households were involved in WUR 
trade in 2009. A more detailed analysis of the water transactions made by these households 
shows that a relatively large share of Atlantic potato farmers are involved, and that these 
farmers tend to have better access to irrigation water than other (Atlantic as well as non-
Atlantic) farmers. 
We further find that high transaction costs, particularly costs of obtaining adequate 
information, and the existing information asymmetry between government and farmers may 
be two major factors limiting the trading of WUR and thus the overall functioning of water 
institutions which are supposed to improve water allocation efficiency. Our survey results 
indicate that in 2009, only 27.9 percent of the interviewed households was aware that they 
were allowed WUR without payment, while only 10.8 percent knew that they were allowed 
to charge money for exchanging WUR.   
Efficient use of scarce water resources requires that the price of water reflects its true 
scarcity value. This can be achieved by leaving the prices of water resources to be decided by 
the market instead of setting a ceiling on the price that can be charged for trading WUR.  
Creating proper institutions for the development of water markets, reducing transaction 
costs involved in using water markets (particularly through provision of more adequate 
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information) and removing existing restrictions on water prices are important preconditions 
for improving economic efficiency of water use. In the implementation of these measures, 
due attention should be given to potential negative effects on the achievement of other 
important policy goals such as reduced income inequality and maintenance of grain self-
sufficiency. If such negative effects are found to occur, appropriate counteracting measures 
may need to be undertaken without compromising the goal of achieving more efficient water 
use in irrigated agriculture.   
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Appendix 5A 
Traded water quantities and prices in Minle County, 2009 
Household Atlantic 
potato 
grower 
Direction Quantity 
(m3) 
Price        
(RMB/ m3) 
Time Direction Quantity 
(m3) 
Price       
(RMB/ m3) 
Time 
1 no in 150 0* NA out 150 0* NA 
2 yes in 440 0* 12 June out 440 0* 12 July 
3 no in 10 0* April out 10 0* June 
4 yes in 100 0.1 July out 100 0.1 August 
5 no out 350 0* August in 350 0* September 
6 yes in              in 240       
3000 
0*             
0.2 
12 June                
20 Sept. 
out 240 0* 17 June 
7 yes in 400 0* Early July out 400 0* End July 
8 yes out 150 0.1 May in 150 0.1 June 
9 yes in 250 0* May out 250 0* May 
10 no in 25 0* 3 June out 25 0* 10 June 
11 yes in 500 0* May out 500 0* May 
12 yes in 350 0* August out 350 0* 2010 
13 yes in 540 0* 20 June out 540 0* 20 Sept. 
14 no in 900 0* June in 100 1.6 January 
15 yes in 100 0* 5 June out 100 0* 20 June 
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Note: * refers to water exchange between different irrigation rounds, without any payment. 
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6. Conclusions and discussion 
 
 
 6.1 Introduction 
The competition for scarce water resources is becoming more and more intense, 
particularly in developing countries. Agriculture is central in meeting this challenge because 
the production of food and other agricultural products takes around 70% of the freshwater 
withdrawals from rivers and groundwater (Molden, 2007). Water scarcity may become an 
important constraint on future food production growth (Rosegrant and Cai 2002; Dinar 2012), 
and policies and institutions are important for efficient and sustainable use of water resources 
(Binswanger-Mkhize, Meinzen-Dick et al. 2010).  
In China the average amount of water per person is only 2300-2400 m
3
/year, about one 
quarter of the world average (Falkenmark et al., 1989). Water available for use in agriculture 
in China has been reduced by increased water demand for industrial and consumption usage 
(increasing by 23.8 percent over the period 1997-2006). In addition, water resources are 
distributed in a highly uneven way across Chinese regions, and current water scarcity in the 
North is most intense (World Bank 2001).  
In order to address the rapidly increasing resource scarcity, market-oriented instruments 
as well as institutional innovations like water pricing and water users associations (WUAs) 
have been introduced in recent years by the Chinese government (Qu et al., 2011). Analyzing 
the impact of these water policies and institutional innovations is of great importance, and can 
be used to inform policy makers about intended as well as unintended effects of their policies 
and institutional arrangements. 
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Empirical analysis of policies and institutions regarding irrigation water use in China are 
scanty due to limited data availability. Relevant topics analyzed in the available studies 
mainly include, among others, performance of farmer-managed systems through WUAs, and 
barriers of development of water markets. These existing quantitative analyses, however, 
suffer from a lack of well-established theoretical frameworks. This study aims to provide 
more insights into the household-level effects of some major recent water policies and 
institutions in northern China, by taking into account the specific local context.. In particular, 
existing differences in government objectives (such as sustainable water use, promoting cash 
crop production, and ensuring grain self-sufficiency) between different levels of government 
are taken into account. The policies and institutional innovations examined in this study 
include WUAs (Chapter 2), government intervention in the allocation of water (Chapters 3 
and 4), and the establishment of a market for tradable water use rights (Chapter 5). Relevant 
theoretical frameworks are used in each of the chapters to guide the empirical analyses. 
The study is based on a dataset collected through two surveys that were carried out in 
Minle County, Gansu Province in northern China in May 2008 and May 2010, covering 
information for the years 2007 and 2009. Econometric methods and a case study approach are 
used to examine the effects of the aforementioned policy interventions and institutional 
innovations on the surveyed households. The rest of this chapter proceeds as follows: Section 
6.2 summarizes and integrates the main findings, and discusses the contribution to the 
available literature. The policy recommendations are then discussed in section 6.3. Finally, the 
limitations of this study and suggestions for future research are outlined in section 6.4. 
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6.2 Summary of the main findings 
 
Conditions for successful performance of WUAs: 
An important topic in the available literature on non-price factors in irrigation water 
management is the performance of farmer-managed systems through WUAs (Wang et al., 
2005; Wang et al., 2006; Wang et al., 2010; Ricks and Arif, 2012; Phadnis and Kulshrestha, 
2012). The limited available literature for northern China focuses on the performance of 
World Bank initiated WUAs versus other WUAs and on five key factors that have been 
identified by World Bank project officers as crucial factors in successful WUA performance. 
They neglect, however, other factors that have been identified in the available literature on 
sustainable governance of common-pool resources and which may play an important role in 
the sustainable management of irrigation water systems (Wade, 1988; Ostrom, 1990; Baland 
and Platteau, 1996; Agrawal, 2003; Ostrom, 2007; Ostrom, 2009; Ostrom, 2010).  
By applying a theoretical framework developed by Agrawal (2003), we examine which 
WUA characteristics affect the water productivity of WUA member households. Our results 
indicate that WUA group characteristics, in particular group size, number of sub-groups and 
heterogeneity of land endowments, are important factors in explaining water productivity. 
Other factors that play a role include the pressure on the water resource caused by a large 
unmet water demand and the degree of dependency on the resource as measured by the share 
of households with migrant heads in a WUA. Another noteworthy result is that resource 
characteristics, i.e. resource size and degree of overlap between the WUA boundaries and 
natural boundaries, do not significantly affect water productivity in our research area.     
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Impact of government interventions in water allocation on farmers’ acreage allocation to 
different crops 
Despite the economic liberalization process, the Chinese government at different levels 
continues to intervene into decision making processes for a variety of (often well-intended) 
reasons. Such interventions include, for example, farm household decision making on crops 
that will be planted and the preferential allocation of irrigation water allocation to households 
that plant specific crops. They may affect the planting of, and irrigation water use on, crops 
that are not subject to interventions. More insight is needed in such (frequently unintended) 
side-effects in order to assist policy makers in their decision making.  
Existing studies of the effects of government interventions in farmers’ production 
decisions focus in particular on input subsidies (e.g. Chibwana et al., 2011) and farm output 
price support (e.g. Floyd, 1965). The impact of direct government intervention in a major 
input market on farmers’ cropping decisions is a neglected issue. In the research area of this 
study, the regional government intervenes in the availability of water for farm households by 
allocating more water to a specific cash crop (i.e. Atlantic potatoes) that it would like to 
promote. Assigning more irrigation water to one crop implies an indirect subsidy of the use of 
water on that crop and an indirect taxation of water applied in alternative uses.  
The results of the empirical analysis confirm the well-known observation that direct 
government interventions often tend to have unintended side-effects. Specifically, while the 
government intervention in water allocation aims to stimulate the production of Atlantic 
potatoes, we find that farmers decisions on land allocated to Atlantic potatoes are not 
significantly affected. The survey answers given by interviewed households on questions 
about planting decisions indicate that Atlantic potato planting decisions are mainly taken by 
village leaders instead of households. 
 110 
Due to the government intervention in water allocation, a smaller amount of water is 
available for other crops than Atlantic potatoes. The results of the empirical analysis show that 
farmers respond by planting more grain crops and fewer other potatoes (i.e. other varieties of 
potatoes than Atlantic potatoes), as potatoes have relatively large water requirements.  
The finding that planting decisions of farm households are strongly affected by village 
leaders is consistent with findings for cotton farmers in southern Xinjiang (Spoor et al. 2013). 
Given the fact that contracts on high-value crops with processing companies and traders are 
frequently signed by village leaders and higher level governments in order to save on 
transaction costs, it may be expected that planting decisions in other parts of China are also 
strongly influenced by local governments. This finding clearly has important implications for 
the analysis of farm household behaviour in China, which tends to apply standard approaches 
derived from neoclassical micro-economic production and farm household theory. I will 
return to this issue in Section 6.4.      
 
Economic valuation of irrigation water and the impact of government interventions in 
water allocation 
Previous studies estimating the value of agricultural water in China have concentrated on 
comparing the valuation between different crops, based on cross section data. The main 
conclusion of these studies (e.g. Yang et al., 2003; Wang et al., 2003; Lohmar et al., 2003) is 
that the water price charged by the WMBs is considerably below its value.  
This study adds to the available literature, for China as well as other countries, by 
examining the impact of a government intervention in water allocation to specific crops on 
(changes in) the economic value of crops. Two hypotheses on the economic values of different 
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crops before and after the intervention are derived from standard micro-economic theory, and 
are tested with the household survey data set for Minle County.  
The results show that before the water allocation intervention the valuation of irrigation 
water differed considerably between various crops, which is inconsistent with theoretical 
expectations. In particular, the returns of water used for grain crops are very low and are even 
below the water prices that are charged to farm households. Potential explanations of this 
finding are that a large part of grain crops are used for own consumption by households, and 
that farmers may have incentives to grow more grains and apply more irrigation water on 
them in order to receive (area-based) grain subsidies. 
The regression results for the year after the government intervention in water allocation 
are consistent with the hypothesis that value of irrigation water is lower for the crop that 
receives extra water (Atlantic potatoes) than for other crops, and that the water value increases 
for those other crops. The only exception is the water value for grains, which remains low 
after the government intervention in water allocation and in fact underlies the water value of 
Atlantic potatoes. But the water values of other cash crops (i.e. other cash crops than Atlantic 
potatoes) and especially other potatoes (i.e. other potatoes than Atlantic potatoes) exceed 
those of Atlantic potatoes in our data set and increase over time as predicted by theory.  
 
Impact of output market development on functioning of water markets 
Market-based allocation of water resources is considered a key mechanism for promoting 
more efficient water use. Several studies have shown theoretically and empirically the 
benefits of such markets (Rosegrant and Binswanger, 1994; Rosegrant et al., 1995; Easter et 
al., 1998; Ringler et al., 2006). Water markets have emerged only recently in north China, and 
have received limited attention in the literature so far. Based on  what is known for other 
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countries (Grafton et al., 2012; Lefebvre et al., 2012; Wildman and Forde, 2012), issues 
related to property rights and transaction costs are expected to play a relatively major role in 
the development of water markets during the rapid transition process that the Chinese 
economy is undergoing. Empirical research examining in detail the water trading among farm 
households in pilot areas where innovative system of water resources property rights 
allocation and trading are implemented is needed to provide deeper insight into the factors 
that determine whether or not water markets are successful. The research area where the 
survey data for this study are collected is located within such a pilot area.   
Available theory (summarized e.g. in Saleth and Dinar) suggests various factors that play 
a role in the performance of water institutions such as water markets. These factors may be 
grouped into endogenous factors such as water scarcity and financial constraints, and 
exogenous factors such as macroeconomic reform, political reform, international agreements, 
natural calamities, and technological progress. Given the establishment of a major potato 
processing company in the research area that became operational after the first survey year 
and before the second survey year, the focus of this study is on the impact of output market 
development as a major exogenous factor on the performance of the water market.  
The survey results show that water markets have emerged at a very limited scale in 
response to the establishment of the potato processing company. Observed water trading in 
the survey is mainly the exchange of water without payment between relatives or neighbors, 
and seems to be meant to improve the timing of water applications to crops with different 
seasonal water requirements. Potatoes need a relatively large amount of water, but they need it 
later in the season than many other crops grown in the region. Those potato farmers who have 
started trading water rights tend to have more land with water use rights than other potato 
farmers in the research area. High transaction costs, particularly costs of obtaining adequate 
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information, and information asymmetry between government and farmers, however, severely 
limit the trading of water use rights. 
 
Conclusion 
Various market-oriented instruments and institutional innovations like water pricing and 
WUAs have been introduced in recent years by the Chinese government to address the 
problem of growing water scarcity in northern China. Given the fast growth rates of the 
Chinese economy, the limited availability of water and land resources, and the process of 
economic and institutional transformation that the country is going through, important lessons 
can be learned from research on the irrigation policies and institutional innovations that are 
being implemented in northern China. Before implementing a new policy at a large scale, the 
Chinese government usually first experiments with the policy at a small scale in one or more 
pilot project areas. Lessons learned from these pilots are then taken into account when the 
policy is scaled up to the national level.  
The research area in this study, Minle County in Zhangye City, Gansu Province, is 
particularly interesting for research on irrigation policies and institutions for two main reasons. 
In the first place, Zhangye City was the first region in China where the Ministry of Water 
Resources initiated a pilot project in 2002 to examine the implementation of tradable water 
use rights and other policy measures promoting water savings in agriculture. And in the 
second place, a large-scale potato processing company has been established in Minle County, 
and became operational in 2008. Because the factory mainly processes potatoes that are 
grown within Minle County, it allows us to examine in detail the impact of a major external 
driving factor of institutional change – growing output demand – on the functioning of (novel) 
irrigation water institutions 
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In the chapter on WUAs it is found that the external environment of WUAs, as measured 
by the share of land planted with marketed crops in a WUA, does not significantly affect the 
water productivity of member households. The water productivity of WUA member 
households is significantly affected by the size of a WUA and several other WUA 
characteristics, but the degree of involvement in cash crop production does not seem to play 
an important role. In the chapter on water markets it is found that markets for tradable water 
use rights have emerged at a very limited scale in response to the establishment of the potato 
processing company. Ten percent of the farmers that grow potatoes for the new factory were 
involved in water use rights transactions in 2009, while no trading of water use rights took 
place in the year before the factory became operational. High transaction costs and 
information asymmetry between the local government and farmers in the region, however, 
continue to serve as major bottlenecks for the further development of water markets. 
In the chapters on farmers’ cropping decisions and irrigation water valuation, a 
government intervention related to output market development, namely the allocation of 
additional water to farmers growing potatoes for the new potato factory, is examined. It is 
found that the intervention induces farmers to plant more grains instead of local potato 
varieties that are not sold to the new factory and that require more water than grains. But the 
share of land allocated to the potato variety that is sold to the new factor is not affected, 
because its planting decisions are mainly taken by village leaders instead of households. In the 
chapter on irrigation water valuation it is found that the government intervention augments 
existing economic inefficiencies in water allocation. Estimated water values are consistent 
with the hypothesis that increased water allocation to a specific crop causes the value of 
irrigation water used on that crop to be lower than the value of irrigation water used on other 
crops.  
In conclusion, the empirical results presented in this study show that output market 
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development had just a limited impact on the development of a tradable water use rights 
market in Minle County, and no significant impact on water productivity. The government 
intervention in irrigation water allocation that accompanied the introduction of the new cash 
crop in the region led to economic inefficiencies in the allocation of irrigation water and in 
farmers’ cropping choices.   
 
6.3 Policy implications 
In this section the policy implications of the research findings will be stipulated by 
suggesting some policy measures for improving the management of water resources. A few 
important ongoing water policies and institutional innovations in northern China are analyzed 
separately in this study. The revealed impacts of these policies and institutions provide more 
insights to policy makers into whether their interventions in water resource management have 
achieved their intended goals, and what unintended effects have been generated. Since the 
research area (i.e. Minle County) is located within the water-saving pilot area of Zhangye City, 
these policy implications may guide future policy making regarding irrigation water use at a 
larger scale. 
Increasing irrigation water productivity is of crucial importance for maintaining food self-
sufficiency, a major national-level policy goal in China. Collection action within WUAs may 
play an important role in this respect. Much attention is paid by policy makers and in the 
available literature to the five so-called key design principles of WUAs as identified by World 
Bank project managers. The findings in Chapter 2 show that a number of factors that are 
commonly identified in the literature on sustainable management of common pool resources 
also need to be taken into account if WUAs are to be successful in promoting higher water use 
efficiencies. In particular it is found that WUAs with a relatively small number of member 
 116 
households, a large number of WUGs, and a low pressure on the available water resources are 
more likely to achieve relatively high water use efficiencies. Water management reforms in 
northern China are more likely to be successful in stimulating water productivity and possibly 
even farm income levels, if these characteristics are taken into account and, wherever possible, 
manipulated in appropriate directions. 
The impact of a government intervention in the allocation of irrigation water is examined 
in Chapter 3 and Chapter 4. With regard to crop choices of farm households, the empirical 
evidence in Chapter 3 indicates that planting decisions of the crop that receives additional 
water (i.e. Atlantic potatoes) are not affected because those planting decisions are mainly 
taken by village leaders. Instead, the evidence indicates that the policy intervention induces a 
shift in planted land area from other potato varieties to grains, because Atlantic potatoes 
require more water than other potato varieties, while grains need less water than both Atlantic 
potatoes and other potato varieties. In other words, the government intervention in water 
allocation induces an economic inefficiency that is expected to influence farm household 
incomes in a negative way. More evidence of the inefficiency created by the government 
intervention is presented in Chapter 4. In theory the value of irrigation water should be equal 
for all crops. But the estimates presented in Chapter 4 show that the water value is lower in 
Atlantic potatoes than in other potato varieties and in other cash crops. Moreover, the value of 
water has gone up for other potato varieties and other cash crops after the intervention. 
Interventions in water allocation may be motivated by the need to increase the yields and 
profits of a newly introduced crop, so that farmers become more familiar with the crop and its 
management needs. Such interventions should, however, be temporary and be abolished when 
farmers have become accustomed to the new technology. In addition, local governments 
should take into consideration the economic inefficiencies that may be created by an 
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intervention when deciding whether or not to stimulate a specific crop by intervening in the 
allocation of irrigation water.          
The third and last policy that was examined in this study is the introduction of markets for 
tradable water use rights. The establishment of water markets is a major element of the pilot 
project in Zhangye City, and some local officials claim that it is a big success, saving about 
one-sixth of the annual water consumption (Zhao, 2007; Lin, 2008). The reality on the ground, 
however, is quite different. The data presented in Chapter 5 confirm results of earlier studies 
showing that hardly any water is being traded among households in the region. Even though 
an important output market is developed in Minle County, the county within Zhangye City 
where the data for this study were collected, the trading of water use rights within that county 
remains very limited. The development of well-functioning markets for irrigation water 
requires that a number of basic conditions are satisfied. These conditions include the 
reduction of information costs and other transaction costs involved in using water markets and 
reducing information asymmetry between the local government and farmers by improving 
information access for farmers. In particular, farm households need adequate information 
about the prices that can be charged for traded water (i.e. to what extent farmers have the 
freedom to charge their own prices), and about potential sellers/buyers of water. Results of the 
valuation of irrigation water (Chapter 4) indicate that the returns of irrigation water used on 
non-grain crops exceed the water prices that are charged to farmers. Therefore, when the basic 
conditions for a properly functioning water market are met, trading of water use rights is 
expected to become more popular and to provide an important contribution to increased water 
productivity in the research area of this study as well as in other parts of northern China where 
similar policies are implemented.   
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6.4 Limitations and suggestions for future research 
The research done in this study has a number of limitations that may be addressed in 
follow-up studies that address the issue of follow-up research on policies and institutions in 
irrigation water management in northern China. These limitations concern the approaches 
used in each of the empirical chapters as well as the study as a whole.  
The WUA characteristics used as explanatory variables of water productivity in Chapter 2 
are based on the theoretical framework formulated by Agrawal (2003). Not all elements of 
that framework are included in the analysis. Only those elements were included for which 
suitable indicators can be identified in the survey data set and for which the indicators show a 
sufficient degree of variation between the WUAs in the sample. As a result, the roles of a few 
factors as identified in the theoretical framework have not been tested in this study. For 
example, according to Agrawal (2003), appropriate levels of external aid are needed in cases 
where local residents may not undertake conservation activities without such compensations. 
The amount of government subsidies (e.g. for canal construction and maintenance) received 
by the WUAs may be used as an appropriate indicator in this regard. However, only two out 
of the 21 WUAs in the study area received such subsidies during the surveyed year. The 
variation between WUAs in this indicator is therefore too limited to be included in the 
empirical analysis.  
In Chapter 3, we concluded that the government intervention in water allocation results in 
a shift from planting local potato varieties towards grains with relatively low water 
requirements. Further research is required to investigate whether it is the water requirements 
of different crops or other factors that motivate farmers to switch between the two groups of 
crops. Moreover, the reason for the insignificant response of land allocated to cash crops 
needs further investigation. In particular, given the role played by village leaders in planting 
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decisions for Atlantic potatoes, it may be investigated to what extent farmers’ decisions on 
cash crop growing are influenced by the local government (village leaders). 
In Chapter 4, the theoretical hypotheses were partly confirmed by the empirical results. 
Yet, other factors that changed during the period 2007-2009 may at least partly have been 
responsible for the results that were obtained in addition to the government intervention in 
water allocation. Further research is needed to identify to what extent the results are 
confounded by such parallel changes. Another noteworthy finding is the very low valuation of 
irrigation water used on grain crops. Research is needed to test the propositions that were 
forwarded in that chapter to explain this finding. 
In Chapter 5, a case study approach was used to examine the development of the water 
market in the study region. The limited number of observations on water trading did not allow 
the application of statistical methods. Given that water trading is recently also being promoted 
in other parts of northern China, more insights into the drivers of and obstacles to water 
market development may be obtained by doing a large-scale survey across different regions 
and applying appropriate econometric methods to the collected data. 
The research carried out in this study raises a number of methodological issues that may 
be addressed in further research. In the first place, the research was carried out in a region 
where water markets are being promoted and where the local government actively intervenes 
in the allocation of irrigation water. No comparison was made with regions having 
comparable characteristics that did not implement similar policies. Further research should 
preferably concentrate on making a comparison between a region undergoing a ‘natural 
experiment’, like the region examined in this study, and a ‘control group’ region.  
A second major methodological issue concerns the use of farm household data and 
microeconomic theory for analyzing cropping decisions in China. In Chapter 3 it was found 
that planting decisions of the newly introduced cash crop are strongly affected by village 
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leaders. Given the fact that contracts on high-value crops with processing companies and 
traders are frequently signed by village leaders and higher level governments in order to save 
on transaction costs, it may be expected that the independence of farm households in making 
cropping decisions is declining throughout China. Little empirical evidence is available, 
however, on this phenomenon, and empirical studies of cropping decisions continue to treat 
farm households as the unit of decision making. Further research in this field should focus on 
the interactions between farm households and their local leaders in the decision making on 
cash crops, and should preferably also take into account the need for tuning planting and 
irrigation decisions for farmers belonging to the same farmer group within WUAs.  
Finally, the scope of the research issues addressed in this study is limited. A related major 
policy issue that is not addressed in this study is the extent to which a policy that would raise 
the price of irrigation water to a level that more closely reflects its actual scarcity value (as 
estimated in Chapter 4) would increase the level of poverty among farm households and the 
degree of income inequality among farm households. A related issue would be the impact of 
markets for tradable water use rights on rural poverty and income inequality. Although these 
issues are beyond the scope of the current study, research on them is urgently needed in order 
to provide an adequate foundation for future irrigation water policies in China.   
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Summary 
 
Water is increasingly becoming a limiting factor for sustainable economic growth and 
development, particularly in developing countries. Besides technical innovations, water 
institution reforms may contribute to improving water allocation decisions. Appropriately 
designed water institutions can motivate water users to conserve and use water efficiently for 
irrigation and other uses. 
In northern China, growing demands on agricultural water due to relatively low water 
availability and increasing grain production are putting more and more pressure on improving 
water resource management. The Ministry of Water Resources of the P.R. China has initiated 
a number of pilot projects to gain experience with the development of water-saving irrigation 
systems. These pilot projects focus on the construction of engineering systems as well as 
institutional innovations in water resource management. Analysing the household-level 
effects of the implemented measures is hence of great importance for further policy 
development. 
The project ‘Building a Water-saving Society in Zhangye City’, initiated early 2002 in 
Zhangye City in northwest China, is the first pilot project of this kind in China. It provides a 
unique opportunity to examine the economic effects of changes in water policies and 
institutions. Minle County, the research area for this study, is located within Zhangye City. A 
large potato processing company was established in Minle County in 2008. After the factory 
started its activities, the local government intervened in the allocation of irrigation water 
within the region by assigning more water to a specific variety of potatoes (i.e. Atlantic 
potatoes) that the factory needs for processing. This further makes Minle County an 
interesting case for analysing the link between output market development and institutional 
change in irrigation water management. 
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The general objective of this study is to empirically investigate the household-level impacts of 
policies and institutional changes in irrigation water use. From this general objective, the 
following four specific objectives are defined and analysed in separate chapters. 1) To 
examine the impact of the institutional setup of Water Users Associations (WUAs) on 
productivity of irrigation water use by the WUA member households, based on a user-based 
resource governance framework. 2) To analyse the effects of a policy affecting the availability 
of water for different crops on farmers’ acreage allocation among crops. 3) To evaluate the 
internal valuation (i.e. marginal value) of irrigation water, before and after the introduction of 
the water policy as explained above. 4) To investigate the effects of output market 
development on irrigation water trading. 
The information used for the empirical analyses mainly comes from two surveys that were 
carried out in Minle County in May 2008 and May 2010. These surveys cover information for 
the years 2007 and 2009, that is before and after the potato processing factory became 
operational. A stratified sampling approach was used for selecting the households and WUAs 
to be interviewed in the surveys. Additional interviews were held by the author in August 
2010 with the Water Management Bureaus (WMBs) that are responsible for water allocation 
within the seven irrigation areas in Minle County.    
Chapter 2 investigates the underlying causes of differences in WUA performance by 
analysing the impact of WUA characteristics on the productivity of irrigation water use. Total 
crop production value and household income obtained from crop production, both expressed 
per m
3
 of water, are used as dependent variables in the empirical analysis. The explanatory 
variables in the analysis are derived from an established user-based resource governance 
framework, that specifies the conditions under which user groups are expected to sustainably 
govern common-pool resources. These conditions are grouped into resource characteristics, 
group characteristics, relationships between resources and user groups, and the external 
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environment (markets, technology). Applying a random intercept model, the estimation 
results show that group characteristics, particularly group size and number of water users 
groups, and the existing pressure on available water resources are important WUA 
characteristics explaining water productivity. 
Chapter 3 analyses the impact of the local government intervention in irrigation water 
allocation on farmers’ crop planting decisions. A system of unconditional crop acreage 
demand functions depending on prices of variable inputs, levels of quasi-fixed inputs and 
prices of outputs is estimated. Two hypotheses are tested: Firstly, the government intervention 
results in an increase in land allocated to Atlantic potatoes and a decrease in land allocated to 
other crops; Secondly, among the alternative crops (i.e. other crops than Atlantic potatoes), 
the water policy is expected to cause a relatively small response for grain crops, because 
grains are mainly used for domestic consumption. The empirical results do not support the 
first hypothesis. The increased water allocation to Atlantic potatoes does not significantly 
affect the land allocated to this crop, because its planting decisions are mainly taken by 
village leaders instead of households. Instead, the intervention results in a shift from planting 
potatoes towards grains with relatively low water requirements. The second hypothesis is 
partly supported by the empirical results. The estimated impact of the government 
intervention is found to be stronger for local potato varieties than for grains, but the impact on 
the area planted with cash crops does not differ significantly from zero. Output prices seem to 
play a more important role in cash crop planting decisions than the water allocation 
intervention.  
Chapter 4 examines the economic valuation (i.e. marginal value) of irrigation water, before 
and after the local government intervention in water allocation. To accomplish this, a system 
of translog production functions is estimated. Two hypotheses are tested: Firstly, the valuation 
of irrigation water is expected to be equal across different crops before the start of the new 
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water policy. And secondly, valuation of irrigation water is expected to be lower for Atlantic 
potatoes as compared to the alternative crops after the water policy change. The empirical 
results do not support the first hypothesis. The valuation of irrigation water used on grain 
crops is very low, and is even below the actual water prices charged to farm households. This 
is probably due to self-consumption of grain by households, and to government subsidies for 
grain farmers that are based on the planted area with grains. The second hypothesis is 
supported by the empirical results, except for grains. The valuation of irrigation water used on 
Atlantic potatoes is lower than the value of water used on other (non-grain) crops. Moreover, 
the returns for irrigation water used on other crops are higher in the year after the water 
allocation intervention than in the year before the intervention.  
Chapter 5 aims to provide insights into the impact of output market development on the 
trading of water use rights by farm households. The results of the two farm household surveys  
indicate that water markets have emerged at a small scale in response to the development of 
the potato market in Minle County. Observed water trade in the second survey, that was held 
after the establishment of the potato processing factory, consists mainly of the exchange of 
water without payment between relatives or neighbours, and seems to be meant to improve 
the timing of water applications to crops with different seasonal water requirements. Those 
who have started trading water rights tend to have more land with water use rights than other 
potato farmers. High transaction costs and information asymmetry between the government 
and water users, however, severely constrain the trading of water use rights in the region. 
Chapter 6 summarizes and integrates the main findings, discusses the policy implications and 
the limitations of the research, and presents some suggestions for further research.  
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Samenvatting 
 
Water is in toenemende mate een beperkende factor aan het worden voor duurzame 
economische groei en ontwikkeling, met name in ontwikkelingslanden. Naast technische 
vernieuwingen kunnen hervormingen van waterinstituties een bijdrage leveren aan het 
verbeteren van beslissingen inzake watertoewijzing. Waterinstituties die op een juiste wijze 
ontworpen zijn, kunnen watergebruikers motiveren om water te besparen en efficiënt te 
gebruiken voor irrigatie en andere doeleinden. 
In het Noorden van China leidt de stijgende vraag naar water voor gebruik in de landbouw 
door een relatief geringe waterbeschikbaarheid en toenemende graanproductie, tot een steeds 
grotere druk om het waterbeheer te verbeteren. Het Ministerie van Waterstaat van de 
Volksrepubliek China heeft een aantal proefprojecten geïnitieerd om ervaring te verwerven 
met het ontwikkelen van waterbesparende irrigatiesystemen. Deze proefprojecten zijn gericht 
op het construeren van technische systemen alsook op institutionele vernieuwingen in 
waterbeheer. Het analyseren van de effecten van de genomen maatregelen op het niveau van 
huishoudens is derhalve van groot belang voor verdere beleidsontwikkeling.  
Het project ‘Opzetten van een Waterbesparende Samenleving in Zhangye City’, dat begin 
2002 geïnitieerd werd in de prefectuur Zhangye City in het noordwesten van China, is het 
eerste proefproject van dit type in China. Het biedt een unieke gelegenheid om onderzoek te 
doen naar de economische effecten van veranderingen in waterbeleid en -instituties. Het 
district Minle County, het onderzoeksgebied van deze studie, ligt binnen Zhangye City. In 
2008 vestigde zich in het district Minle County een groot aardappelverwerkend bedrijf. Nadat 
de fabriek gestart was met zijn activiteiten, intervenieerde de lokale overheid in de toewijzing 
van irrigatiewater binnen het gebied en stelde meer water beschikbaar voor een specifieke 
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aardappelras (‘Atlantic’), dat de fabriek nodig heeft voor verwerking. Om die reden is het 
district Minle County tevens een interessante casus voor de analyse van het verband tussen 
productmarktontwikkeling en institutionele verandering in het beheer van irrigatiewater. 
Het algemene doel van deze studie is het verrichten van empirisch onderzoek naar de effecten 
op huishoudniveau van beleid en institutionele veranderingen betreffende het gebruik van 
irrigatiewater. Op basis van dit algemene doel worden de volgende vier specifieke doeleinden 
gedefinieerd en behandeld in afzonderlijke hoofdstukken: 1) Analyse van de invloed van de 
institutionele opbouw van watergebruikersverenigingen (Water Users Associations, ofwel 
WUA’s) op de productiviteit van irrigatiewater gebruikt door huishoudens die deel uitmaken 
van een WUA, op basis van een gebruikers-georiënteerd theoretisch raamwerk van het beheer 
van hulpbronnen. 2) Analyse van de effecten van een beleid dat de waterbeschikbaarheid voor 
verschillende gewassen beïnvloedt, op het landareaal dat boeren aan de verschillende 
gewassen toewijzen. 3) Evaluatie van de interne waardering (marginale waarde) van 
irrigatiewater, vóór en na invoering van het hierboven beschreven waterbeleid. 4) Analyse 
van de effecten van productmarktontwikkeling op handel in irrigatiewater. 
De informatie die werd gebruikt voor de empirische analyses is hoofdzakelijk afkomstig uit 
twee enquêtes die werden uitgevoerd in het district Minle County, in mei 2008 en mei 2010. 
Deze enquêtes bevatten informatie over de jaren 2007 en 2009, dat wil zeggen vóór en na het 
operationeel worden van de aardappelverwerkende fabriek. Bij de selectie van huishoudens en 
WUA’s die tijdens de enquêtes zouden worden geïnterviewd, werd gebruik gemaakt van een 
gelaagde steekproef. In augustus 2010 werden door de auteur aanvullende interviews 
afgenomen bij de Watermanagementbureaus (WMB’s) die verantwoordelijk zijn voor 
watertoewijzing binnen de zeven irrigatiegebieden in het district Minle County. 
In Hoofdstuk 2 worden de onderliggende oorzaken voor prestatieverschillen van de WUA’s 
onderzocht door middel van een analyse van de impact van WUA-kenmerken op de 
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productiviteit van irrigatiewater. De totale waarde van de geproduceerde gewassen en het 
huishoudinkomen verkregen uit die gewassen, beide uitgedrukt per kubieke meter water, 
worden gebruikt als afhankelijke variabelen in de empirische analyse. 
De verklarende variabelen in de analyse zijn afgeleid van een gevestigd gebruikers-
georiënteerd theoretisch raamwerk van het beheer van hulpbronnen dat de voorwaarden 
specificeert waaronder gebruikersgroepen verondersteld worden gemeenschappelijke 
hulpbronnen duurzaam te beheren. Deze voorwaarden worden in een viertal groepen verdeeld, 
t.w. kenmerken van de hulpbron, groepskenmerken, verbanden tussen hulpbronnen en 
gebruikersgroepen, en externe omgeving (markten, technologie).  De resultaten van een zg. 
random intercept-model geven aan dat groepskenmerken, met name groepsgrootte en aantal 
watergebruikersgroepen, en de bestaande druk op beschikbare waterbronnen, belangrijke 
factoren zijn in de verklaring van waterproductiviteit. 
In Hoofdstuk 3 wordt de impact van een interventie van de lokale overheid in de toewijzing 
van irrigatiewater op beslissingen van boeren betreffende de aanplant van gewassen 
geanalyseerd. Er wordt een empirische schatting gemaakt van een systeem van 
onvoorwaardelijke gewasareaal-vraagfuncties, met prijzen van variabele inputs, niveaus van 
quasi-vaste inputs en productprijzen als verklarende variabelen. Twee hypotheses worden 
getoetst: ten eerste, de overheidsinterventie resulteert in een toename van het areaal waarop 
Atlantic aardappels worden geteeld en resulteert in een afname van het areaal met andere 
gewassen; ten tweede, wat betreft de andere gewassen wordt verwacht dat de interventie een 
relatief kleine respons oplevert voor granen, aangezien granen hoofdzakelijk gebruikt worden 
voor eigen consumptie door huishoudens.  
De eerste hypothese wordt niet ondersteund door de empirische resultaten. De toegenomen 
watertoewijzing aan Atlantic aardappels heeft geen significante invloed op het landareaal 
waarop dit gewas wordt geteeld, aangezien de plantbeslissingen betreffende Atlantic 
 136 
aardappels  hoofdzakelijk genomen worden door de dorpsleiders in plaats van huishoudens. In 
plaats daarvan resulteert de interventie in een verschuiving in het areaal beplant met 
aardappels naar granen met relatief geringe waterbehoeften. De tweede hypothese wordt 
gedeeltelijk ondersteund door de empirische resultaten. De geschatte impact van de 
overheidsinterventie blijkt sterker te zijn voor lokale aardappelrassen dan voor granen, maar 
de impact op het areaal dat beplant wordt met marktgewassen verschilt niet significant van 
nul. Marktprijzen lijken een belangrijker rol te spelen bij de plantbeslissingen voor 
marktgewassen dan de interventie in de watertoewijzing.  
In Hoofdstuk 4 wordt de economische waardering (marginale waarde) onderzocht van 
irrigatiewater, voor en na interventie door de lokale overheid in de watertoewijzing. Om dit te 
realiseren wordt een empirische schatting gemaakt van een systeem van translog-
productiefuncties. Er worden twee hypothesen getoetst: ten eerste, met betrekking tot de 
waardering van irrigatiewater wordt verwacht dat deze gelijk voor de verschillende gewassen 
voor de interventie in de watertoewijzing. En ten tweede wordt verwacht dat na de 
waterbeleidswijziging de waardering van irrigatiewater lager zal zijn voor Atlantic 
aardappelen dan voor alternatieve gewassen. De eerste hypothese wordt niet ondersteund door 
de empirische resultaten. De waardering van irrigatiewater dat wordt gebruikt in 
graangewassen is erg laag en ligt zelfs lager dan de feitelijke waterprijzen die aan 
boerenhuishoudens in rekening worden gebracht. Dit is waarschijnlijk te verklaren uit het 
eigen gebruik van graan door huishoudens en uit overheidssubsidies aan graanboeren die 
worden gebaseerd op het areaal dat met graan beplant is. De tweede hypothese wordt 
ondersteund door de empirische resultaten, behalve voor granen. De waardering van 
irrigatiewater voor Atlantic aardappelen ligt lager dan de waarde van water voor andere 
gewassen, behalve graan. Bovendien liggen de opbrengsten van irrigatiewater dat gebruikt 
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wordt voor andere gewassen, hoger in het jaar na de interventie in de watertoewijzing dan in 
het jaar voorafgaand aan de interventie. 
Hoofdstuk 5 is gericht op het verkrijgen van inzicht in de impact van marktontwikkeling voor 
landbouwproducten op de handel in watergebruiksrechten door boerenhuishoudens. De 
resultaten van de twee enquêtes onder boerenhuishoudens geven aan dat er op kleine schaal 
waterrechten verhandeld worden als respons op de ontwikkeling van de aardappelmarkt in het 
district Minle County. De waargenomen handel in water tijdens de tweede enquête, die 
gehouden werd na komst van de aardappelverwerkende fabriek, bestaat voornamelijk uit het 
uitwisseling van water zonder betaling tussen verwanten of buren, en lijkt bedoeld te zijn om 
de timing van het watergebruik in gewassen met verschillende seizoensafhankelijke 
waterbehoeftes te verbeteren. Degenen die waterrechten zijn gaan verhandelen zijn 
gewoonlijk in bezit van meer grond met watergebruiksrechten dan andere aardappelboeren. 
Hoge transactiekosten en informatieasymmetrie tussen overheid en watergebruikers beperken 
echter in hoge mate het verhandelen van waterrechten in het gebied. 
In Hoofdstuk 6 worden de belangrijkste bevindingen samengevat en geïntegreerd, worden de 
beleidsimplicaties en de beperkingen van het onderzoek besproken, en worden enige 
suggesties gedaan voor nader onderzoek. 
 138 
 
Acknowledgements 
 
Having lived in China for more than 20 years, I made one of the biggest decisions in my life. 
In the summer of 2008, I took leave of my family and all the friends in China and came to the 
Netherlands, with limited knowledge about this country and the western world. I was rather 
curious about the new environment, but also somewhat nervous due to the barriers ahead - 
particularly the linguistic and cultural differences. 
Looking back now I feel pleased to have made that decision, as I consider it to be a milestone 
in my life. I am very much grateful for the assistance from all the people and organizations 
who have contributed to the completion of my thesis. 
First of all I would like to thank my promoters, Prof. Erwin Bulte for your guidance and 
comments throughout the research; Prof. Xiaoping Shi for your contribution to the 
questionnaire design, the setting up of the fieldwork and the thesis completion. My biggest 
thanks goes to my supervisor, Dr. Nico Heerink. Without you, I would not have been here in 
the first place, and your continued support and guidance helped me out in difficult times and 
led me in the right way. Also, I would like to mention your family – Wenhui and Linda for the 
moments that we spent together during the past years, they mean a lot to me. 
I would also like to say thank you to Prof. Thomas Herzfeld for all your assistance and 
support during the period of formalizing my research proposal and writing two joint papers. I 
highly appreciate all your patient and quick explanation whenever I had questions, and your 
continuous guidance even after you moved to Halle. I am also grateful to Dr. Xueqin Zhu and 
Dr. Liesbeth Dries for working together on the articles, your insightful and constructive 
comments and suggestions. 
 139 
Many thanks to my colleagues of the Development Economics Group for the great working 
environment and your good advice: Marrit, Pan Lei, Kees, Rein, Rob, Ezra, Gaudiose, Judith, 
Wu Yan, Lihe, Niccolo, Francesco, Godwin, George, Aisha, Fedes, Gonne, Lonneke, Koen. 
Dineke, Marian, Karen and Betty, thank you for all the support and smiles when I kept 
bothering you with different questions and requests.  
Fellow students, colleagues of the SURE project, especially Bettina, Corry, Chaohui, Jia, 
Shuqin, Wenling and Xianlei - I will always remember the workshops and gatherings that we 
had in Wageningen, Lanzhou and Nanjing. I will treasure our talks, discussions and friendship. 
Being born in a fertile region in Southeast China, I met lots of expected and unexpected 
difficulties when carrying out fieldwork in a water-scare region in Northwest China. Hence I 
would like to express my gratitude to all of the organizations and officials in my research area 
for the efforts that you made in setting up the field work: Gansu Academy of Social Sciences, 
Water Management Bureau (WMB) of Minle County, and WMBs of all the irrigation areas. 
Thanks for your help, I managed to overcome these difficulties and finally completed my 
research. I will always remember your hospitality and our talks over very nice local dishes 
and drinks. 
My special thanks to Diana van Dijk and Gaudiose Mujawamariya for being my friends and 
sisters forever. I was so lucky to have known you since I first came to Wageningen. Many 
thanks to my friends Anipa, Anne, Crystal, Dapeng, Dan, Junwei, Katerina, Nina, Olga, 
Shumin, Siyu, Tingting, and Jane. I truly enjoyed being with all of you “sun and rain”. 
I would like to take the opportunity to thank the family of Mirjam and Arie Oskam. I have 
been fortunate to have you around in the past years. I appreciate all the lovely moments and 
meals that we had every once in a while at Bosweg, during special days like Christmas and 
Sinterklaas. You have been teaching me a lot about the Netherlands – the culture and people 
 140 
of this wonderful country, and making me like it more and more. It is rather difficult to 
express all my feelings, but I have already been considering you as my family for these years. 
Finally, I dedicate this thesis to my parents. Thank you for the infinite love for your only, 
stubborn child and allowing me to do whatever I liked. Thanks for teaching me values that 
make me the person that I am and constant support throughout my life. We are millions of 
miles away from each other, but I feel like we are always together, as we share all the 
happiness, success, and difficulties. Without your advice and comfort especially during hard 
times, I would not have been able to complete this work. Despite mentioning you last, I want 
you to know that this thesis is for you. I love you. 
 141 
 
Funding 
 
Financial support for this research is provided by the Programme Strategic Scientific Alliances (PSA) 
of the Royal Netherlands Academy of Arts and Sciences (KNAW) and the Ministry of Science and 
Technologies of P.R. China, by the National Natural Science Foundation of China and by the Program 
for New Century Excellent Talents in University of the Ministry of Education in China.
 142 
 
Training and Supervision Plan (TSP) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Name of the course Department/ 
Institute 
Year ECTS 
(=28 hrs) 
Project related competences    
Econometrics (AEP 21306) WUR 2009 6 
SURE course on institutional theories WUR, ENP 2008 4.3 
The economic institutions of agriculture of food 
& rural areas: institutional dynamics, 
organizations and governance 
WUR, AEP 2009 4 
Writing research proposal WASS 2008-2009 6 
General research related competences    
Mansholt introduction course MG3S 2008 1.5 
Scientific Writing WGS 2009 1.5 
Techniques for literature search and 
argumentation building for SURE PhD students 
WUR, ENP 2009 1.8 
Career related competences    
“Irrigation water management in northern 
China” 
Shanghai, China 2010 1 
“Water allocation mechanisms: An overview” Shenyang, China 2009 1 
“Impact of water allocation interventions on 
farmers’ cropping decisions” 
Kaifeng, China 2012 1 
“Water users associations and agricultural water 
use efficiency” 
Foz do Iguacu, Brasil 2012 1 
“Impact of water allocation interventions on 
farmers’ cropping decisions” 
Beijing, China 2012 1 
“Water users associations and agricultural water 
use efficiency” 
Nanjing, China 2012 1 
Annual workshops SURE Wageningen. Nanjing, 
Lanzhou 
2009-2012 4 
    
TOTAL   35.1 
 143 
 
Curriculum vitae 
 
Lei Zhang was born on 23 February, 1984, in Jiangsu in P.R. China. Lei accomplished her 
BSc and MSc studies in the College of Economics and Management at Nanjing Agricultural 
University, P.R. China (2002 - 2008). During this period Lei focused her research on food 
safety management, and at the meantime she worked as a College Counsellor for 
undergraduate students in the university. 
Lei started her PhD study in Development Economics at Wageningen University in 
September 2008. Her PhD research concerns the effects of institutional design and its ongoing 
transformation on sustainable agricultural water use in China. During the past four years she 
worked as a Teaching Assistant for a course 'Methodology for Field Research in the Social 
Sciences', and as a Scientific Researcher for a project 'Food security and the productivity, 
health and nutrition nexus', both at Wageningen University. 
Lei actively participated in international conferences and presented her papers. These 
conferences, among others, include the 28
th
 ICAE (International Conference of Agricultural 
Economists) conference held in Foz do Iguacu in Brazil and the 2012 CES (Chinese 
Economists Society) conference held in Kaifeng in P.R. China. 
Since 1 March 2013, Lei has been working in Social Sciences and Economics Department at 
Elsevier (in Amsterdam) as a Managing Editor. 
